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Ever-increasingly, countries, states and regions are voicing a desire to be 
autonomous through a process of balkanization. This book explores the 
historical emergence, interdisciplinary application and current socio-spatial 
reasons why more places are seeking self-governance around the world. The 
spatialization of balkanization is particularly addressed in terms of destruction 
and renewal through a detailed socio-political interrogation of architecture 
and the urban, including their changing symbolic and functional forms. 
The book offers a reworking of the concept of balkanization through a 
reflective and critical analysis. The particular attention on the city of Belgrade, 
including the 1990s dissolution of Yugoslavia through specific case study 
focus of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, provides insightful 
connections between balkanization, violent remaking and global politics. 
Against the detailed historical overview and prevailingly negative 
understanding of balkanization, a more positive instatement of balkanization 
for purposes of inclusivity is also presented. 
The book will be relevant to academics and students interested in spatial 
politics. The broad analysis will appeal across disciplines such as Geography, 
Politics, Architecture and Urban Studies. 
Nikolina Bobic is a Lecturer in Architecture at the School of Art, Design and 
Architecture, Plymouth University, UK. 
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Preface 
The historically received understanding of balkanization acquired its negative 
connotations from the experience of fragmentation and division as imposed 
through violence in response to socio-political instability and conflicts in the 
Balkans. This book explores these processes of violent remaking (destruction 
and renewal) through a detailed interrogation of architecture and urbanism in 
terms of their changing symbolic, ideological and functional forms. Broadly, 
this is done through a reflective and critical engagement with the history of 
the Balkans understood through the discourse of Balkanism and balkanization. 
Yet there is another, currently neglected, tradition of balkanization from the 
very same territory that gave rise to the term as a geopolitical synonym for 
political fragmentation, division and hostility. This lesser known tradition 
provides an inclusive and hopeful vision, which this book investigates in detail 
as it has manifested in the recent history of Belgrade as well as in the more 
distant past of the former Yugoslav context. 
The focused analysis helps in understanding broader emergent patterns of 
socio-spatial polarization across various scales, and in respect to global 
geoeconomic and geopolitical restructuring. This is particularly important 
because balkanization is becoming a significant urban and geopolitical pursuit 
in contemporary times. Countries, cities and regions are ever-increasingly 
voicing the desire for independence and balkanization from the nation or 
union they are a part of. Drawing connections between balkanization, 
economics, law, media and technology is to gain awareness of and to engage 
with the emerging implications of spatial remaking and global politics. 
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Setting the framework 
Balkan(ization) and global politics 
Framing Balkanism and balkanization 
Balkanism 
In a world where countries, states, cities and regions are increasingly voicing 
the desire for independence from the nation or union they are a part of, it seems 
that balkanization – that is, geopolitical fragmentation – is manifesting on an 
ever-wider scale. At the time of writing, the push towards balkanization was 
most recently seen in the vote by the UK to part ways with the European Union 
(EU). On a country and regional scale, some other examples include 
Scotland’s close-run attempt to secede from the UK, and in Spain the impetus 
to separate in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In the current political and 
economic climate, balkanization seems to a global concern. However, to 
understand balkanization, there is a need to first frame the discourse of 
Balkanism. 
The Balkans is perceived through the lens of violent imaginary of racial and 
ethnic hatreds; Balkanism being a mode of identification prompted by the 
expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans in the 19th Century and 
the geopolitical balkanization through fragmentation and reorganization of the 
region that flowed from that. More broadly, Balkanism is also a signifier of 
violence associated with the Balkan War in 1912–13 and the beginning of 
WWI. Coined by Maria Todorova in 1997, the term Balkanism emerged due 
to this geographical zone not fitting within the European Occidental ideal, yet 
not being Oriental enough to be called Oriental.1 In other words, Balkanism 
poses an identification problem; its peripheral location and its social, cultural 
and spatial behavior are neither Occidental nor Oriental enough, resulting in 
it being seen as some form of agitator, not fitting a binary ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
construct. 
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The study of Balkanism not only emerged in the Balkans but also is – 
according to Dušan Bjelić – an “intellectual export industry of the Balkans.”2 
Balkanism encompasses that which has been associated historically with the 
region as well as critical responses to that imaginary.3 Unlike Edward Said’s 
Orientalism, which addressed the need to refrain from certain perceptions and 
identities about the Orient,4 the literature on Balkanism, in contrast, affirms 
constitutive differences and paradoxes for the sake of the Balkans’ 
representational concreteness in terms of the relationship between the Balkans 
and the West.5 Also, the presence of colonization is less obvious and direct, 
unlike that in the Orient. 
Balkanism unsettles what is perceived as solid. The Balkans have been 
described as a zone of transition and passing through,6 and “a bridge between 
stages of growth,” thus invoking labels such as “semideveloped, semicolonial, 
semicivilized, semioriental.”7 For such a liminal and complex series of 
identifications, Balkanism outside the borders of the eponymous region tends 
nevertheless to be seen within the fixed and simplistic framework of a zone of 
irreversible violence and dissent spurred by fragmentation. That reductionism 
is the common currency when describing peripheral and Other zones is, 
unfortunately, an unremarkable feature of the contemporary climate. 
The need to legitimize homogeneity through adoption of Western values 
was seen in the renaming of the Balkans as the Western Balkans in 1998.8 The 
renaming was contingent on balkanizing this geopolitical region, from the 
perspective that only those states still associated with the Balkanist rhetoric 
need to be grouped together and called the Western Balkans. The identification 
is, thus, not used for geographical purposes or geopolitical ones but rather as 
a new way of labeling all those areas that resist a firm identity. Though, to 
deploy Stephen Graham’s thinking, geopolitics is a flat discourse, as it largely 
focuses on the plane across, and predominantly disregards the vertical plane 
that cuts through.9 Such a focus on horizontality alone facilitates dismissal of 
the politics in the change of name, politics geared towards an insistence that 
this rogue zone attain Western stability and progress. 
To think Balkanism in terms of the politics of the Western Balkans is, for 
Rastko Močnik, encompassing of both horizontal and vertical dimensions. 
Horizontality is inclusive of antagonisms found between various ethnicities 
and states within the Balkans, while the vertical plane is associated with 
various Western contractual impositions to do with required collaboration 
between all the Yugoslav belligerents and the EU.10 However, to address the 
region only in terms of horizontal and vertical dimensions is reductive, 
particularly when these dimensions come into contact with questions of 
violence. To plot the politics against cartesian coordinates is to disregard the 
national and global forces acting upon the region as well as the way in which 
changes are contingent on the time at which they occur. 
Balkanization 
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The imposition of balkanization for purposes of attaining stability emerged 
when the Balkans and its borders were reorganized during the 1878 Congress 
of Berlin. Very broadly, both of the terms – Balkanism and balkanization – 
are largely synonymous with dissolution, division and lack of dialogue and 
cohesiveness. However, to affix this definition to only the Balkans is to divide 
by distinguishing areas and peoples who violate from those who defend. The 
association of the Balkans with violence seems to have a distinctly reductive 
historical framing in that such connotation ‘logically’ leads to balkanization 
linked to Balkanism, and thus associated with a violent parcelization of a 
territory into smaller zones claiming ethnic homogeneity. 
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Figure 1.1 Balkanization of the Balkans from the 18th Century to now. 
A reluctance to relinquish the villainous image of the Balkans thus 
indirectly determines the knowledge we have, indeed the very construct, of 
this geographical region. Despite the commonalities – balkanization being 
associated with fragmentation and at times Balkanist prejudices – they cannot 
be reduced to one another since balkanization does not always co-exist and 
overlap with Balkanism. The key difference is that Balkanism is linked to a 
transitory and liminal space, while balkanization is used as means to remake 
space and organize knowledge for purposes of power and control and in the 
name of eradicating the Other. 
The construct is also encompassing of a set of values and norms; an 
ordering one needs to comply with if one is to attain the civilized ‘normality’ 
and stability found in the Anglo-American and Western world. According to 
James Der Derian, such division disregards the ongoing history of 
balkanization from the Roman Empire until the present.11 What is more, he 
notes, when balkanization is implemented by the West for purposes of 
attaining stability, it is nothing other than a means to create opportunities for 
exploitation.12 Herein lies the commonality between Balkanism and 
Orientalism: whenever zones and cultures are concretely represented for 
purposes of Western knowledge, and undeniably exploitation, the motives are 
geared towards imposing Western control.13 However, while fragmentation of 
settlements, cities and territories has a long historical trajectory, often pursued 
for accretion of settlements, balkanization as a process is associated with the 
Balkans. It is because this region is identified as an in-between zone, a region 
of paradoxes and friction. The implementation of balkanization is more 
fervent as it is contingent on the existence of this peripheral zone of excess as 
buffer between the Eastern Orient and the Western Occident. 
In the contemporary world, the term balkanization14 is specific not only to 
the Balkans and its circumstances. It has also been used to describe, for 
example, the impact on the US of immigration on its urban planning, legal 
system, medical practice and the internet.15 These more recent connotations of 
balkanization tend to erase the derogatory associations with balkanization as 
undertaken in the Balkans, the breaking up of a large and violent geopolitical 
zone into smaller states for purposes of bringing peace and order. However, 
the contemporary non-geopolitical usages still retain the power-oriented 
associations of an underlying lack of dialogue. To understand the complexity 
of balkanization, and its relation to Balkanism, there is a need to frame it in 
terms of the former Yugoslav context. 
Yugoslavia, balkanism and balkanization 
The ‘truth’ about the discourse of Balkanism is to be analyzed from the 
periphery. The part of the periphery that I turn to is one that has posed the 
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most alternative way of deploying balkanization – the former Yugoslav 
context. Against the actual fragmentation of the old Ottoman Empire into the 
other Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey), the 
formation of Yugoslavia (land of the southern Slavs) in 1918 approached 
balkanization in reverse, by grouping together territories where different 
South Slav peoples lived – meaning that the entity created was heterogeneous. 
In other words, while some areas of the Balkans were fragmented for purposes 
of creating an ethnically pure nation-state model (a homogeneous structure 
superimposed onto previously heterogeneous nations), Yugoslavia not only 
retained but also extended its process of heterogeneity. This is the significance 
of the former Yugoslav context, and the reason behind this book’s focus on the 
region. 
With the 1999 Operation Allied Force being the 20th Century’s last military 
intervention, the significance of studying this intervention in terms of its 
spatial and Balkanist implications is paramount. This is because both the 
intervention and its timing resonate with the complexity of deliberate 
balkanization and often disguised violence inflicted. The deployment was not 
only on the various aspects of a city, but also implemented by ‘obvious’ 
mechanisms such as the military’s use of technology, or less obvious ones 
such as the economy, law, mass media and colonization. The significance of 
examining the intersection of Balkanism, balkanization and the intervention 
is also because this military operation has not been given enough attention, 
especially from a spatial and architectural perspective, despite the academic 
interest in and investigation of the discourse of Balkanism that coincided with 
the 1990s disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY).16 Balkanization was revived with the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
It must be noted that while this volume predominantly frames Balkanism in 
terms of the zone and peoples of former Yugoslavia, the Balkanism discourse 
is broader and encompasses all the areas of the Balkans. The analysis of 
Balkanism here is undertaken via Yugoslavia not only because the zone has 
implemented balkanization in ways different from the norm, but also because 
the 1990s secessions from Yugoslavia was often framed as the Balkan war; 
the ‘powder keg’ of Balkan violence and balkanization was epitomized in 
Yugoslavia. In other words, the reverse balkanization that was implemented 
in Yugoslavia for purposes of achieving heterogeneity was largely crushed by 
the events that occurred within that territory.17 The familiar characterization 
of the Balkans as a savage and bloodthirsty place was not only resurrected 
during those events but also used to affix and determine this space. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia started with the relatively peaceful 
secession of Slovenia in 1991 and continued through more violent conflicts in 
Croatia (1991–95), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–95), Kosovo (1998–99) and 
Serbia (1999).18 The focus here will be on these latter conflicts, as the ones 
most resonant with violence during the period of the 1990s. The entity’s 
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heterogeneity was crushed in a parcelizing balkanization driven, as reported 
around the world, by elements of ethnicity and nationalism. With a historical 
imaginary as a permanent source of ethnic hatreds and nationalism, 
Yugoslavia was bound to erupt in violence; after all, its historical ‘truth’ is 
written in blood. Not only was the dissolution ‘surely’ a yearning for 
democracy and freedom, but also it proved that Tito’s espousal of non-
alignment and the economic merging of socialism and capitalism had reached 
its expiry date with the ‘democratic’ revolutions of 1989 in Russia and Eastern 
Europe.19 
The apparent self-evidence of this imaginary was demonstrated with 
numerous books, testimonies, memoirs and diaries about Yugoslavia and the 
1990s violence; expert punditry emerged overnight and was largely accepted 
without question. Western positions were shaped simplistically rather than 
through an effort to understand Yugoslav affairs in their complexity.20 The 
mass media largely abandoned its critical brief when reporting on the 
dissolution. Balkanization of Yugoslavia seemed to be a given; it was, after 
all, a zone of historical instability considering its geographic position between 
the East and the West, a region of disputes and backwardness where 
democracy was foreign in both concept and practice. However, the 1990s 
dissolution was a very different invoking of balkanization to Yugoslavia’s 
inceptionary processes of co-existence and diversity at the start of the 20th 
Century.21 Indeed, it was its reversal. 
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Figure 1.2 Balkanization of Yugoslavia in the 20th–21st Century. 
Critically analyzing the Yugoslav context will assist in framing the many 
ways balkanization as an act and a method can be deployed: from its 
opportunistic application to the analysis of balkanization in terms of more 
recent enactments since the 1990s. Particular attention will be paid to the ways 
in which this analysis may aid in understanding the more coercive 
implementation of balkanization that is globally taking place today. This is 
principally important because the spatialization of violence has become 
entangled with economic, mass media, technological and legal apparatuses; 
indeed, these entanglements make it harder to demonstrate evidence of 
violence. When balkanization is brought into being in the Balkans, it is largely 
done to override the values and practices found in this zone, since the Balkans 
is broadly perceived as an area where – using Todorova’s thinking – “normal” 
(Anglo-American and Western) values simply do not subsist. The lack of 
supposed normality is used as a reference for drawing a symbolic line of 
division between us (civilized and ordered Anglo-America and the West) and 
them (barbaric Balkans prone to slaughter). The binary symbolism turned into 
an historical artifact is an opportunity to cleanse Western history of its own 
imperialism and barbaric colonizations. 
As it was used in the 19th Century, the term was associated with violence 
inflicted upon neighboring territories and peoples. At the same time, it was 
also the means for securing peace. Thus, the understanding of balkanization 
had not only cyclical connotations but also inherent scope for inversion. For 
Der Derian, the oddity of utilizing balkanization was evident in the 1878 
Congress of Berlin, which on one hand was an attempt to bring peace to the 
Balkans through creating artificial boundaries that could, it was assumed, 
secure unity and freedom, while on the other hand the attainment of this peace 
was contingent on controls imposed by the Great Powers.22 Even though the 
assumption in 1878 was that the borders were mapped onto ethnically 
homogeneous territories, the method could certainly have no grounding within 
the heterogeneity of the former Yugoslav context. As a comment on such self-
contradiction, Walter Benjamin’s words could not ring more true: “there is no 
document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism.”23 Studying Balkanism and balkanization via the former Yugoslav 
context is thus oriented towards mapping barbaric, that is, civilized 
spatializations of violence. As such, it proffers insights into the changing 
global modes of balkanization in terms of control, and the ways in which they 
are temporally and spatially remade and reconstructed for purposes of 
manipulation and exploitation. 
One aspect of manipulation was seen in NATO’s 1999 operation, which was 
framed as a strategic intervention where, if any damage were done to the 
immediate surrounds in Kosovo, the consequences would be insignificant 
since the context in question had no distinctive value. On the very day of 
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NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ targeting, US President Bill Clinton said in an 
address: 
Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe, 
Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the 
Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity [. . .]. To the south are our 
allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in 
Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small countries.24 
Such a derogatory and devaluing position was reflected in the words of the 
New York Times’ global analyst Thomas Friedman. He is reported to have said 
that “[f]rom the start the Kosovo problem has been about how we should react 
when bad things happen in unimportant places.”25 These unimportant zones 
are not only areas that cannot be located on a map or where security is a 
potential concern considering the historical clash of Western and Eastern 
civilizations and religions. They are also, and more importantly, zones that 
evade straightforward distinctions, the difficulty of representation being due 
to their liminal and under construction identity. 
The tying of rhetoric to the need to eliminate complex liminality – and 
ultimately difference, considering the historical presence of heterogeneous 
cultures, values and ethnicities – is a significant form of violence, since it is 
allied to the belief in and need to subscribe to a set norm and identification, 
which is always measured in terms of Western European and Anglo-American 
ideals. According to Noam Chomsky, Kosovo was the prime example used in 
an argument that, for the first time in history, “states were observing 
‘principles and values’ under the guidance of their ‘noble’ and ‘altruistic’ 
Anglo-American tutors, and that the UN Charter must be revised to allow the 
West to carry out ‘humanitarian intervention’.”26 The relationship between the 
intervention and balkanization is that it was used for purposes of first 
fragmenting the territory and then destroying architecture and infrastructure 
as well as affecting the urban and architectural spaces of everyday life. The 
attack was aimed towards subordinating and then immobilizing various lines 
of communication such as transport routes, media networks and the alternative 
economy. 
Balkanism and balkanization are complex. Thus, this volume will broadly 
draw together a range of currently quite disparate discussions on balkanization 
from a variety of fields (urban planning, sociology and anthropology, internet, 
law and medicine), to the more specific focus to do with the former Yugoslav 
context, in order to address the growing significance of the term balkanization 
and its implications. The lessons learned from an in-depth analysis of the 
Yugoslav context can be used to examine other global contexts and cities. This 
is particularly important because little critically detailed and synthesized 
research has been done in respect to the phenomenon, and virtually none from 
the architectural and urban perspective. 
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Spatial role of politics and balkanization 
Architecture and balkanization 
The necessity to analyze balkanization from an architectural and urban 
perspective is because it reveals political and, often veiled, aspects. Urbanism 
and architecture do not exist in isolation from social history and politics of 
balkanization, and as such tend to become a target, as they signify the Other. 
To target and remake cities and architecture today is not only to fragment, 
hollow out and reconstruct, but also to understand the consequences of how 
economics, law, mass media, technology and the military (the global politics 
of control) intersect with architecture. Control of the Other is possible to the 
extent that the forces of control intersect with architecture. Balkanization is 
used not only to fragment and unmake the Other but also to remake it, since 
the process of unmaking affords the opportunity to remake and instate the 
preferred (Western European and Anglo-American) ways of living which, in 
turn, assist in managing the Other. 
Architecture and the urban are political, and this volume will address how 
the noted forces of control play out pragmatically as well as in terms of 
identity, ideology and symbolism. Urbanism and architecture do not exist in 
isolation from social history and politics. Examples of architecture and the 
urban from the former Yugoslav context and, in particular, Belgrade and the 
1999 NATO intervention on Serbia, will be examined and used as a lens 
through which to expose and question the hegemonic implementation of 
balkanization. This is for two key reasons. The first, related to the broader 
Yugoslav context, is that it shows how a country that was a key leader in the 
Non-Aligned Movement and that instated an alternative thinking about 
architecture, socio-economics and politics, has been balkanized for purposes 
of instating Western power and control. The second reason, specifically 
related to Belgrade and Serbia, is that the 1999 military intervention offers the 
first insight into the changing modes of balkanization into the 21st Century. 
The insights that arise may help in thinking how balkanization is present in 
cities outside the regions mentioned, despite these not being addressed here. 
To address the relationship of balkanization to broader global urbanization 
would require writing a second volume; however, some of the ways in which 
balkanization and politics of architecture may be considered are identified 
ahead. 
From a pragmatic perspective, architecture is the very agent and medium of 
violence, and associated with understanding the processes by which 
balkanization has been implemented. Speed is essential as a way to control, 
survey and map as well as introducing consumerism and mass privatization as 
a preferred economic context. In this process, the law is deployed to enforce 
ad-hoc campaigns and transform values that in the long-term suit the agenda 
of market economics. The effects of unmaking and remaking facilitate control. 
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Control is not always completely apparent, and is brought into being through 
national, EU and international policies to suit a particular hegemonic agenda 
to do with security. 
The ideological and symbolic aspects of architecture are related, and are to 
do with aesthetic and verbal rhetoric, including the ways in which it is 
presented and mobilized through architecture for political and economic gain. 
Rhetoric is performative and exercised for purposes of historical myth making 
and attaining supposed security. Balkanization becomes the preferred means 
of achieving these aims. This agenda is politicized spatially by utilizing the 
law, language and media/images, and connected to a dialectic of evil; all of 
which help flatten the complexity of place and history, whilst also exposing 
the danger that arises when spectacle infiltrates politics. 
Political matters to do with identity of architecture and the urban include 
the attempt to eliminate alternative positions seen in everyday life, values and 
rights, as found in the discourse of Balkanism. Ultimately, balkanization is 
enacted with the aim to negate difference, an attempt to achieve ethnic purity 
either by proclaiming a sovereign right to land or through the construct of that 
territory as lacking civil values, thus establishing the need to flatten it. 
Negating difference is geared towards immizeration and dehumanization, and 
architecture is used as a significant way of spatializing the agenda. Often, the 
urban and the architectural are destroyed to the point that inhabitation 
becomes impossible. 
Some attempts to address the process of balkanization as a positive strategy 
and spatiopolitical facilitator of “bottom-up” initiatives against the “top-
down” power structures are seen in the thinking of Srdjan Jovanović Weiss.27 
For Weiss, fragmentation ultimately leads to diversification, as seen with the 
territorial fragmentation of the SFRY in the 1990s. The official Serbo-Croatian 
language was broken up to identify four languages (Bosnian, Croatian, 
Montenegrin and Serbian).28 In other words, this change has brought on 
“multiplication.” Another positive, according to Weiss, was seen in the branch 
of Deutsche Bank in Manhattan where balkanization first became a design 
strategy to fragment the 40-storey monolithic structure so that the interior 
becomes completely hollow, and second to use the fragmented self-similar 
entities for purposes of reassembling them in a different way.29 Weiss’ thinking 
is that balkanization is a strategy and as such is to be implemented for 
purposes of “learning with” the Other; however, the Other is “accepted as 
missing.”30 
This volume does not follow Weiss’ thinking in attempting to eliminate the 
liminal Other, since balkanization ultimately is not about self-identity but 
about control. The Other not only exists but also is a key aspect to re-think 
questions of norms, urban conditions and everyday living. Also, thinking 
diversification, including the identification of agency as “bottom-up” or “top-
down” is much less straightforward considering the complex affair of multiple 
agencies enfolded in spatializing power, control and violence – including the 
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networks of control societies – that are operational today. The convolution of 
the modes of control and the conditioning of norms are more carefully and 
surreptitiously regimented in control societies since, utilizing Gilles Deleuze’s 
thinking, “snake’s coils are even more intricate than a mole’s burrow.”31 These 
are certainly present in the remaking of former Yugoslavia. 
Spatial violence and spatial remaking 
The fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and its simultaneous 
reorganization were supported by the Western-devised Dayton Agreement, 
which made the assumption that peace can be instated by establishing 
homogeneous ethnic enclaves. For a region known for its ethnic heterogeneity 
and mixing, this is not only a complete violation and misunderstanding of 
culture and history but also in itself the epitome of violence. By removing the 
geopolitical association of the Balkans and replacing it with a purely political 
one, the integration of the Balkans with Europe and the West becomes 
contingent on restricting diversity to avoid difficulties that supposedly arise 
when negotiating multiple ethnic identities and values in one territory. What 
this thinking shows is short-sightedness when forming states on the basis that 
peace and order cannot be achieved without ethnic separation. The Western 
preference for sovereignty in terms of a common ethnic identity is an 
instatement of colonialism: newly independent and war-ravaged countries 
established on this basis not only have become even more accessible to foreign 
organizations and investors, but also their reconstruction and existence are 
contingent upon entering into debt-inducing relationships with such entities. 
Society in the former Yugoslavia was regulated, striated and overlaid with 
surveillance. The mode of this regulation, this striation, was different from 
that practiced in the EU and the West. Part of the reformation after NATO’s 
1999 intervention has been oriented towards re-territorializing and 
incorporating this differently striated space into the wider European and 
global network for the purposes of control, surveillance and defense. The 
economic loans, largely provided by the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and similar donors, are a seamless way to militarize the 
society and urban life; NATO and the economic donors are an entangled 
monopoly of global politics enacted in the name of stabilization. 
Stephen Graham accurately observes that “[t]he rich cities of the advanced 
capitalist world profit from urbicidal violence, which deliberately targets the 
city geographies of the Global South to sustain capital accumulation.”32 
Provisionally, supposed stabilization is dependent on a two-step process; first, 
creating a system of exclusion by identifying an insignificant Other zone as 
problematic, and second, asserting the need for it to be politically altered. One 
instance of this is seen in the addition of Western to the name Balkans. The 
name change is a way of eliminating the right to difference considering that 
the organizations and global forces involved in loan financing states, such as 
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contractual economic impositions of the EU and the World Bank, also 
indirectly control the ways in which urban areas are developed and expanded. 
What makes the control more seamless is that the reconstruction of 
destroyed Yugoslav cities and institutions is tagged with a post-socialist and 
transitional agenda. The transitional tag is used as a way to excuse a period of 
repression and backwardness (pre-1990s Yugoslavia) as preceding imminent 
democratization and progress following the termination of the conflict. Thus, 
in order to address balkanization as it applied to the violence of cities in the 
former Yugoslav context, and to map these examples in terms of national and 
international perspectives, it is necessary to consider the very categorization 
of this region as undergoing transition. In other words, the use of the 
transitional tag is an opportunity to assert a dependency relationship and 
supervision by foreign investors; to be democratizing is to be in the regulatory 
hands of private global corporations. 
That the dimension of geoeconomics and politics is entangled in 
monopolization and reduction of complexity was seen with NATO’s 
‘humanitarian’ intervention. The association of the 20th Century with violence 
and inhumane warfare has spurred global politics to seek means to enforce 
justice ‘humanely’ in the 21st Century. The humanitarian intervention of 1999 
was certainly not an exercise in philanthropy and was not mutually beneficial. 
Hybridizing humanitarianism with military warfare hijacks and colonizes the 
present while attempting to prevent the future from occurring. Today’s power 
is exerted in an attempt to eliminate the possibility not only to engage with the 
politics of history, but also to activate it. The activation is dependent not only 
on removing the overarching understanding of a history but also on thinking 
spaces beyond those external to the privileged norm. Similarly, to activate 
history is to think outside and beyond the networks of control. 
In terms of the Western Balkans, control has been achieved by constructing 
history along the lines of relatively simplistic Balkanist imaginaries and 
denying this region an opportunity to exist as a liminal zone. The world order 
of today is politically just only if it assumes deregulation of alternative ways 
of thinking socio-economics and welfare through processes of balkanization; 
it is bureaucratization made possible through control implemented in 
‘humane’ ways. According to Chomsky, the 1999 intervention heralds the 
arrival of a use-by date for international law and for NATO’s ability to 
orchestrate the definitions of justice.33 This is particularly significant in terms 
of understanding more contemporary iterations of balkanization, and the 
reason why this volume dedicates considerable space to its analysis, 
predominantly by focusing on the city of Belgrade and NATO’s 1999 
Operation Allied Force more generally. 
The ‘humanitarian’ agenda is seemingly at odds with Leon Trotsky’s 
thinking on the Balkan Wars of the 1910s, namely that war always reveals our 
barbaric ways even as we believe that progressiveness and civilization – all 
that is admirable in material acquisitions, customs and habits – foreground our 
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society.34 With the 1999 intervention, the barbaric side of NATO’s 
‘humanitarian’ agenda has been somewhat concealed. This apparent 
contradiction is deceptive, made possible precisely because the threshold of 
conventional understanding of military violence on one hand, and compassion 
on the other, has been blurred. Unlike the compassionate side of humanitarian 
aid directed towards all peoples in need, military humanitarianism creates a 
clear line between victims and perpetrators of injustice on the basis of 
ethnicity. What has lent plausibility to the possibility of a ‘humanitarian’ 
agenda in military interventions is the fact that the interventions are carried 
out from a distance, through smart bombing and remote control on computer 
screens. NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force was the first war prosecuted 
from the air alone. 
Technology has been used not only to obliterate the limits and implications 
of violence but also to disable the possibility of engagement with the 
paradoxes of humane warfare now that it is transmitted to a global audience 
via the televised screen of spectacle. To spectacularize violence is also to 
neutralize it by aligning it more closely with the conventional understanding 
of humanitarian aid. Yet the ability to believe that military interventions can 
be humanitarian and an attempt to bring peace and democracy reflects the 
reality that we live in a society that is not only controlled but sedated. The 
effect of targeting and framing zones from a distance thus not only assists in 
eclipsing the complexity of violence, but also eliminates the possibility to 
believe that any worthwhile life exists in Western Balkans. After all, Clinton 
identified regions surrounding Kosovo as simply small countries unworthy of 
the name. Seemingly, to engage with the implications of humanitarianism in 
the former Yugoslav region of the Western Balkans is balkanizing politics 
itself. 
Global politics is not a means to eliminate borders and enable a 
cosmopolitan culture of inclusivity and solidarity.35 It is instead somewhat 
resonant with Manuel Castells’ “network society” where governing is no 
longer institution-bound but spread globally, meaning that power is found in 
new networks of information and images that are, perhaps, less rigid.36 The 
contemporary examples of global politics certainly resonate with Zygmunt 
Bauman’s “negative globalization,” where current examples to do with 
coercion and instability facilitate the opportunity to also ask questions to do 
with control and common privileges.37 It may also be argued that the fully 
fledged expansion of global politics which took hold with the 1989 Velvet 
Revolution and the collapse of Cold War international politics has meant that 
the military has not only embraced but also drives global and largely 
privatized news media, market economics and securitization for purposes of 
exercising control over any system still keen to resist the Anglo-American and 
Western one. In terms of Belgrade and Serbia after 1999, it is a low-intensity 
and high-tech ground conflict deployed with the intention of achieving de-
socialization through reformation of urban spaces and society. It is being 
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facilitated by rapid changes to infrastructure, law, privatization of companies 
and transformation of territorial relationships. The intent is geared towards 
transforming a once-socialist country under Titoism – which had an 
alternative approach to economy, law and the military – to a Western one 
under Western colonial hegemony. 
More so, it is not just a matter of militarization being intertwined with these 
dynamics, but that technology – that is, speed – has been used to accelerate 
and extend the limits of conventional war strategies into urban infrastructure. 
Contemplating the modern world of militarization, Paul Virilio observes that 
it 
is a world in motion, expressed in translations of strategic space into 
logistical time, and back again. It is a history of cities, partitions, trading 
circuits, satellites, and software; of a political landscape governed by 
competing technologies of surveillance, mobilization, fortification.38 
Virilio suggests that the current society is distinguished by speed and 
militarism rather than capitalism, since the accumulation of capital would tend 
to stop the acceleration of technological advancements.39 However, the 
argument to be put forward here is that the balkanization of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s demonstrates a different scenario. By analyzing the ways in which 
balkanization has been carried out in the former Yugoslav context, this volume 
will argue that the drivers are both speed – that is, militarism, including the 
extension of military control into every facet of society – and capital, in terms 
of the proliferation of consumer culture and debt. In other words, militarism 
and capital co-exist; each contains within itself elements of the other. 
Militarization is the means to facilitate and stimulate the speed that 
consumerism and debt manifest. 
Considering that speed implemented is also a measure to prevent violence, 
as seen in the humanitarian launching of missiles in 1999, the opportunity to 
engage with the complexity of a technological culture and consider its 
implications from different perspectives is undermined. To have an 
understanding of a technological culture of speed would mean that one would 
start eroding the current popular disengagement from politics, since the 
rhetoric and imposition of security measures have largely become the driver 
behind every state and global activity as well as their political legitimization. 
It is inevitable that, with the privatization of information and data, the 
understanding of the military and conflict also becomes privatized and 
interest-driven; the general rhetoric that is transmitted to the public is largely 
uniform and synonymous with flattening and neutralizing information through 
appropriation. A constructed story on a television screen can be accepted as 
accurate in circumstances where certain violent events are readily taken as 
evidence and confirmation that a certain nation is ‘naturally’ prone to acts of 
violence. Violence on the sports field is one example. Virilio has noted that 
“football simulates primordial territorial clan warfare, and the supporters of 
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Red Star Belgrade are quickly recast [by the West] as the shock troops of 
Serbia sweeping through Bosnia.”40 
The tendency to regard certain spaces and histories, such as that of the 
Balkans, as prone to violence not only treats identity as fixed but also aids in 
discursively positioning such supposed zones of violence and threat as 
responsive only to the use of force, as any other approach will not be 
comprehended. Seemingly, balkanization – as it is conventionally 
implemented for purposes of territorial and ethnic separation – is a means of 
not only flattening the complexity of violence but also legitimizing these 
global networks of control. The enactment and legitimization of balkanization 
is made possible through the invocation and implementation of security. Any 
attempt to challenge the status quo is interpreted as a clear sign of refusal to 
enter the civilized world, as was seen during the non-negotiability of the legal 
conditions in NATO’s Rambouillet Agreement.41 Security is an important 
element of this narrative, in terms of negotiating disparities of cultural co-
existence, nationalism and ethnic hatreds between Serbs and Albanians in 
Kosovo; intervention to impose international security measures was presented 
as a prerequisite for peace and stability as well as an obligation to respond to 
acts of violence. 
The force of balkanization 
While balkanization in its conception is not detached from the Balkans and 
the discourse of Balkanism, the multidisciplinary use of balkanization means 
that it has a fluidity and force that cannot be bound geographically. At the 
same time, the reason why we can think about the discourse of Balkanism 
having potential is precisely because it not only embeds the open-ended 
complexity of excess and abnormality but also operates in ways that build 
paradoxes and alternatives into the networks of control. This book approaches 
excess and fluidity as positive, but not in a way where decentralization and 
fragmentation are seen as a dialectic bottom-up process, or a top-down 
imposition. Instead, by utilizing the very thinking and spatial practices found 
in the balkanization of the former Yugoslavia, which has historically and 
geographically been seen as a frictional zone, this volume uses the SFRY as a 
case study, a means to challenge the current writing on both the Balkans and 
balkanization. In other words, when Western deployment of global politics 
and violence come into contact with a space that is operating with a different 
flexibility and logic (such as Balkanism), alternative understandings of 
violence engendered with the disintegration of Yugoslavia may be projected. 
The alternative queries that arise from addressing the balkanization of the 
former Yugoslavia are inclusive of, but not limited to, at least three significant 
modes of re-thinking violence. The first re-thinking is to do with the 
application of the label ethnonationalist conflict to war and violence that 
occurs in Other countries, thereby shutting down the possibility of exploring 
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violence in Western cities that itself may derive from conflict among multiple 
ethnicities.42 
The second query to do with violence involves the way that potential to 
consider the role external forces (the West) have played in facilitating the 
destruction of cities in the former SFRY has been eliminated. Since the 1999 
incursion, certain former SFRY Republics (now independent countries) have 
been granted easier access into the EU, because particular EU conditions have 
made the erasure of certain forms of violence possible for some of them – such 
as Croatia. Granting the possibility to efface the record of particular acts of 
violence conditions how particular spaces and histories are portrayed in 
politics and the media. 
The third disguised mode of violence is even more complex. The query is 
why act upon violence in Kosovo in 1999 rather than considerably earlier, 
considering the centuries-long violence in this territory, a history that 
encompasses the period of Serbia’s loss of the territory of Kosovo to the 
Ottoman Empire despite the self-celebrated bravery of Serbs when defending 
and then losing the ‘cradle’ of Serbia’s homeland. In other words, what was at 
stake in 1999 that made this NATO Operation unavoidable? Addressing this 
via the 1999 targeting is paramount, particularly the targeting of Belgrade as 
capital of the then Republic of Serbia and Montenegro. The implications of 
this will extend the agenda and impact of balkanization and Balkanism by 
addressing, through specific case studies, how architecture and urbanism 
intersect with matters to do with economics, warfare, environment, and social 
and individual values. 
Thus, the exploration of Balkanism and balkanization will be used as a 
critical tool to address the contradictions as well as implications of control and 
violence on architectural and urban levels as well as their implementation and 
consequences when it comes to standards of living (economic, social and 
individual). Having said this, the focus is not on showing society as it really 
is; to believe in such a possibility is to eliminate the need to imagine. Instead, 
the focus is on putting forward questions, placing sparks, stirring frictions and 
proffering alternative positions to the general assumptions about Balkanism. 
The critical agenda thus addresses alternatives through the very re-
interpretation of the discourse historically and spatially, which indirectly 
disturbs and destabilizes historical ‘truths’ to do with Balkanism and 
balkanization. The disturbance enables a different understanding of history by 
opening up ways of thinking and spatializing Balkanism and balkanization 
that have largely remained closed. Neither does this analysis react against the 
current political structures. To have a reactionary position does no more than 
institute a cyclical active-reactive relationship, which not only strips away 
creativity but also fails to recognize that the outside exists. To react is not to 
affirm life. The study is instead actionary; the outside – utilizing Deleuze’s 
thinking – does exist. 
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The volume will be framed from a Foucauldian angle whereby knowledge 
will be generated from the perspective that it is not universally given; it has 
simply been formalized as acceptable and universally true.43 In other words, 
to loosen the supposed truth about the discourse of Balkanism and to critique 
the relations that have facilitated the knowledge. Even so, the volume does 
not just put forward critique but also offers alternatives; the alternatives are 
affirmative, despite attempts to negate them. 
In order to address the framework outlined, the book will be broken into six 
sections. Chapter 2 BALKANISM AND BALKANIZATION: Fragmentation, 
Grouping and Excess will extend the preliminary framings on Balkanism 
found in this introduction. The focus will be on disassembling and critically 
analyzing the formation, alteration and implementation of Balkanism and 
balkanization in a number of different fields. This will be done not only from 
a historical perspective in terms of addressing questions to do with territory, 
ideology and politics, but also to examine the ways in which this term has 
been deployed in fields as wide-ranging as urban planning, sociology and 
anthropology, international law and the digital world. Against this broad and 
global analysis, specific focus will be directed towards addressing how 
balkanization was pursued as an initiative within former Yugoslavia in the late 
19th Century and the bulk of the 20th Century, deployed as it was in radically 
novel and creative ways (grouping through diversification, solidarity and 
individual rights). Similarly, the more recent utilization of balkanization 
within this context mimics the more commonly understood premise of 
balkanization as being fragmentation and parcelization for purposes of 
establishing majority ethnic enclaves. The analysis of balkanization through 
both a broad and global lens and a focused and regional one will assist in not 
only extrapolating the complexity of balkanization but also mapping the shifts 
in its implementation and understanding over time and in different fields. The 
focused mapping will address the implications of Balkanism and 
balkanization across film, public space and architecture as well as thinking 
global politics through a different lens to the current one. 
The third chapter, YUGOSLAVIA IN BALKANIZATION: Beyond Civil War, 
Beyond Ethnonationalism explores how fragmentation that occurred in the 
SFRY in the 1990s plays a key role in understanding the more coercive 
implications of balkanization taking place today (within this region, and 
globally). The argument will be that the Yugoslav context was a zone where 
these coercive acts were simultaneously entrenched and tested for subsequent 
spatial deployments of balkanization globally. Against this proposition, 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration will be framed against the ideological and political 
agendas according to which the country was constructed and later balkanized. 
In other words, the historical framework will contribute towards the 
understanding of fragmentation in respect to violence (of both obvious and 
less obvious kinds). It will go beyond the proposition that the dissolution of 
SFRY was purely an example of ethnonationalism or that it was a civil war. 
  34 
The balkanization of SFRY was a complex enactment of spatial violence, a 
complexity first noted during the country’s disintegration in the 1990s as 
fragmentation was related to war, international law, international security 
enacted in the form of UN troops and media, and the fragmentation of the 
ethnically diverse country. The discussion will be contextualized by 
examining memory and destruction, and the appropriation of both of these 
when it comes to the reconstruction of cities such as Vukovar and Dubrovnik 
in Croatia and Sarajevo and Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the cities that 
were affected the most during the 1990–95 disintegration of the SFRY). 
The aim of the fourth chapter, ALLIED OPERATIONS: Present-Future 
Partnerships of Humanitarianism, Peace and Victory is to explore the more 
coercive aspects of balkanization in terms of spatial violence. This considers, 
in particular, the ways in which the first humanitarian air intervention – 1999 
Operation Allied Force – lets us explore the methods that shape these new 
modes of balkanization: from history and memory to control via media. The 
virtuality of violence has very different connotations for those viewing it as 
presented through spectacular imagery than it does for those experiencing the 
effects of ‘humanitarianism.’ To give context to the discussion, the review will 
be focused on specific examples of architecture, monuments and landscape 
zones in terms of identity and reconstruction. 
CIRCULATING VIOLENCE: Decomposition, Dispossession and Control, 
the fifth chapter, will analyze more closely not only the relation between 
Balkanism and balkanization but also the geopolitical implications in terms of 
the more hidden enactments of violence during Operation Allied Force – the 
logistics of the Operation and the effects on the environment and human 
bodies, not least from the depleted uranium contained in NATO’s high-tech 
projectiles. The aspect of spatialization will be addressed through the 
circulating forces of violence to do with media and high-tech infrastructure 
such as satellites and unmanned drones as well as the legal procedures 
themselves that facilitated the Operation. The analysis of resources and 
infrastructure, as another instantiation of violence spatialized in the aftermath 
of 1999, will critically address the relations between destruction and 
reintegration in terms of balkanization. 
Chapter 6, TERRITORIALIZATIONS: Transitions, Thresholds and 
Transgressions will address the means and methods of, as well develop 
awareness to do with, current and future (altered) agendas of fragmentation in 
terms of gentrification, violence and control taking place along the margins of 
Belgrade’s waterfronts, and the impact of the same when thinking about 
marginal groups such as the Romani and the economically less privileged. As 
such, this chapter provides an exploratory analysis when thinking about these 
more coercive and softer enactments of balkanization. These softer 
spatializations of balkanization and, in effect, violence, will be mapped 
against urban planning and infrastructure as well as the role that public spaces 
play in this re-territorialization of Belgrade. In particular, how the transitional 
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tag is used as means to instate particular thinking and methods to do with 
urban planning (associated with a tightening of operational forces of control) 
and ways of deploying Balkanism to think of alternatives. 
The last chapter – PRESENT SPACES, PRESENT TIMES: Other Spaces, 
Other Times – will draw together the key ideas raised in the previous chapters 
but, more important, focus on balkanization in terms of its variable liminality, 
since the very concept has an embedded mobility. Any fixity of the concept – 
or any attempt to clearly define it – is secondary to the flexibility and mobility 
found in its interpretation. Thus, mobility will be approached as productive 
and as a creative potential. This chapter will reconceive balkanization by 
amplifying its very heterogeneous potential (diversity seen for a large part of 
the 20th Century in Yugoslavia, and the Balkans prior to the mid-19th 
Century) in order to open up global thinking about questions to do with the 
economics of fear in terms of territory, security and displacement. More 
broadly, this will address how the more progressive thinking about 
balkanization (associated with diversification and constituency) may be 
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2 
Balkanism and balkanization 
Fragmentation, grouping and excess 
The Balkans 
Balkanism and balkanization 
Historically, the term Balkanism has predominantly been associated with 
violence and socio-political instability. The concept is used to identify the 
Balkans and is laden with an imaginary of ethnic hatreds. Dušan Bjelić’s 
position on the imaginary violence is that the works of prolific writers on 
Balkanism1 tend to approach the discourse and the zone of the Balkans as a 
body of knowledge that straddles both the study of colonial representation (as 
distinct from Orientalism) and the genealogical question of how certain 
‘truths’ arose about the Balkans.2 Within this question are entangled aspects 
of place, language and history; indeed, even the political relation between 
image and identity in terms of geography and culture. Questioning the source 
and conditions of knowledge to do with the representations of the Balkans and 
Balkanism helps to destabilize the very construct of the Balkans as a barbaric 
zone. One contribution to this destabilization is to recognize that, prior to the 
18th Century, the word ‘Balkan’ in the English language was associated solely 




Figure 2.1 The different configurations of the Balkans – as an often/usually included 
political entity to its actual geographical Danube-Sava-Soca boundaries. 
The first use of the word Balkan in Europe was in the 15th Century by the 
Italian humanist and diplomat Filippo Buonaccorsi Callimaco to note the 
Turkish name given to a mountain. However, it was not until the mid- to late 
18th Century that Balkan became a common name for geographers and 
travelers. Thus, it had taken nearly four centuries for the Turkish word Balkan 
  
to gain currency in the West; the Ottomans had been using it since the start of 
their occupation of Europe in the 1300s. It is possible that at that time the term 
was used to describe the geography of the area, since in Turkish, the word bal 
means ‘mud,’ and kan is the diminutive. 
It is only between the French Revolution in the late 18th Century and the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries that 
the modern Balkans emerged on the political map as a region. The bringing 
together of areas under the Ottoman Empire in this way had been proposed by 
the German geographer August Zeune in the early 19th Century. The 
imaginary of the Balkans as a passionately violent zone was attached only 
after the Ottoman Empire withdrew; the withdrawal process coincided with 
the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. The territories that were until recently under the 
Ottomans were balkanized as the ethnically pure nation-state model was 
superimposed there. While the ideal of a homogeneous nation state developed 
gradually in Western Europe, it was imposed politically relatively abruptly in 
the Balkans. This is notable since the region has been acknowledged 
historically as having the greatest ethnic heterogeneity of cultures, languages 
and ethnicities in Europe.4 
That diversity largely derived from its geographical position in that it has 
historically been at crossroads for trade, communications and military 
campaigns starting with ancient Greece and Rome and continuing across 
Byzantium, Ottoman Turkey and Roman Catholic Europe. The ethnically 
purist Western initiative imparted onto heterogeneous nations led, 
unsurprisingly, to violent civil unrest;5 events which earned for the Balkans a 
reputation as a region of endemic violence inhabited by semi-civilized and 
only semi-European barbarians.6 The recent balkanization of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s further cemented the image of the Balkans as a rogue region and a 
chaotic frontier, one whose racial and ethnic disagreements have always been 
deep-seated and thus predestined for eternal conflict, since ‘civilized ways’ 
are not possible there.7 However, balkanization as a method of fragmentation 
has a significantly longer history. 
The term balkanization was first mentioned in the 1918 New York Times 
article “Rathenau, Head of Great Industry, Predicts the ‘Balkanization of 
Europe’.”8 The interviewed Dr. Rathenau described the political, industrial 
and economic calamities found in Germany post WWI potentially having 
devastating effects on Western civilization should Germany not take wake up 
and take charge; Germany, indeed, was potentially about to lose further 
territory and power.9 Another series of journalistic reflections were made in 
1921, the early 20th Century fragmentation of European empires and the trail 
of dissent, ravages of WWI and the peace treaties were described as 
“Balkanized Europe.”10 The particular focus being on the newly formed yet 
also backward, financially weak, distrustful and often too passionate parts of 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans, which were seen to require a long political 
education in order to understand the meaning of democracy.11 The broad 
  
effects of “Balkanized Europe” were those of introversion, lack of dialogue 
and willingness to collaborate and as such hindering the possibility for 
economic growth. For the journalist Mowrer, the possibility for Europe to 
unite and to follow in the footsteps of the US was not a possibility in the 
foreseeable future; Europe was seen as too ignorant, careless and immature.12 
Eric Hobsbawn described balkanization as formation of mini-states 
underpinned by nationalism and associated balkanization with the 
fragmentation of the Balkans after WWI.13 However, as Todorova correctly 
points out, “All Balkan states, except Albania, had existed from several 
decades to a century before World War I.”14 
Balkanization as a geopolitical act and a method was spurred by the 
withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from Europe. The move was instated for 
purposes of modernization and attempts to achieve ethnic homogeneity within 
each territory. The need to extend the values of the Enlightenment 
complemented the desire to enlarge the footprint of Europe, though only if the 
land incorporated retained a subordinate imaginary. This was seen in the latter 
part of the 19th Century when all the areas still under the Ottoman Empire 
were referred to as “European Turkey.” Balkanization is, thus, not only 
implicated in borders but also in nation shifting, where newly created 
neighboring territories may not only be hostile towards each other but where 
maintenance of peace and order is ultimately dependent on the West. This was 
seen with the 1878 Congress of Berlin and has persisted to this day. In the heat 
of NATO’s 1999 targeting, over 120 years after the Congress of Berlin, Robert 
Kaplan suggested that “[o]nly western imperialism – though few will like 
calling it that – can now unite the European continent and save the Balkans 
from chaos.”15 It seems both that the Balkans are ‘at a lower evolutionary 
scale’ and that to evolve is dependent on external guidance lest violence 
should ensue.16 
Balkanization is thus implicated in the Balkanist imaginary where Europe 
is seen as civilized, reasonable and tolerant while the Balkans are portrayed 
as a place of wilderness, irrationality and unending conflict. Seemingly, 
balkanization is a question of Todorova’s thinking about Balkanism not just 
in terms of identity reversal of the Balkans – from backward and primitive to 
progressive and developed – but also for two other agendas.17 The first is that 
this one part of the world has historically never been developed and civil, and 
that it needs to be ‘trained’ to become so. Second, it is held that the need for 
this training is limitless since history purportedly shows that violence 
persistently erupts in the region despite – oddly – the historic intervention of 
‘tried and tested’ democratic policies that have made the West an enduring 
beacon of civility and peace. 
Even after becoming a part of the European polity through its separation 
from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, the violence and barbarity associated 
with the Balkans have persisted; this resistance to the civil values found in 
Europe and the West has been put down to its “semi-European” nature.18 
  
These representations are a political construct imported from outside, from 
Europe and the West. According to Vesna Goldsworthy, the Balkan Peninsula 
comes to represent some kind of “anti-Europe”; it is always “not yet 
European” or “that which Europe has been long ago.”19 Todorova frames this 
in-between connotation within a perspective that holds that the Balkans are a 
part of Europe though on its periphery.20 For Aleš Debeljak, the geographical 
and territorial reading of the Balkans is embedded in mythological symbolism 
and associations that yoke together a rational, progressive and technical 
Europe and a fanatical, underdeveloped and primitive East.21 The implication 
is that the Balkans are a space with a transitory character, where time operates 
in ways that are outside European measures as well as outside the preferred 
European, or Anglo-American, norms.22 
The aesthetic of the unruly imaginary of the Balkans has pervaded other 
fields of arts and culture too, with film and literature taking center stage in 
driving this imaginary and maintaining it, particularly its association of the 
Balkans with semi-civilization, violence and monstrosity. Goldsworthy has 
charted the Balkanist prejudices found in works of English literature such as 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), Anthony Hope’s The Prisoner of Zenda 
(1894) and Olivia Manning’s Balkan Trilogy (1960), amongst others.23 One of 
the characters in Agatha Christie’s The Secret of Chimneys (1925), the peasant 
Boris Anchoukoff, is said to be the epitome of a man from the fictitious small 
Balkan country Herzoslovakia, having “high Slavonic cheekbones, and 
dreamy fanatic eyes” and being “a human bloodhound from a race of 
brigands.”24 Stoker’s Dracula is also noteworthy as it traverses both literature 
and film (dir. Bela Lugosi, 1931). Within the novel, the origins of Dracula are 
found in the exotic Balkan land of fear and blood. For Bjelić, the imaginary 
of Dracula offers insights into the genealogy of violence in Europe more 
broadly in that the Balkans as a zone of enduring violence is coeval with the 
association of Europe with enduring peace.25 Such proportionality is no longer 
just a question of Goldsworthy’s writing on Balkanism in terms of 
“imperialism of the imagination,”26 but is now a matter of imperialism of the 
aesthetic that raises questions about the intellectual landscape of those who 
succumb to the constructed aesthetic. Whilst some of the characterizations 
attributed to Balkanism may sound Orientalist, Balkanism and Orientalism 
display important differences. 
Scholars of the Balkans differ on the exact relation of Balkanism to 
Orientalism. According to Todorova, while the discourse of Orientalism is 
about asserted oppositions, the discourse of Balkanism is about asserted 
indistinctness.27 In terms of subordination, for Elissa Helms, Orientalism is 
directly connected to Western colonization, while Balkanism arose in less 
direct ways; Western impositions of domination and expectations of 
subservience were more diffuse.28 For Močnik, Balkanism has inherited 
Orientalist legacies, though configured twice: as the myth of European 
progress, and as the myth that backwardness is inherent in non-European 
  
contexts.29 Other authors on Balkanism, such as Robert Hayden and Milica 
Bakic-Hayden, position Balkanism as a variation on Orientalism in view of 
the centuries-long Ottoman rule of portions of the Balkans; the belief held by 
Hayden and Bakic-Hayden is that the region is irredeemably tied to the 
Orient.30 The variant is described as a process of “nesting Orientalism” within 
the zone of the Balkans itself, whereby each region in the zone would identify 
areas south or east of it as having traces of Orientalism or primitivism.31 
Bakic-Hayden and Hayden’s thinking complements the symbolic imaginary 
in the thinking of Said, for whom the Orient is a project of essentialist 
stereotypes rather than an actual place.32 According to Močnik, Balkanism 
should be considered in terms not only of the zone’s Ottoman history but also 
of the relation of Balkanism to globalization, from the perspective that post-
1990s balkanization is contingent on inscribing this identity with the glossy 
image of globalization.33 Indirectly, balkanization of the Balkans is further tied 
to eliminating the Balkans’ association with communism and socialism. 
The differing opinions are essentially driven by geopolitics. Definitions of 
the Balkans, straddling the Orient and the Occident, are simultaneously “semi-
Oriental” and “semi-European,” suggesting both spatial and representational 
ambiguity as well as transgressing and disturbing the conventional 
identifications of space and borders. Unlike the critical discourse of 
Orientalism, which arose in the Western world, the study of Balkanism is 
predominantly located within the Balkans, meaning that it can fairly be 
identified as “an intellectual export industry of the Balkans.”34 The imaginary 
of Balkanism refers to a concrete place with clear geographical outlines and 
historical certainty, by contrast with the figurative projections about the 
Orient.35 Its defined boundaries, though, were pointing to areas that were 
under the Ottoman Empire and as such still symbolically alien to the rest of 
Europe. What the projections of Balkanism and Orientalism do share is their 
binaries of opposition: Western order, justice and civility against the Balkanist 
or Orientalist disorder, corruption and barbarism. Balkanism and Orientalism 
are always set up against an ideal and cast within a position of lack; what it 
means to be not part of Europe and the West in terms of values and norms. 
Balkanization beyond the Balkan borders 
Despite balkanization being used to parcelize the Balkans for purposes of 
eliminating the imaginary of this region as a zone of complexity and chaos – 
including its sense of difference from Western Europe and Anglo-America 
from the perspective that the Balkans as a term still carries derogatory 
connotations of volatility in the lifestyle and behavior of its inhabitants – the 
application of balkanization has branched out. 
That balkanization has been extracted from the geographical context of the 
Balkans, and adopted elsewhere, with at times less volatile uses, is seen from 
the term’s emergence into fields that include urban planning, urban sociology, 
  
law, digital communications media, medicine and biology, with varying 
currency and degrees of power-oriented connotation. In biology, the term has 
been used to separate systems from a common territory, thus establishing clear 
hierarchies. For example, there is a separation of molecular and evolutionary 
biology, or biochemistry; such a specialization-oriented method is reductionist 
as it does not treat the body as an integrated system but one of divided systems. 
This separation is also evident in the 16th and 17th Century parcelization of 
the field of medicine by distinguishing medicine from its supporting areas 
such as nursing, the subdivision weakening the field.36 The negative 
implications within medicine do not end there, since the greatest perceived 
risk is in the way in which morality and ethics are cognized in specialist fields 
such as neurology and cardiology. Subdivision parcelizes the very 
consideration of ethics; action is allowed upon certain isolated concerns 
without considering the human body as an integrated and complex organism.37 
The application of the term balkanization, however, was predominantly used 
to describe situations in the 20th Century. In the 1940s, the term was used in 
passing and in respect to projected economic consequences to draw attention 
to the negative economic effects likely to flow from blockage of interstate 
commerce and trade. In the 1960s, Austrian and German institutions were 
characterized as corrupt, segregated and mismanaged.38 
The relation between institutions and segregation is particularly prominent 
in colonial territories. The period after WWII and into the 1960s saw the use 
of balkanization to predominantly describe the decolonization of Africa. In the 
1960s, the English and the French described the newly independent states in 
derogatory terms from the perspectives that the states were facing a bleak and 
frustrating future, and one which was bound to turn into a version seen in the 
hostile Balkans.39 The alternative to this view is that balkanization in Africa 
was implemented for purposes of economic interest and Western power.40 
More recently, balkanization has been used to draw relations to the processes 
of bureaucracy. For example, the British model of bureaucracy has left its 
mark in once-colonial territories, predominantly when it comes to government 
and legal systems. In Mumbai, measures to protect the environment and the 
ecosystem in the event of a disaster such as a flood are significantly less 
effective due to the balkanized structure of city administration originally 
bestowed by the British; there is a breakdown of dialogue between different 
bureaucratic domains, which then immediately hinders the efficiency of any 
disaster mitigation.41 
The polarizing effects of balkanization are most deleterious when the 
outcome has the capacity to directly affect people. At that point, it no longer 
just describes a context but operates as a means to achieve fragmentation. 
When it comes to urbanism, balkanization has been invoked in situations of 
security, segregation and conflict. In Octavia Butler’s futuristic 1993 novel 
Parable of the Sower, balkanization is used to describe a divided population 
some of whom live in gated communities while others do not, a situation that 
  
leads to wars in and around Los Angeles.42 The dystopian novel projects a 
world of extreme privatization, disparity of wealth and protectionism.43 This 
fictionalized narrative complements the real-life urban concerns aired in the 
writings of Michael Dear. Dear describes a proto-postmodern condition driven 
by global restructuring and market economics, the outcome of which is a 
series of balkanized enclaves distinguished from each other socially and 
culturally, yet also politically and economically polarized, as evident in the 
existence of fortified and peripheral cities. These ideas are also addressed in 
Mike Davis’ writings, particularly in terms of lack of dialogue between 
different socio-economic and ethnic zones exacerbated by the presence of 
enclaves.44 This can be contrasted with Douglas Massey’s and Nancy 
Denton’s readings of US spatial politics, namely that enclaves are created to 
achieve residential racial segregation,45 which, in turn – according to Leeson 
– contribute towards establishing a business network and “enclave 
economies.”46 These enclave economies also contribute towards creation of 
personal networks.47 However, the fact that these enclave economies are 
inextricably linked to “ethnic enclaves”48 means that assimilation and the 
possibility for co-existence in the US not only is limited but also facilitates 
conditions that over time can turn into physical and spatial incursions. When 
balkanization is used as a method for purposes of co-existence, it facilitates 
opportunities for heterogeneity. 
That the fictional agenda of Butler’s text became a measure of reality was 
seen in US President Bill Clinton’s likening of the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, 
California, when a white policeman beat up the black citizen Rodney King, to 
the ethnic cleansing spurred by racial and ethnic differences encountered in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the violence between the Serbs and 
Muslims.49 Drawing parallels between the riots and the Balkans was a way to 
absolve American institutional and urban practices of responsibility for the 
polarization and privatization of wealth. The Balkans were invoked to imply 
that this type of violence is fundamentally inconsistent with the origins and 
identity of America. What went unacknowledged in Clinton’s comparison is 
that the riots arose out of the disparity of wealth and access to resources as 
well as the effects of gated communities on American urban planning. 
Balkanization is used as an urban strategy for purposes of creating enclaves, 
often on the periphery and in order to subvert or maintain order; the outcome 
of which for D.G. Shane is equivalent to the qualities of a heterotopia.50 They 
can be deployed to effect the devastation, invasion or fracturing of 
communication.51 These balkanized enclaves and their interstitial spaces are 
similar to the ravages of Sarajevo; they can easily attain the violence seen in 
the Balkans, according to the perception of the former Yugoslav model as the 
example par excellence of paramilitary gangs and petty dictatorships.52 
Balkanization, from an urban planning perspective, is tied to not only 
questions of culture and ethnicity but also geography and policing of mobility, 
which Saskia Sassen frames in terms of migration and geopolitics.53 Questions 
  
of migration may also be seen as a carefully engineered program where, along 
with the restriction of welfare rights, there is also a possibility to control racial 
diffusion or the “browning of America.”54 It is a discriminatory regime that is 
evident not only in the US but also in Western Europe and Australia. 
The most recent UK example was the campaign in support of Brexit. The 
dominant media rhetoric was built not around critical analysis of EU policies 
but a fear that the influx of migrants was having a negative impact on the UK 
economy and the British citizenry. Here, the threat was tied to underlying 
questions of money even though the surface agenda was that the UK should 
retain an authentic identity for which land, language and people need to 
remain in alignment; rhetoric reminiscent of Martin Heidegger’s claim that a 
people and their land are a unity via language.55 In other words, there is a 
connection between a people, their land and their language; everyone who 
does not belong to that soil, whose being does not arise from a distinct place 
or cannot trace their history in terms of language and land is automatically 
defined as Other and outsider. It is the argument of racial hygiene; one that is 
very similar to the rhetoric found in Nazi ideologies constructed around racial 
superiority and the perceived threat posed by the Jews. It has been seen, in 
diluted form, even within the UK’s borders. UK planning laws remain 
discriminatory towards the Roma; they are directed towards the expulsion of 
the Romani from their caravan settlements as well as their segregation.56 
Where balkanization could be said to have the greatest impact in legal 
processes is during trials where overlapping jurisdictions are involved, 
making it harder to receive justice, an outcome that is particularly visible in 
colonial territories such as Australia and the US.57 For example, when 
addressing aspects to do with compensation in terms of civil rights such as 
property rights or rights to one’s health, safety and a clean environment, the 
dispensing of justice becomes harder since each jurisdiction operates under its 
own set of laws. Thus, justice becomes more elastic and easier to manipulate 
precisely because the administration of law becomes more bureaucratic. In 
terms of the environment, balkanization is also implemented in matters to do 
with energy regulation, ranging from control of fees to developing more 
environmentally friendly energy sources.58 In other words, balkanization is 
used as a legal policy to “enact environmental regulations and otherwise 
control the environmental effects of energy use and production within their 
borders.”59 
The legal, economic and political insecurities afflicting Western Europe and 
Anglo-America are also affecting the way in which national identity is 
comprehended in that it is tied to the colonial mentality of ownership and 
territorial expansion. In Australia, such colonial motivations have been in 
operation since its post-1788 Anglo-Saxon colonial formation, tied as it was 
to the elimination of Other peoples, values, languages and customs through 
the genocide directed towards the indigenous Aborigines. Here, balkanization 
was implemented by fragmenting the conceptions of land and territory that 
  
accorded with indigenous beliefs and superimposing borders that 
discriminated against indigenous values and customs. 
Inceptionary 1788 colonial practices are seen to this day in the detainment 
of refugees on an archipelago of off-shore locations in the Pacific. Unlike the 
post-1788 colonial practices, those of the post-1990s are entrenched not only 
in the automatic detainment of all undocumented migrants arriving by boat, 
but also in the legitimization of market colonialism. The economic agenda is 
present not only because vast amounts of money have been invested in 
privatizing and sustaining the industry of border control but also because of 
the rhetoric that migrants would supposedly erode the Australian economy, 
hence the need to detain all undocumented refugees in off-shore camps. One 
of these is located on Christmas Island, a nature reserve also mined for its rich 
deposits of phosphate, that has since late 20th Century been used for purposes 
of imprisoning ‘illegal’ immigrants. Purchased by the Australian government 
from the British in the late 1950s, the terror exercised on this island has largely 
remained hidden from the mainstream media. 
That these practices have been appropriated and exported by European 
governments in the name of security – that is, market economics – is one of 
the more twisted sequelae of addressing matters to do with ‘illegal’ migration. 
The benefits of territorial expansion, if done through policy alone, are that 
peripheral zones can now be used for purposes of containing the migrants and 
refugees. This is seen in the agreements struck by European governments, 
inclusive of the UK, with countries such as Libya and Turkey for purposes of 
detaining asylum seekers.60 These peripheral zones are a more isolated and 
regimented version of the 18th Century peripheral institutions such as prisons 
where treatment of inmates and disciplining methods were removed from 
visibility. The disciplinary measures are entangled in doctrines of risk, 
security and legal exceptionalism.61 With United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) records indicating that 65 million people were 
forcibly displaced in the year 2015, and as the design of camps often comes 
to mimic that of prisons, to be displaced and in search of a new home is 
equivalent to having breached the law. Balkanization is present upon the 
homogeneous stamping of the displaced with an imprisoned identity of never 
being able to belong; their existence dependent upon exclusion and separation. 
Understanding territory is particularly peculiar in a field hailed, since its 
inception, for its openness and accessibility to all: the internet. The 
balkanization of digital communications media through the creation of 
distinctive enclaves is driven by aspirations to ensure data sovereignty. One 
key example of the need to establish sovereignty of data was seen in the 2013 
case where Edward Snowden was able to reveal that US classified data had 
been shared with various European governments and companies without 
authorization.62 Balkanization of data and privacy in the digital age occurs in 
at least two ways. The first is to do with the growing range of biometric 
identification tools (from fingerprint scans to voice recognition), which is 
  
known as biometric balkanization.63 Here, the use of the term balkanization 
tends to be seen in a positive light, not only because the increase in biometric 
tools allows a more optimal match for a specific need but also because 
compartmentalization of these tools facilitates the alignment of individual 
desires and organizational interests,64 the effects of which may lead to not only 
conflation between the individual and the organization but also open 
manipulation and control of the former by the latter. The second aspect of data 
and privacy is to do with the balkanization of the internet for purposes of 
security and censorship, by – for example – keeping data within EU 
boundaries protected from other territorial zones such as the US internet 
infrastructure networks,65 which would have notable implications for trade 
and financial flows. 
Balkanization and Yugoslavia 
The broad framing of the Balkans and Balkanism, including the use of the 
term balkanization globally and in diverse fields, was necessary in order to 
appreciate the significance of Yugoslavia’s implementation of balkanization 
and this region’s specificity within the Balkans. The constructed violent 
imaginary of the Balkans tends to eclipse the ethnic heterogeneity and national 
constituency found within the formation of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century, 
which continued the lineage of diversity historically found in the Balkans. 
The path to the 1918 formation of a heterogeneous Yugoslavia through 
unification of the South Slav peoples into one nation-state was paved with 
violent nationalist outbursts. For Yugoslavia, a prerequisite for national 
unification was the removal of Austro-Hungarian rule. One significant and 
widely noted example of such violence occurred in 1914, when a Bosnian 
Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip (in)famously shot and killed the Austrian 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, in 
Sarajevo. Princip’s act played a role in the imminent outbreak of WWI, but it 
was aimed as a blow against the Austro-Hungarian rulers, who met any 
opposition and especially expressions of anarchy with murder and deportation 
to concentration camps.66 An act of anarchy intended to unite the South Slavs 
also confirmed the reputation of the Balkans as a despotic region, one that so 
soon after freeing itself from Ottoman rule was already pulling away from 




Figure 2.2 Memorial in Sarajevo to mark the 1914 assassination of the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg. 
The despotism of the Balkans belonged to a different type of European 
culture. This Other European is the black sheep of the family, a threatening 
anomaly to be kept apart from, yet a part of, the ordered and unified European 
whole; the abnormal region forever in need of taming. It may be said, 
however, that the 1914 assassinations were not just a blow for national self-
determination, self-rule and unification of culturally close groups but, more 
important, were an expression of resistance to the way Western interests 
privileged a certain idea of homogeneity in their prescriptions for the future 
of a region of long-standing heterogeneity. 
The desire to unify the South Slavs (apart from Bulgarians) and the 
culturally close groups that lived in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia was given concrete expression in 
1918 with the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, even though the name 
Yugoslavia was used colloquially since 1918).67 This first Yugoslavia also 
incorporated non-Slavic minorities such as Albanians, who were largely found 
in the province of Kosovo and, to a smaller extent, in south Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. The peoples who lived in the region were 
culturally aligned through their common Slavic ancestors who, over time, 
separated into three different tribes who, in the 7th Century, settled in different 
parts of the southern Balkans. With this in mind, the reverse balkanization of 
1918 may be seen as a reunification of the three Slavic tribes. 
  
However, with so much history between the initial settlement, tribal 
separation and reunification in the 20th Century, the parliamentary system 
established in the kingdom needed to reflect that these were separate nations 
with some 13 centuries of separate history despite their common cultural and 
linguistic roots. Croatia and Slovenia had been largely under Austro-
Hungarian influence, but for Bosnia and Serbia, influence had come from both 
the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Over the period, it is not 
surprising that other rulers too passed through or took territorial ownership of 
the noted areas. With the re-organization of the Balkans in general, and 
Yugoslavia in particular, it was also necessary to select a common tongue. In 
1850, during the Vienna Agreement between Serb and Croat scholars, the 
Stokavian dialect was selected from three options (Stokavian, Cakavian and 
Kajkavian) and endorsed as the foundation of the common Serbo-Croatian 
language. This language became the standard in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Montenegro, with slight variation, as well as the significant 
difference that the alphabet to be used in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
Latin, and Cyrillic in Serbia and Montenegro. 
The Kingdom was structurally premised on each state having an 
independent financial system and its own body of laws as well as a 
constitutional power of veto. Perhaps as a consequence of centuries of 
incorporation in different empires and under different rulers, the polity of the 
first Yugoslavia inherited numerous different legal, monetary and transport 
systems.68 The process of reconfiguring these administratively privileged the 
Serbs, due both to Serbia having a longer history of independence and the 
number of districts with majority Serb population located in the rest of 
Yugoslavia. On the other hand, republics that had historically been within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire (such as Slovenia and Croatia) were more 
developed in terms not only of transport networks, but also economically. 
Here, market farming was developed and economics used both for local 
investments and infrastructural development as well as trade. 
Areas that were under the Ottoman rule, such as Serbia, practiced 
predominantly subsistence farming; this had an impact not only on their 
economy, but also on urban development and everyday life. The architect Le 
Corbusier’s impressions of Belgrade seemed to confirm a city of chaos and 
excess. During his travels in 1911, he pronounced Belgrade to be an undefined 
city and “a ridiculous capital, worse even: dishonest city, dirty and 
disorganized.”69 These impressions formed part of the journey he undertook 
with his friend August Klipstein that had Constantinople as its final 
destination. Prior to arrival, Le Corbusier imagined Belgrade as “the magic 
door to the East, swarming with colourful life, populated by flashing and 
bedizened horsemen wearing plumes and lacquered boots!”70 In the event, his 
records largely indicate less than complimentary impressions; the people in 
Serbia are described as ruddy, their speech as lacking zest, the wine as cunning 
and food as being too heavy.71 At the time, Belgrade was clearly a mish-mash 
  
of different styles, including influences of Ottoman architecture. Neither the 
city nor Serbia lived up at that time to the expectations of Le Corbusier’s purist 
modernist palette. 
The formation of the second Yugoslavia began during WWII, during the 
Second Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia 
convened in the Bosnian town of Jajce (Little Egg).72 The overarching agenda 
of this second Yugoslavia was not only to retain the multi-ethnic palette but 
also to diversify it through the instatement of social, cultural and linguistic 
rights for its constituent nations (Serbians, Croatians, Slovenians and 
Macedonians); the Bosnian Muslims would later be recognized as the sixth 
constituent nation in 1961. Such rights were also, over time, given to 
Albanians, Hungarians, Slovaks and others, though these remained ethnic 
minorities. Territorially, this was evident with the formation of two provinces 
within Serbia after WWII: Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, with a notable 
majority of the Hungarian ethnic minority, and Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo and Metohija, with a notable majority of Albanians living there. The 
conferring of rights was a socialist version of democracy, one that was – 
theoretically at least – strengthened through self-management, the intent of 
which was, through decentralization and subdivision in any working and 
social sector, to allow those participating in that sector to reap the fruits of 
their labor. The ultimate goal was for the state to wither away by transferring 
state power to the society.73 
  
 
Figure 2.3 The ethnic diversity of the SFRY. 
The 1990s disintegration of Yugoslavia was at the same time the dissolution 
of this model, and the reintroduction of the barbaric imaginary. 1990s 
balkanization was a five-stage process of small wars. The 1991 war in 
Slovenia reached a conclusion relatively peacefully and with little legacy of 
physical destruction or casualties. The following second and third stages were 
the Croatian War of Independence (1991–95), and the Bosnian War (1992–
  
95); these were wars of physical erasure, uprootings of heterogeneity and 
solidarity. The following fourth stage was NATO’s 1999 ‘humanitarian’ 
intervention. The current, and fifth stage, is tied to what has taken place since 
each of the prior conflicts was terminated. This stage has been evident not 
least in the official renaming of the region as Western Balkans,74 a term 
adopted in Brussels in 1998. By grouping together all remaining unruly and 
‘problem’ countries, Western Balkans is no longer a geopolitical 
categorization but a political one. The EU membership is likely to remove the 
political implications and associations of the country being Balkanist.75 For 
the EU, the Western Balkans comprise Albania and, except for Slovenia, all 
the republics of former Yugoslavia. The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) uses the term Western Balkans to refer to all 
countries recognized by the EU, except for Croatia. These unruly Western 
Balkans areas still carry the Balkanist slur of an imaginary “ghetto enclave” 
of violence.76 This helps explain why entry into the EU for successor republics 
of the former Yugoslavia has generally been subjected to questions to do with 
liberal democratization and whether the extremity of 1990s violence is 
acknowledged as ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
  
 
Figure 2.4 The constitution of Western Balkans countries. Croatia is occasionally 
included, depending on whether it is defined by the EU, or the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
However, the pressing slur of violence was selectively mapped when 
granting membership to some former Yugoslav republics. Croatia’s unclear 
Western Balkans identification may explain its recent EU membership despite 
the fact that it has since the 1990s become one of the most ethnically pure 
  
countries in Europe by exterminating and/or converting to Catholicism its 
once constituent nations of different faiths and ethnicities.77 The 
preoccupation with ethnic purity is particularly ironic for this region 
considering its historical heterogeneity. Croatia’s links to Nazi Germany and 
mass genocide during WWII also seem to have been conveniently forgotten 
by the EU.78 This is not to deny the atrocities committed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by Bosnian Serbs (as widely reported in the news media), or 
those committed by Bosnian Muslims (somewhat less reported). It is more to 
put into question the sanitation of particular acts of violence and the construct 
of tolerance practiced by Europe. However, tolerance is oddly situated in the 
now European Croatia considering that its late 20th Century formation was 
contingent on the forcible expulsion of about 200,000 ethnic Serbs as part of 
its 1995 Operation Flash and Operation Storm, otherwise known as Homeland 
War. Similarly, the supposed progressiveness is also contingent on averting 
one’s gaze from the trauma of concentration camps for Jews, Roma and Serbs 
during WWII when Croatia was a Nazi puppet State. The mission to cleanse 
this history from the Balkans selectively decides which countries are allowed 
to erase that violence in order to cross the European threshold of stability, 
peace and egalitarian dialogue. 
Balkanism and balkanization as heterogeneity 
Public space 
Addressing Yugoslavia, Balkanism and balkanization genealogically, 
however, undermines the very potential of this region of frictional liminality 
as well as that of the country that took a counterapproach to balkanization by 
affirming and expanding its heterogeneity. What the genealogical turn, 
however, does offer is the opportunity to return to the conditions that brought 
the construct into a reality. From a different perspective, the discourse of 
Balkanism may be reconceived by deploying the thinking of Paul Patton, for 
whom revolutionary action is contingent on the very necessity to reconsider 
the text and its interpretation.79 This reconsideration is contingent on 
amplifying Balkanism and Yugoslavia’s ambiguous and heterogeneous 
potential, since both are signifiers of what Europe casts out as abnormal and 
full of excess. Once its alternative, anomalous and abnormal identification, no 
longer has negative associations, opportunities then arise to move history 
beyond the frozen frame of Balkanism as villainy. 
Where the spatialization of Balkanist abnormality exposed and challenged 
national and international political inconsistencies to do with violence was 
evident during NATO’s 1999 targeting, when Belgrade’s public spaces hosted 
gatherings dubbed Songs Sustained Us (Pesma Nas je Odrzala), convened as 
a means not only to resist NATO bombings but also to re-inhabit and re-
interpret those spaces under attack. Many read the Songs Sustained Us events 
  
as yet more evidence of Balkan irrationality, including the then US Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright, who responded, “I just don’t understand 
anything, these people are totally insane.”80 The sites of the Songs Sustained 
Us gatherings included a significant portion of Belgrade’s Old City center, 
which were utilized not only for music performances, but also art exhibitions, 
film and sporting events. The gatherings were evocative of potential identified 
in Deleuze’s thinking whereby pure events escape the present by moving in 
several different directions simultaneously.81 
Notably, the Cultural Arts Society (Kulturno Umetnicko Drustvo) presented 
ensembles of Serbian traditional dance under the slogan “With dance and song 
we are defending Yugoslavia.” Photographic exhibitions such as the 
conceptual photography of Dimitrije Cipcic’s “Public Revolt” adorned Knez 
Mihailova Street. Artists brought out their canvases and painted in the streets. 
While some of the paintings had religious connotations, others were more 
graphic, with slogans such as “You target me with a bomb, and I target you 
with a paintbrush.” The National Theatre, a building that fronts the Republic 
Square, staged numerous plays and operas. The theater was considered a 
shelter for freedom of spirit, with performances taking place even at night 
while the bombs were falling on the city. Other events in Belgrade’s public 
urban spaces included the 46th Festival of Short Film, the oldest film festival 
in Europe, which ran 14–19 April 1999. The Belgrade Marathon, which took 
place on 17 April, was organized before the actual bombings started, with 
confirmed participation by entrants from 40 countries. The event was not 
postponed, despite the withdrawal of international runners. The marathon was 
accompanied by the slogan “No bomb can break the soul and will of the 
capital city,” and started appropriately in the then Boulevard of Revolution. 
The official poster for the race read “Stop the war, run the world.” 
All these events, which were a proclamation of the will to live, came to be 
labeled as acts of abnormality. Unlike D.G. Shane’s inscription of heterotopias 
for purposes of establishing peripheral enclaves, the Songs Sustained Us 
events are more transgressive in that they reflect Foucault’s notion of 
heterotopias; places where, as he states, “without boats, dreams dry up, 
espionage replaces adventure, and police [take the place of] the pirates.”82 The 
heterotopic spaces of Belgrade during the NATO air attacks maintained the 
dreams of the people and provided a way of transforming various national and 
international disciplining structures. 
While NATO tried to extinguish Belgrade’s economy, infrastructure and 
will, another minor economic and creative process began to take shape. 
Fashion parades were organized, with the black-and-white military target 
symbol finding its place on T-shirts and dresses and becoming a fashion 
statement. Street vendors and food stores became the “pirates” as they sold 
target buttons, posters and badges during the NATO bombings. The gatherings 
demonstrate that the body can still be integrated into historical processes 
  
whereby history is opened up through the manifestation of a will that extends 
beyond the governing set by national and international impositions. 
These events were held despite the Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist for the 
New York Times, Thomas Friedman,83 writing that “[i]t should be lights out in 
Belgrade: every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war-related factory 
has to be targeted. [. . .] You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We 
can do 1389 too.”84 Friedman’s comments, according to Stephen Graham, 
urged not only that all that facilitates urban life be suspended and brought to 
a halt, but also that immobilizing movement and eliminating all resistance in 
the society is a question of reversing time by choosing the appropriate target 
and weapon.85 Of the dates selected, 1950 is associated with the period of 
socialism in Belgrade (and Serbia), and 1389 is significant as it marked the 
defeat of Serbia by the Ottomans (as well as the loss of the territory of 
Kosovo). 
Between Albright lamenting the apparent abnormality of those protesting 
and Friedman drawing attention to Balkanism as not just a permanent 
identification of this country but also the very means by which its prior history 
can be eliminated through time reversal, there is a construct that those who 
live in this region are somehow less human, thus implicitly validating the acts 
of ‘humanitarian’ violence directed towards the people living there as part of 
NATO’s 1999 operation. Through the invocation of Balkanist abnormality, 
what the international community is doing is not an outright declaration of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ but a reinvoking of the imaginary of the irredeemable barbarity 
present within the region and amongst the people. It is a process that 
automatically absolves Anglo-America and Western Europe of the 
commission of any act of violence, since violence occurs only in the Balkans. 
The technique is reminiscent of Carl Schmitt’s writing on the political 
whereby politics is founded upon the mere identification of the enemy, which 
not only justifies but also validates the negative speak.86 
The role of the human body during the 1999 protests suggests that bio 
power, management of the population, was not entirely possible during 
NATO’s bombings. The body did not remain passive. The disciplining effect 
of the bombings was severe in that the NATO strikes both coincided with and 
assisted the Milosevic regime’s intensification of its own disciplining of the 
bodies of the population of Belgrade and Serbia. This is illustrated in articles 
in newspapers such as the Serbian state-run Politika (Politics), which 
provided instruction on how to recognize and respond to different emergency 
sounds as well as patriotic texts on the vitality and nutritional value of national 
dishes, affirming that food was plentiful. In May, spurred by sporadic 
disruption of electricity and water supplies, Politika’s articles took on a more 
serious tone, advising on how to preserve foods and suggesting that 50 liters 
of water per day was adequate for all of an individual’s cooking and hygiene 
needs. These reached their height in the leaflets, distributed to every 
household, addressing aspects of civil protection under the banner Urban 
  
Population Self-Protection Reminder (Civilna zastita: podsetnik za 
samozastitu gradskog stanovnistva). 
The existence of the individual was under constant threat. However, the use 
of the body during the Songs Sustained Us gatherings exposed both the 
strength and fragility of the human body when deployed as a tool of resistance. 
This is evidenced in the human bodies that acted as live shields to protect 
Belgrade’s Branko’s Bridge, despite 60 road and rail bridges and overpasses 
in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) already having been destroyed 
during the operation and the threat from NATO’s Air General Michael Short 
on 15 May 1999 that included the words: 
I think no power to your refrigerator, no gas to your stove, you can’t get 
to work because the bridge is down – the bridge on which you held your 
rock concerts and you all stood with targets on your heads. That needs to 
disappear.87 
The importance of the body is the ultimate terrain of resistance where 
individuals, by inserting their bodies into a very politicized and contested 
space, became possible targets of NATO’s strikes, whilst also becoming an 
open display of an individual’s will to life. The deployment of the body as a 
form of resistance showed that the Operation’s use of force and control could 
be challenged; history was not only activated but also power was reborn. This 
in itself shows the potential of Balkanism and balkanization when deployed 
for purposes of extending diversity and utilizing the excess and the abnormal; 
the events revealed an alternative re-inhabitation and re-interpretation of 
public spaces; they not only moved beyond control societies, but also 
demonstrated the possibility of countering control societies through 
deployment of bodies in space. 
Film 
The Songs Sustained Us gatherings evoked the ‘insanity’ of Emir Kusturica’s 
carnivalesque films in which the joy for life is always present. In Kusturica’s 
Underground (Podzemlje, 1995), events of WWII and the violence of the 
1990s onto which they are mapped are interchangeably brought into play and 
experienced by a community of people living underground and on the surface; 
the underground is symbolic of all that was once removed from the landscape 
of visibility. The film’s themes of secrecy, gore, betrayal and, most important, 
nationalism, are not explored for purposes of reinforcing all these associations 
of violence in the former Yugoslavia; they are used for purposes of both 
purifying and compounding the constructs about the Balkans. This is done 
through the deployment of the very stereotypes of the Balkans as a feral zone 
of rogue violence and long-standing ethnic hatreds. The strategy here is to 
eclipse negativity through the negative imagery by which the construct has 
been made possible. Kusturica, in many ways, revels in the differences found 
  
in this region, from drinking in excess to partying and violence. Life resides 
recklessly in the Balkans; life and death, peace and war co-exist in more 
transparent ways and are more passionately felt and disclosed. 
However, no sooner does Kusturica set up these themes in Underground 
than he immediately pulls them down, suggesting that only those who have 
lived in the context can comprehend the situation in the former Yugoslavia. 
From this perspective, he both inverts the dichotomy of exterior and interior 
borders and confronts the slippery boundary of fact and fiction, reality and 
dream. The film’s first scenes are a chaotic mix of sex, bombs and animals 
escaping from the zoo; these are soon interwoven with scenes from a film 
about WWII and the struggle of Partisans against the Germans. Yet one is 
never quite sure whether the film is just a film or an actual narration of real-
life events. It is a simulation of events and times sliding past each other, and 
simultaneously brought into and out of each other. 
His film enters a different time frame to the one found in Europe where 
events are set out along a chronological line. If Balkanism sits outside the 
history of civil Europe and the West, and if Bauman’s position on the history 
of time beginning with modernity – whereby “modernity is the time when 
time has a history”88 – is valid, then it is not a question of Balkanism lagging 
in time by not entering the Western history of Enlightenment (which Foucault 
identifies with various modes of classification and disciplining of every aspect 
of life), but simply that Balkanism exists outside the disciplinary codes of 
Europe. The film ends with a parcel of land splitting from the main territory, 
and thus the presence of Balkanism and balkanization remains bound and in 
continuous existence. The Balkans, in this instance, do not evoke Todorova’s 
conception of this zone as reminiscent of the periphery and as such a space 
that is ghettoized in terms of its developmental processes.89 Rather, it is that 
the newly balkanized territory of Kusturica’s film shows that the Balkans and 
Balkanism are in their own right an alternative entity and force. To balkanize, 
using the Yugoslav context as a precedent, is done for purposes not only of 
creating a territory of diversity but also of sidestepping the binary ‘us’ and 
‘them’ construct. 
The symbolism of the title Underground is not only suggestive of the partial 
nature of perception of reality. It also proposes that the knowledge of violence 
is limited. The film’s imagery of underground passages, used by the West as 
well as Yugoslav forces in the lead-up to and during the 1990s Yugoslav wars 
for purposes of shelter as well as for transport and storage of goods from food 
to aid supplies and munitions, presents a multilayered and perhaps unexplored 
narrative of violence within this context, violence that has remained largely 
absent from the mass media. The absence of violence is the physical presence 
of the underground in the film. The construction of a stable understanding of 
Balkanist violence and the wars that have been fought in this region challenges 
and resists the omnipresent belief that Balkanist history can be mapped in a 
straightforward manner. The underground tunnels make it possible to draw a 
  
parallel and argue that the hegemonic attempt to identify peace and civility 
with one side, and war and vulgarity with the other side, is not only unstable 
but also porous and can be challenged. 
To compare the Balkans with Europe is simply to set up a dichotomy 
between a whole and its counterpart, allowing Europe’s image to remain 
perennially untarnished and progressive, as it can project its threats through 
the absurdity of the peripheral other. This is to an extent the story line of the 
US film Cat People (1942, dir. Jacques Tourneur), in which an American 
average-Joe marries Irena Dubrovna, a Serbian artist. Their marriage is tainted 
by Irena’s psychotic fear that she suffers from an ancient curse under which 
intimacy and arousal will turn her into a panther. Enlightened order is thus 
symbolically paired with primitive anxieties. This figure of the cat ‘oddly’ 
reappears in Kusturica’s comedy Black Cat, White Cat (Bela Macka, Crni 
Macor, 1998). In his film – whose narration slips between Serbian, Bulgarian 
and Romani – the recurring motifs of black cat and white cat assist in framing 
questions to do with love, loyalty and friendship. 
The understanding of elementary values is taken further with the setting of 
the film itself, located along the border of Serbia and Bulgaria; a zone where 
Balkanist passions reach great levels from matters to do with money, to 
feelings of joy and love and experiences of trauma. The two dichotomous cats, 
meanwhile, take on an all-knowing role; they are the only witnesses to events 
in the film not seen by others, they see beyond the immediate. Yet they are 
also the only witnesses of the true love between young Zare and Ida. 
Seemingly, there is something about the symbolism of the cat(s) that suggests 
that time and space in the Balkans evade all rational and chronological 
thinking about them, and that values of love and loyalty both still pertain if 
perceived through less rational thinking. The operation of balkanization in the 
film is symbolically suggested through the presence of both a black and a 
white cat, and the ability of these not only to co-exist but also be stronger in 
their perception and knowledge; this co-existence was seen in the former 
Yugoslav context where diversity was implemented when grouping together 
territories and people. 
While Balkanism is conceptually open-ended, it also operates as a 
transitional spatial force that cannot quite fit any given mold. This may be 
because the behavior patterns seen as normal in the ‘civilized’ world do not 
hold sway here.90 Operationally, the potential of Balkanism’s variable 
liminality is not necessarily about the marginality of this zone, if marginality 
gives this zone a sense of centrality,91 but that this liminality opens up the 
potential of thinking identity outside the clear and concrete boundaries of a 
highly engineered society. Variable liminality (which is inclusive of being 
limit-distinct) evokes the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari, where identity is  
  
not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer 
of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each 
will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied.92 
Thinking identity across the trajectory of liminality resists identification of 
Balkanism in terms of a binary logic (Christianity/Islam, 
civilization/barbarism, etc.). Instead, it facilitates thinking identity in terms of 
instability and complexity. To have instability is to facilitate a possibility to 
move time and history on from a state of perpetual replay in the cause of 
spreading Western normality and civil values by eliminating all that is 
considered abnormal and barbaric. What instability offers is the conception of 
identity as ever-changing and ever-arising; one that is many and where the 
origin is not only never given but also always remade. 
Architecture and the urban 
When considered architecturally, instability implies that both the ground and 
the horizon are dynamically fluctuating. The presence of dynamism was seen 
in Nikola Dobrovic’s Generalstab complex design that emerged as the winner 
of the 1953 closed competition organized by the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA). It was the first architectural signifier 
of SFRY’s 1948 split from Soviet Russia. Dobrovic approached the 
Generalstab complex not only as the means to deal with the requirements of 
the project on an urban and architectural level, but also as a formative 
resolution and demonstration of a future Grand Belgrade and, indirectly, 
Yugoslavia.93 The project was imagined to showcase the construction of an 
alternative identity by enshrining the rights of different classes and nations 
through the concept of Yugoslavia as a federation. 
According to Franke Wilmer, the new post-WWII Yugoslav identity was 
enveloped in several agendas: anti-imperialism, partisan heroism and the 
formation of an alternative socialist program that attempted to sidestep the 
excesses and extremes of both Western capitalism and Soviet-style 
communism.94 Against its symbolic identifications, Dobrovic’s drive to assert 
a new dynamic urban vision for Belgrade through the design of the complex 
was supported by referencing the city’s immediate surroundings; the city’s 
shifting horizons facilitated by flat horizontal ground and vertical 
topographical points broken and brought together by the rivers Sava and 
Danube.95 His vision attempted to re-think and re-interpret space and society 
beyond the framework devised by the state or dominant Western modernist 
ideology. 
The notion of dynamism seems to have arisen out of Dobrovic’s three 
specific interests. The first was his interest in philosophy; particularly Henri 
Bergson’s ideas on matter and memory. The second was his interest in art. The 
third was the necessity he saw to re-interpret CIAM (The International 
  
Congresses of Modern Architecture)96 to suit the context of Belgrade and 
Yugoslavia. All of this culminated in the idea of dynamism, which was 
orchestrated in Dobrovic’s design of a narrow volume measuring 250m in 
length. The volume was set back from the street and stretched across from one 
end of the site to the other. This move not only facilitated a 270m-wide field 
to spatially orchestrate his vision of space as a series of shifting horizons, but 
also allowed breathing space for the surrounding historical buildings.97 
The void within the complex, made possible due to the interval of space 
between its two buildings, itself split by a road, offered the symbolic 
contextualization and the memory of the Sutjeska Offensive; the fatefulness 
of the battle for the future of Yugoslavia was brought to the capital city of 
Belgrade.98 This is significant since in the West following the end of WWII 
there was an attempt to delete memory from architecture.99 Dobrovic’s 
drawing out of a relation to the Sutjeska Offensive in 1960 brought together 
the thinking behind Henri Bergson’s ‘cone’ with a historical event.100 The 
relation between them was that an event transforms identity in time through 
becoming; in this instance, with the formation of Yugoslavia as an alternative 
brand of Socialism (Titoism) that was not aligned with the agenda of Cold 
War politics.101 In terms of the actual 1943 battle, the memory of the event is 
wrapped in the narrative of 120,000 Germans failing to break the Partisan 
formations of less than 20,000 soldiers or capture then commander Josip Broz 
Tito. The battle in southeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina lasted for a whole month 
and was directly vested in re-aligning the morale, position and unfolding of 
the events to come in breaking the Fascist grip. Considering the mismatch in 
numbers of soldiers on the two sides, it is unsurprising that this event took on 
epic proportions in the new narrative of SFRY identity; a narrative framed by 
bravery, strength and will. 
According to Vladimir Kulić, were it not for the symbolism of Sutjeska as 
the key element of the Generalstab complex, the void would have no 
meaning.102 However, the more important focus, and one that largely remains 
unexamined, is not whether the void within the complex was a literal insertion 
of an epic offensive that occurred in the ‘V’-shaped Sutjeska valley. It is rather 
that the void is a signifier that the event was transformative not only of that 
particular moment but also of memory and history, since history was opened 
up by the event. History as a preconditioned state of affairs was altered 
through an act of insertion in time. The event facilitated the more affirmative 
and heterogeneous balkanization of the second Yugoslavia; balkanization that 
arose through extending the heterogeneity of values and rights. The role of 
architecture in this process is that it accommodated this alternative identity by 
re-interpreting CIAM modernism through the void; signified by the 
unpredictable movement of the offensive and the dynamism of Bergson’s cone 
which undermine Cartesian flattening of identity and perception. Thus, the 
conception of a Balkanist identity is not in the delineation of either and/or, but 
in the overlapping of at least two spaces, for example, the multilayered and 
  
intersecting historical, geopolitical and socio-economic context of Belgrade. 
One can speculate that this identity may be fluctuating and open, and in this 
state challenges the conventional notion of borders being binary, fixed and 
perceived through a particular lens. 
For Henri Bergson, the relation between memory and perception is found 
along two axes. The first axis is based on rotation, where memories come 
together and converge from the ‘present’ moment; such memory is of a 
mechanical and habitual nature. The second axis is based on concentration of 
more complex perceptions, such as those made available to us through 
dreams; memory here is of cosmic nature in that it extends beyond individual 
memory, it is encompassing of memory beyond the individual. Within this 
configuration based on elastic expansion-contraction-rotation, one is no 
longer a mere observer of life but an active creator, since identity and life are 
constituted through multiple layers of memory in extension, with no layer 
having a clear beginning or end.103 The significance of Bergson’s philosophy 
to Dobrovic’s architecture was seen in the architect’s initial four-option 
proposal for the design of the complex which he called “Bergson dynamic 
schemes”104 as well as in Dobrovic’s assertion that Bergson’s 
conceptualizations are not a matter of idealism but a base upon which modern 
architecture and its theory may be conceived.105 It is not only that Dobrovic 
brought aspects of the Sutjeska Offensive to Belgrade in the form of a void, 
but that he also offered an opportunity to remake the identity of that site and 
make transformation an active part of Belgrade and the new Yugoslav identity. 
While he had a vision for the new formation, Dobrovic felt strongly that 
individual visions required translation into something solid and actual, with a 
social imperative. While a dose of abstraction and ambiguity are required, 
when visions remain at the level of visions, architecture suffers.106 
It is not just that the transformative nature of the Sutjeska Offensive has 
remained unmentioned since NATO’s 1999 intervention, but previous 
associations with the Generalstab complex have become obscured beneath 
processes of its erosion and demolition, both of which are seemingly 
contingent on negation and forgetting.107 The Generalstab complex was 
targeted twice, on the nights of 29 April and 30 April and of 7 May and 8 May. 
These two nights saw the most forceful strikes in terms of the overall urban 
infrastructure damage caused to Belgrade. The delay in the targeting of this 
complex, despite its strategic importance, is perplexing, considering NATO’s 
initial strategy was presented as being proportional, meaning that only 
military and police institutions associated with the Slobodan Milosevic regime 
were to be targeted. Since it is likely that the 1991 urban destruction of 
Vukovar, the 1991 bombings of Dubrovnik and the 1992 siege of Sarajevo 
were all ordered from Belgrade’s Generalstab complex,108 the complex was 
predictably a prime NATO target. Yet one of the first targets of NATO’s 78-
day campaign was an empty factory just outside the city. During that same 
night, three empty schools as well as a nearby monastery in suburban 
  
Rakovica109 were partially destroyed. A more relevant and ‘justifiable’ target 
on that first night was the military air base in the Belgrade suburb of Batajnica. 
Immediately after the targeting, the complex (un)intentionally became a 
memorial and a cultural artifact associated with Operation Allied Force. More 
recently, the role of the complex in its past, present and future has been 
reduced to eliminating any memories that deviate from the somewhat corrupt 
politics of control found within the Property Directorate of the Serbian 
Government and the Serbian Army. The lack of awareness regarding the 
image of the Sutjeska Offensive as an event that affirms life and facilitates a 
creative leap in history is a signifier of Serbia’s current passive and stagnant 
identity. Ironically, the stagnation has been reinforced through the political 
changes post-1999: the October 2000 democratic elections; rapid privatization 
of land, property and infrastructure; and the introduction of a consumer 
culture. A new ‘democratic’ government also meant a shift in the country’s 
policy towards integration with Europe, including a shift on questions related 
to security measures following the script determined by Europe, that is, 
NATO. 
 
Figure 2.5 The fileted Generalstab complex in 2010, with the Military Headquarters 
(Building A) on the left-hand side incurring greater damage than the Ministry of 
Defence (Building B). 
The changes are geared towards globally eliminating any difference in 
political opinion; a new type of Iron Curtain is being drawn. It is framed by 
the push to absorb all political difference of Balkanism and balkanization in 
terms of grouping together and accommodating diversity; the changes are 
  
directed towards establishing a perpetual present that eliminates any rifts, 
meaning that the individual and social are the ever-passive audience; to live 
and to think is to observe time as a condition of habit, rather than as a condition 
of movement between contemplation, action and change. The latter is 
suggestive of Bergson’s thinking on matter and memory in relation to the 
cone; pure memory found on a plane at the base of the cone moving forward 
into singular images. 
The concentration of imagery was directed towards action and creation 
during the conception and actualization of the Generalstab complex, which 
was completed despite Dobrovic parting ways with the project due to 
differences of opinion with the JNA. The West initially saw sufficient value 
in the project to merit providing funding for the Generalstab complex by way 
of a World Bank grant, at a time when buttressing of Yugoslavia as a viable 
political force not aligned with the Cold War politics of Western Europe or 
Soviet Russia was of importance in establishing and strengthening Belgrade 
as a cultural, architectural and political center. However, when the building 
was finished, it was perceived by the West as an architectural nightmare of 
concrete and pink stone façade, and an indicator of Communism.110 This shift 
in perception is significant, as from the end of WWII to the completion of the 
Generalstab complex in the mid-1960s, Yugoslav architecture was built 
mainly in the modernist International style and, unlike that of other communist 
countries, was praised by the West.111 
It was only when Yugoslavia started to clearly form its own alternative 
identity, signified by the Generalstab complex, that Yugoslav architecture 
came to be perceived in the West as an architectural nightmare. The nightmare 
associated with the complex was attributed to Dobrovic’s integration of 
modernist architecture, philosophy and local materials (red stone came from 
the Kosjeric Plant in Serbia, and white marble from Brac, an island in Croatia), 
which might be claimed to prefigure the later arrival of postmodernism in the 
West. In a lecture given on 31 January 1963 in the amphitheater of the Faculty 
of Architecture in Belgrade, and at the invitation of the Society of Architects 
and Technicians of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Dobrovic said: 
What is our task in this part of the globe? Is it not about grinding those 
materials that have been brought here, with no customs inspection, in the 
domestic mill and while grinding combining them with all those domestic 
additives and spices, domestic brains and hearts, which will turn it into 
our product, our national school’s product?112 
The fact that in the 1960s the SFRY was starting to re-establish political and 
military communication with the Soviets did nothing to enhance the 
perception of Yugoslav architecture in the West. Up until then, the SFRY was 
presented in a politically positive light due to the 1948 split from the USSR, 
which the West interpreted as a hopeful sign that other socialist and 
communist satellite states would follow and, in turn, undermine the USSR’s 
  
power. More recently, there has been a strange subversion of all that arose and 
prevailed during the period of Socialist Yugoslavia; it is largely portrayed in 
terms of mere nostalgia, backwardness rather than deliberation, and as that 
which stood in the way of the lifestyle of choice and freedom associated with 
the English-speaking Western world. 
Seemingly, whether the specter of Balkanist violence is invoked is 
contingent on alliance and integration with the West. That Yugoslav political 
orientation remained unclear and, as such, unpredictable, would have also 
been cause for concern. In a 1977 lecture, “Global Balkanization,” the 
Russian-American novelist/philosopher/screenwriter Ayn Rand associated the 
ways of living found in areas ranging from Catalonia and the Basque region 
all the way to Yugoslavia with separatism and pre-civilized ways of thinking 
statehood.113 Particular to Yugoslavia, balkanization was seen as a tendency to 
endless warring against other ethnic tribes. Along similar lines, balkanization 
in this configuration was critiqued as incompatible with the preferred Anglo-
American capitalism, due to its abnormal and odd ways of existence.114 To 
cooperate and align with the West from the 1970s was to embrace 
globalization of the market economy, that is, privatization, consumerism and 
surveillance. The agenda of global politics was certainly present in 
Yugoslavia; however, its implementation was based on charting a path that 
diverged from the Western one. 
This alternative way of practicing balkanization and globalization was seen 
during Yugoslavia’s period of non-alignment from the 1960s.115 On an urban 
and architectural level, firms such as Energoprojekt (Energyproject), Rad 
(Work), Mostogradnja (Building Bridges) and Komgrap from Belgrade, 
Energoinvest (Energyinvest) and Hidrogradnja (Hydrobuild) from Sarajevo 
and INGRA and Rade Koncar from Zagreb were guarantors for projects 
covering architecture and infrastructure systems in Africa, Asia and South 
America: Libya, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, to Iraq, Pakistan 
and Kuwait, and Peru. Each firm had the skill and capability to oversee every 
aspect of design and construction and transfer this knowledge globally. The 
motive behind Tito’s globalizing strategy was to provide a quality product at 
a lower cost than Western competitors, who not only charged more but also 
were not members of the Non-Aligned Movement. That self-management was 
inbuilt into the Yugoslav system meant that any profits won for early project 
completion were also distributed amongst the individuals involved in the 
particular project. Globalization was a question of evening out socio-
economic disparities, rather than amplifying them, as seems to be the norm 
today. 
In terms of the Generalstab complex, the evening out of disparities was by 
conceptualizing space as an opportunity to accommodate events and think 
perception as dynamically shifting frames. Dobrovic saw it as important to re-
think ideas and the role of architecture; he compared static and traditionally 
comprehended architecture with ‘accidentally fallen dust.’116 However, his 
  
thinking has an inversion: that of accidental fallen dust as a discharge and a 
spatial strategy to reimagine alternative futures whose projected identity is not 
predetermined or fixed, it is under construction. In other words, within the 
extended void facilitated by NATO’s targeting, the fallen dust of the complex 
has not only destabilized the structure and a conceptualization of what a void 
may be but has also put into question whether decay and dust historically come 
from the inside out or outside in, which, in turn, marginalizes and reframes 
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Yugoslavia in balkanization 
Beyond civil war, beyond ethnonationalism 
Dissent and war 
Alternative thinking to the 1990s balkanization of Yugoslavia 
Balkanization as a geopolitical parcelization of the SFRY through dissolution 
of its long-standing heterogeneity has been operational from the 1990s. The 
international rhetoric has it that this dissolution has been driven by 
ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism, a milder form of racism, is a drive to 
achieve ethnic purity within the borders of a given territory. However, the 
alternative position to the commonly accepted one is that while nationalism 
was used as a tool of manipulation to instate and drive both the dissolution 
and the subsequent conflict, it was not the sole driver. Neither is the narrative 
that the war was a result of Balkanist hatreds present amongst the ethnicities 
in this region the whole story. The balkanization of Yugoslavia was a potent 
mix of economic recession, ideological control through nationalism and 
mobilization of mass media; the destruction of cities in Yugoslavia and 
proclamations regarding rights to land and territory started after the gaining 
of international support for national self-determination. 
Against a diagnosis of nationalism, in July 1991, and several days after the 
war in Croatia began, over 150 intellectuals and activists from every part of 
Yugoslavia held a meeting in Belgrade to appeal to the international 
community to guarantee protected status for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which at 
the time was still peaceful.1 That same year saw large peace demonstrations 
held in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Skopje.2 In late September 1991, with the war 
in Croatia already underway, a peace march of 10,000 people spread across 
the Balkan region, with its final destination being Sarajevo. The march created 
a human chain connecting the (Croatian) Catholic Church, the (Serbian) 
Orthodox Church, the (Muslim) Mosque, and the (Jewish) Synagogue.3 These 
  
events counter a common belief that no alternatives were put forward to the 
international community.4 In other words, while nationalism was certainly 
present and a notable factor in the dissolution of the SFRY, it is problematic 
when nationalism is seen as the sole factor. 
The term ethnic conflict is used uncritically to describe the war and 
dissolution of SFRY, as if there were something self-evident and organic rather 
than constructed about that category.5 The surge of attention to and 
understanding of those events was fed by an uninterrupted circulation of 
(often) unverified references, storylines and discourses. The category thus 
inscribes onto the whole nation a specific behavior, which, in turn, is used to 
validate the Balkanist imaginary. To single out the Yugoslav dissolution as a 
unique instance of conflict that arose out of deeply seated Balkanist hatreds, 
nationalism and differing cultural values is to flatten the underlying motives 
and significance of wars such as WWII, the Cold War or the conflicts in 
Northern Ireland. If one were to characterize the dissolution of Yugoslavia as 
a signifier of ethnic barbarity, then surely the nations that participated in those 
other wars would also risk being categorized as barbaric cultures. 
From a different perspective, the belief that the dissolution was a result of 
ethnic hatreds is a colonial way of framing balkanization and an attempt to 
glorify the embrace of multiple ethnicities supposedly typical of Anglo-
American and Western European societies.6 The current colonial framing to 
do with conflicts in this region is different from the conquests of the Ottoman 
Empire. The heterogeneity found in the Balkans was largely respected by the 
Ottoman Empire up until the 17th Century. Conversion to Islam – largely in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina – occurred for social status, the right to hold onto land 
and estates and to avoid paying higher taxes. The late 1970s and early 1980s 
economic crisis in Yugoslavia, exacerbated by the need to repay debt from 
post-WWII loans from the World Bank and the IMF, contributed both to an 
erosion of the socialist ideology of brotherhood and unity and to being used 
as a trigger to inflame nationalist tensions; the economic downturn in Croatia 
and Slovenia was politically promoted as a direct outcome of socialism. 
The Western subsidies and loans from the late 1940s and early 1950s did 
initially facilitate a surge of productivity and economic stability in the 
following decades; but from the 1970s, the interest payments on the debt were 
increasing at an uncontrollable rate. A debt of US$4 billion in the early 1970s 
tripled by the end of the decade. Needless to say, the 1979 global oil crisis and 
recession hit Yugoslavia’s precarious economic situation hard.7 The pattern of 
economic downturn continued into the 1980s, with the 1983 debt recorded at 
US$20.5 billion and rising; it was the highest per capita debt in Eastern 
Europe. Having little in foreign exchange reserves, even everyday items such 
as coffee and petrol became scarce; the economic crisis was clearly spreading 
with no end in sight.8 However, the coincidence of the economic crisis in 
Yugoslavia with the World Bank’s and the IMF’s 1980s economic 
liberalization only exacerbated the crisis which opened up Yugoslavia to 
  
privatization and market economics and the removal of public ownership and 
state control. The situation steadily deteriorated, reaching the climactic point 
in 1989 when inflation stood at 2,000 per cent and the unemployment rate at 
15 per cent. The state of economic collapse was particularly evident in 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, all of which declared bankruptcy in 
1987. Bosnia-Herzegovina looked to be going down the same road with the 
collapse of significant industrial complexes such as Agrokomerc.9 
In the context of economic depression, individual republics – particularly 
the most economically stable, such as Croatia and Slovenia, that were obliged 
to fund over 50 per cent of federal budget outlays – started to pursue policies 
that benefited themselves rather than the country as a whole. The economic 
gap between the wealthiest republic, Slovenia, and the poorest, Kosovo, 
tripled in the 1960s, and sextupled in the 1980s. Understandably, Croatia and 
Slovenia’s position was that the socialist policy of economic equalization in 
the name of brotherhood and unity was not put into practice. Their preference 
was that if any re-distribution were to occur it needed to happen directly from 
one republic to another rather than via the federal government in Belgrade. 
The belief was that the economic set-up privileged Serbia the most, since 
during the formalization of Yugoslavia post-WWII, this republic was 
exempted from the need to contribute towards the federal budget.10 
The central government in Belgrade was undermined not only by the 
economic downturn, with its calamitous spike in unemployment rates, but also 
by the failure to find a new unifying voice to smooth over disagreements in 
the federation following the death of Tito in 1980. The dissolution that ensued 
was a result of economic and political fracturing, rather than purely of ethnic 
hatreds. By the end of 1991, Yugoslavia existed no longer; both Slovenia and 
Croatia had gained independence and adopted political systems that 
abandoned socialism. The final blow in the collapse of Yugoslavia was dealt 
by international rather than national decisions.11 Where the IMF and the World 
Bank played a role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia was through refusal to 
relieve the inflation-fueled ballooning debts. 
In the 1990s, the West supported non-socialist leaders, parties and 
governments in the former Yugoslav context. Nationalism was ignored, as the 
West assumed that newly formed governments would remove all associations 
with socialism and embrace the market economy. Moreover, and according to 
Susan Woodward, 
[b]y accepting the principle of national self-determination for the 
independence of states – without regard to the Yugoslav conditions of 
multinationality and the shared rights to national sovereignty of the Titoist 
system, or a willingness to enforce their unilateral decision on borders – 
Western powers were making war over territory inevitable.12 
The wars turned into a cleansing of heterogeneity, and architecture was often 
used as a means of establishing ethnic purity. 
  
Dislocation of Croatia 
Croatia’s balkanization from SFRY was bookmarked with the 87-day shelling 
and siege of Vukovar (August–November 1991) by the JNA, and the Serb 
forces’ October 1991 bombings of the city of Dubrovnik, the first of these 
taking place on 23 October. That the bombings were globally reported in the 
mass media is not a surprise considering that Dubrovnik was recognized in 
1979 by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site. This walled medieval city is 
populated with museums and libraries that map the founding of the city in the 
7th Century, including its connections to Byzantium and the Franciscan and 
Dominican orders. Its notable buildings within the Old City are prime 
examples of Gothic-Renaissance palaces, Baroque churches and Franciscan 
and Jesuit convents. The destruction of such heritage by the JNA in Croatia 
prompted the use of the term urbicide by architect and former mayor of 
Belgrade Bogdan Bogdanović in 1993 to describe the massacring of 
urbanity.13 The 1991 use of urbicide had a different genesis to the earlier Cold 
War use of the term,14 as it was related to war and the fragmentation of the 
ethnically heterogeneous SFRY. The urbicide of the SFRY and the destruction 
of its cities led to the first international involvement in the form of UN troops. 
The war-affected Yugoslavia had become a question of international security 
and one for the international media. 
In respect to Dubrovnik alone, Bogdanović saw it as an attack “of a madman 
who throws acid in a beautiful woman’s face and promises her a beautiful face 
in return.”15 Generally, he addressed the destruction in a way that 
distinguished between those dwellers who understand and revel in the 
heterogeneity of a city and those who are narrow-minded and hate the city; 
the mentality found in village dwellers or those who live on the outskirts of 
the city. He appeared to associate urban and anti-urban spaces, and those who 
dwell there, with particular sets of ideals and values including security, order 
and quality of life. At another level, he presented the “killing” of the city as 
the destruction of civic value, the elimination of the city’s material 
foundations and commonalities, and the opportunities these afford for 
heterogeneous cultures to share public space.16 Perhaps the differentiation was 
spurred by the 2 May incursion that occurred in the Serb village of Borovo 
Selo − located along the periphery of Vukovar − when a number of Croat 
policemen and Serb civilians died. The deaths occurred in the wake of the 
arrest of two Croatian policemen by the Serb civilians in this village on the 
charge of discriminating against Serbs. The shortcoming of Bogdanović’s 
suggestion is that he views the periphery and the peasant through the 
conservative lens of folklore whereby peasants are narrow-minded, backward 
and nationalistic, while city dwellers are educated, cosmopolitan and open-
minded. The understanding of the violence perpetrated upon cities such as 
Vukovar and Dubrovnik facilitated a reading of the violence as a “revenge of 
  
the countryside” on the urban.17 A backwardness supposedly found only in the 
rural culture undeniably evoked the Balkanist rhetoric of barbarity. 
According to UNESCO, the intent of the targeting of Dubrovnik was 
psychological since projectiles directed towards the Old Town “were 
incapable of inflicting much actual structural damage though they did make 
an impressive and deafening metallic noise as they exploded and a small but 
sinister whistling sound as they flew over the roof-tops.”18 Moreover, the 
images used for media purposes were predominantly of burning yachts and 
boats, the smoke enhancing a scene of devastation and destruction.19 
Undeniably, watching yachts burn imparted a heightened psychological effect. 
Significant damage was suffered by the following religious and cultural 
buildings: St. John’s Fort, the Synagogue, the Jesuit Church and the west 
windows of the Dominicans’ Monastery and Museum.20 The violence that was 
reported in the international media in the lead-up to the disintegration of SFRY 
and immediately thereafter contributed towards support for Croatia’s 
independence and a general understanding of the destruction occurring in 
Croatia. The media portrayed violence perpetrated by the JNA and Serb forces 
often eliminated the violence directed towards the Serbs by the Croatians in 
Dubrovnik and the rest of Croatia. The rising divisions between the ethnicities 
and republics were made possible through the rhetoric and threat of Other. 
Croatia’s desire to dislocate from the SFRY was voiced in a late 1980s 
speech given by the historian and retired general, and founder of the 
nationalist and right-wing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ – Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica), Franjo Tudjman, when he declared that “[t]he NDH 
[Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska – Independent State of Croatia, as it was known 
during WWII when it was a Nazi state] was not simply a quisling creation and 
a fascist crime; it was an expression of the historical aspirations of the 
Croatian people.”21 The historical goal was possibly in reference to “long-
standing Croatian aspirations for statehood – the ‘Thousand Year Old Dream,’ 
as it came to be known.”22 Following the election of Tudjman as the Croatian 
president in April 1990, a significant change was made to Croatia’s 
constitution in December of that year. Croatia would no longer be legally 
bound to recognize the Serbs in Croatia, who formed approximately 12 per 
cent of the population, as constituent peoples; instead, they became a national 
minority.23 This legal shift significantly affected the rights of the Serb 
population. Croatia declared independence and full sovereignty in June 1991. 
The political changes in Croatia also coincided with incidents that broke out 
in May 1991 in Knin, a city with a majority Serb population and which 
between 1991 and 1995 acted as the capital of the newly formed Republic of 
Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina – RSK). This Serb majority within 
Croatia predominantly lived along the borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia. Their move to this area was made possible during the 16th Century; it 
was a military frontier separating the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. The 
Serbs were given the land by the Habsburgs, and the freedom to cultivate it, 
  
in exchange for defending the military border. Even after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Serbs in this region retained relative independence; their 
desire for self-sufficiency and rural-oriented lifestyle also meant that the zone 
remained the poorest in Croatia. Their relative self-sufficiency was put into 
question in 1991. That year, protests broke out in Knin as a result of the 
reinstatement of the chessboard flag and coat of arms, the insignia used by the 
Independent State of Croatia during WWII. Even though the Germans set up 
the state, the Croatian Ante Pavelić led it. During this time, hundreds of 
thousands of Jews, Roma and Serbs were killed or interred in one of the 26 
concentration camps in Croatia. 
 
Figure 3.1 The boundaries of Croatia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina during the 
1991–95 period. 
The Serb media in Serbia seized on Croatia’s reintroduction of perceived 
fascist symbolism to amplify the rhetoric that Croatia was attempting to repeat 
the violent acts perpetrated during WWII. From the late 1980s, systematic 
discrimination against its Serbian population included eradicating housing and 
employment rights, while the removal of Serb-oriented socio-cultural factors 
such as ethnic language (the use of Cyrillic script), speech and literature was 
also noted.24 According to a UN report: 
[d]ual script road signs even in areas where Serbs were a majority were 
torn down, Serbian sounding words were purged from the official no 
longer Serbo-Croatian language, some Serbs were asked to sign loyalty 
oaths to the government and some lost their employment in government 
positions or were subjected to confiscatory taxation.25 
  
The period from 1991 to 1993 also saw 10,000 houses mainly owned and 
occupied by Serbs razed or blown up, sometimes while people were still 
inside.26 
The violence occurring in Croatia in the late 1980s and early 1990s occurred 
at a time when the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic began his rise to power. 
Undeniably, he exploited the situation in Croatia to advance his power through 
rhetoric that insisted measures needed to be taken for the Serbs to feel safe in 
the Yugoslav republics. Milosevic secured victory in the 1990 presidential 
election in Serbia on the basis of a nationalist campaign spurred by violence 
between Serbs and Albanians in what was then known as the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija. Support for Milosevic increased after the 
speech he gave in Kosovo on 28 June 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the 
Battle of Kosovo at the Field of Blackbirds where the Turks defeated the Serbs 
and the medieval Serbia. The anniversary was organized by the Orthodox 
Church. During the speech, he invoked the long history of the Serbs as a heroic 
and strong nation, even when under foreign rule. What Milosevic managed to 
achieve with this political move was not only to short-circuit time by bringing 
events of the distant past into the present, but also, by using the mythologized 
narrative of the battle (the Serbian Prince Lazar dying whilst defending Serbia 
against the Turks), to deploy the event to proclaim heroism, strength and 
oppression as recurrent cycles in Serbian history. Similarly, by invoking the 
event and the name of Prince Lazar he placed the 1980s turmoil of Yugoslavia 
and his own persona along the same trajectory; not only was history repeating 
itself, but also Milosevic was the latest defender of Serbia in the present day. 
The underlying agenda undeniably intended to revive nationalism by setting 
up Serbs as victims whilst also promoting a belief that Serbs may once again 
be forced to leave Kosovo, which historically was seen as their land.27 The 
situation was exploited by Milosevic; he was quoted as saying “[y]ou 
shouldn’t abandon your land just because it’s difficult to live [sic. there], 
because you are pressured by injustice and degradation.”28 The speech, loaded 
as it was with emotive words, skated along the slippery line between fact and 
fiction. The rhetoric he used laid the ground for the forthcoming legal and 
constitutional changes which reached their apex with the eradication of the 
autonomy of Kosovo. Considering the significance of the Battle of Kosovo in 
Serbian history and mythology, and its association with the 500-year-long 
Ottoman rule, the speech incited initial support for Milosevic not only in 
Serbia, but also in areas in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with a significant 
Serb population. The speech became a discursive and performative tool to fuel 
nationalism in collective Serb consciousness and to silence all those who were 
opposed to nationalism by manipulating the socio-political crisis beyond the 
territorial borders of Serbia; the aim was to amplify and solidify Milosevic’s 
stronghold in Serbia and Serb-populated areas in Yugoslavia. The fact that 
Milosevic’s message was both nationalist and socialist – not, as in Croatia, 
  
nationalist and market economy–oriented – gained both initial and ongoing 
support for him. 
The war on homogeneity was not just a war of economics, international 
involvement and media manipulation. After all, the international community 
played a role by recognizing independence of Croatia. It was also a war over 
rights to land and territory. For Milosevic, the violence was driven by a 
seemingly ‘given’ necessity (and right) to join together Serb-populated areas 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia. For Tudjman, it was oriented 
towards the forced ejection of the once-constituent Serb nation from Croatia, 
which materialized in August 1995 as part of Homeland War (Domovinski 
Rat), a two-part offensive.29 The first of these took place in May 1998, a part 
of Operation Flash (Blijesak), which restored control over the northern parts 
of the RSK, and the second was Operation Storm (Oluja), whose magnitude 
was more severe. The Operation Storm that forced over 200,000 Serbs to flee 
was presented as war for Croatian independence and as a question of taking 
back control of a significant chunk of Croatian territory measuring nearly 
10,500 square kilometers, or about 18.5 per cent of the land in Croatia. The 
objective of homogeneity through balkanization, that is, imposition of ‘ethnic 
purity’ and assertions of rights to land that were associated with Tudjman’s 
and Milosevic’s rise to power, is both ironic and paradoxical considering the 
centuries-long cultural heterogeneity found in this region. 
Dislocation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Since Bosnia-Herzegovina was more multi-ethnic than Croatia, and prior to 
the disintegration of the SFRY considered a Yugoslavia in microcosm, efforts 
to eradicate heterogeneity there were more extreme. There were three groups 
in this war and three self-declared areas: Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) who 
were devoted to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 1991); Croats 
who were faithful to the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (established in 
November 1991), and Croatia; and Serbs who were committed to the Republic 
of Srpska (proclaimed in January 1992) and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The Serb military action was undertaken by Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Serbs, led 
by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, with support from Serbia’s Slobodan 
Milosevic. Military action on behalf of Croatians was led by Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s Croat Mate Boban and supported by Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman. 
Muslim military combat was led by Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslim first 
President Alija Izetbegovic. The heads of state and their parties had, just like 
in Croatia and Serbia, been elected on the basis of nationalist campaigns. Any 
opposition was met with processes of marginalization and silencing of the 
voices that deviated from the prevalent rhetoric of each ruling party. With the 
international support, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum in February–
March of 1992 for purposes of secession. The event led to unrest, the 
parcelization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and dislocation from SFRY. The Bosnian 
  
Serbs wanted to remain under their local leadership in association with Serbia, 
while Bosnian Croats wanted to become a part of Croatia. For the Bosnian 
Muslims, this was an opportunity to form a Bosnian Muslim independent state 
for the first time since their conversion to Islam during the Ottoman rule of 
Bosnia. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the destruction of cities would be widespread, but 
the cities whose destruction attracted most international attention were Mostar 
and Sarajevo. In terms of Mostar, the targeting of the historically significant 
16th Century Old Bridge (Stari Most) over the Neretva river and nine other 
bridges inside the city meant that there was a real disruption to daily life for 
the locals. The aim, according to Martin Coward, was to alter day-to-day 
routines and social interactions in such an extreme way that it became 
impossible for them to return to normal.30 The Old Bridge was significant for 
its architecture and its narrative of a bridging of east with west. The symbolic 
connotation continued over time in that its targeting by the JNA and actual 
destruction by the Croatian Military Defence (Hrvatska Vojna Odbrana – 
HVO) in November 1992 symbolized the breakdown of communication 
within multi-ethnic Bosnia. 
The flattening of heterogeneity was also present within the built 
environment, which was adorned with Ottoman, Mediterranean and Western 
European architectural elements. The documentation of urban destruction was 
recorded and commented upon by a group of architects in a document called 
Mostar ’92 – Urbicide.31 However, the targeting was not just directed towards 
destroying public buildings, community housing, urban infrastructure, 
Catholic churches, Austro-Hungarian monuments and public parks and 
gardens. It was also to erase the place of rest and memory of those who passed 
away, whilst simultaneously using the city as a site of death in the name of 
eliminating diversity. The architect Krešimir Šego wrote that in Mostar “[t]he 
cemeteries were destroyed with the town, and the dead are now buried in the 
parks and gardens.”32 Zoran Bošnjak, another architect, was more specific in 
describing the elimination of diversity once present in this city. He noted that 
“[t]he little park of Liska, where sweethearts used to meet in the shade of age-
old pines, is now a crowded graveyard of war victims – young and old, 
military and civilians, men and women, Serbs, Croats and Muslims.”33 
Sarajevo, as the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also received considerable 
media attention. The focus was not necessarily due to its status as capital, but 
more for what it was seen to signify – a melting pot of cultures and ethnicities. 
Its siege by the Serb forces was thus perceived as the flattening of an open-
minded and plural Europe, and its destruction described as “warchitecture” by 
Sarajevo’s Association of Architects.34 In 1993, in the midst of the siege of 
Sarajevo, this destruction was marked with an exhibition in Paris 
Warchitecture – Urbicide Sarajevo. Carefully detailed maps indicated damage 
inflicted on specific architectural elements and spaces as well as noting 
whether the destruction was partial or complete. The exhibition displayed 
  
architecture as a spatial and visual manifestation of damage by the Bosnian 
Serb army where supplied maps and photographs framed architecture in terms 
of war ruins. Targeted architecture was also broken down into historical and 
cultural categories: Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, modernist and 
contemporary.35 The project had its international launch at the Paris Pompidou 
Centre in 1994; the frontier of war was expanded virtually through the 
exhibition, including the borders of Sarajevo as a city under siege. 
A well-documented example of “warchitecture” is the destruction of the 
19th Century Sarajevo City Hall (Vijecnica) and the National and University 
Library of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1896 building is located in proximity to 
Bascarsija – a historic bazaar built in the 15th Century during Ottoman rule – 
and the residential zone on the other side may be seen as gateway structure 
between these two zones. The imposing scale of the structure underwent a 
couple of redesigns; the cultural diversity was present with the choice of the 
architects. The first design was by the Czech architect Karel Parik. However 
due to disagreements, presumably on matters to do with finance, Parik was 
replaced with the Austro-Hungarian architect Alexander Wittek. His role was 
to rework Parik’s proposal. The pseudo-Moorish-style design was inspired by 
the style of Islamic mosques; the inspiration was an interpretation and one 
tailored to suit the aesthetic of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The completion 
was seen through by the Croat architect and conservationist Ciril Metod 
Ivekovic following Wittek’s death in 1894. Since its completion, the structure 
stood paramount in the identity of Sarajevo. 
In August 1992, Vijecnica was attacked over a period of three days; Bosnian 
Serb grenades carved up the structure. The targeting of the 19th Century 
pseudo-Moorish-style structure also destroyed centuries-old records from the 
Balkans, over a million books and 100,000 manuscripts. It is said that 
[a]ll over the city, sheets of burning paper, fragile pages of grey ashes, 
floated down like a dirty black snow. Catching a page, you could feel its 
heat, and for a moment read a fragment of text in a strange kind of black 
and grey negative, until, as the heat dissipated, the page melted to dust in 
your hand.36 
The destruction was associated with destruction of memory – memoricide – 
as it was an attempt to destroy the documentation of history.37 In other words, 
the shelling of significant buildings such as Vijecnica or the Oriental Institute 
contributed to the historical loss of numerous documents in Arabic, Persian 
and Hebrew, and symbolically to an eradication of co-existence. However, this 
was an attempt to eliminate not only history but also daily habits, as seen in 
the targeting of everyday places such as markets and cafés.38 
The destruction of buildings in Eastern Sarajevo (largely populated by 
Bosnian Serbs) largely escaped global media attention and interest, however. 
To this day, the city is divided into two parts: Western and Eastern Sarajevo. 
Balkanization in this instance was deployed for purposes of destruction, 
  
division and ultimately reconstruction; motivated by the creation of ethnically 
pure states and histories. From this perspective, the infliction of balkanization 
cannot be disentangled from questions of how to deal with the rubble of a city 
and reconceive a new identity by integrating both the distant and immediate 
history and memory of a place. 
Stability and peace 
Remaking as falsifying history 
The remaking of cities in the aftermath of war was not a straightforward 
scenario of reconstruction for the sake of allowing people and life to return 
back to ‘normal.’ The reconstruction was tied to a number of political and 
‘peace’-driven initiatives that posited peace as contingent on creating 
ethnically homogeneous enclaves; the process was highly contrary to the 
historical heterogeneity found in this region. In order to push through this 
agenda, history became a significant tool. 
The collapse of RSK in Croatia in 1995 led to the Erdut Agreement for the 
region of Eastern Slavonia, in which the city of Vukovar is also located. The 
Agreement facilitated ‘peaceful’ reintegration into the Republic of Croatia, a 
process that lasted from 1995 to 1998. In practice, stability was generally 
achieved by the Croatian Army driving out the majority of its Serb population 
during the 1995 military operations. The overall military strategy and specific 
techniques of this operation are not only studied within the US military for 
training purposes, but also portrayed as a desirable approach to politically 
altering history.39 
Because Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have one clear ethnic majority, the 
task of creating an ethnically homogeneous geopolitical entity there was 
significantly harder. The outcome was the creation of two sub-states managed 
by the UN protectorate as a third party: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(FB-H), predominantly Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat and constituting 
51 per cent of the territory; and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), 
occupying the remainder 49 per cent and predominantly Bosnian Serb. The 
international 1995 Dayton Agreement perpetuated balkanization through an 
establishment of homogeneous enclaves, whilst simultaneously creating the 
conditions for Bosnia-Herzegovina to become dependent for its survival on 




Figure 3.2 Present boundaries of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika 
Srpska (The Serb Republic). Brcko District was formed in 1999 as a self-governing 
unit to reflect the multiple ethnicities present in the city of Brcko and the surrounding 
areas even after the war. 
Whilst the signing of the Dayton Agreements at Versailles in 1995 is 
regarded as synonymous with peace, pluralism and reconciliation, the reality 
seems to be very different. The lack of ethnic plurality and cultural diversity 
  
is reinforced by the fact that the agreement was contingent on parcelizing the 
FB-H into ten cantons, with little mixing between different ethnic groups. In 
other words, from 1995, about 90 per cent of its people have lived in 
homogeneous communities. The return of displaced people to lands on the 
border between the Serb Republic and the Federation has been minimal.41 For 
a country that was multi-ethnic for centuries, forced balkanization is an 
instatement of violence, although less visible than the one seen during 1992–
95 which, apart from notable destruction of the built environment, also saw 
the displacement of 1.5 million people and over 100,000 deaths in this former 
Yugoslav Republic. 
Current violence is steeped in deception through rhetoric that invokes 
democracy and peace and obfuscates the barbarity and violence that is 
synonymous with this Balkanist zone. The belief that the one is definitely 
replacing the other through the bestowal of economic loans along with 
associated legal conditions is not only a means to veil the political impositions 
of control; to believe in such a binary rhetoric is the greatest moral narcotic. 
While this region has been under many rulers, including those of the Ottoman 
and the Austro-Hungarian empires, current violence and control is more 
dangerous precisely because of the rhetoric of democratic and plural solutions 
brought upon this region. Integration of the Balkans, that is, Western Balkans, 
with Europe and the West is made contingent on reducing diversity to 
circumvent the supposed difficulties that arise when negotiating multiple 
identities and values in one territory. Identity formation through the 
implementation of balkanization is thus equated with reactivating and 
boosting the necessity for territorial enclaves of ethnic homogeneity, rather 
than diversity. However, what this thinking simultaneously shows is a belief 
in the superiority of Western spatial formation on the basis of ethnic-separatist 
thinking and its own shortsightedness in the face of historical demonstration 
that ethnic diversity and co-existence have been possible in this region. 
At a national level, balkanization makes possible the use of specific 
historical events to craft memories of recent wars so as to lock the present 
within a particular framing of the past. The reconstruction of Croatia and FB-
H is a complex cross-fertilization of myth, fabrication and selective amnesia. 
The new identity is one of truth-formation created for purposes of dwelling 
upon the recent past; the political dogma insistent on not forgetting is there to 
keep the recent memories and emotions of the war raw and alive. The 
symbolism of war is a powerful tool in not only mobilizing history for 
purposes of achieving ethnic homogeneity and for keeping the nationalist 
flame alive, but also in facilitating a perpetually despondent image of a city in 
a limbo of war and trauma. 
Locating Croatia 
  
The 1990–91 Serbian destruction of the city of Vukovar was the precursor to 
the wild military fantasy to rebuild it in a non-existent Serbo-Byzantine style 
as a way of asserting Serbian identity.42 It is an architectural fraud comparable 
to flattening the Old Town of Warsaw to raise “a new Teutonic Warsaw from 
the ashes.”43 According to Bogdanović, the Serbo-Byzantine style does not 
have any historical lineage in Vukovar; a city that was at one point on the 
border of the Roman Empire – associated with the split between Orthodoxy 
and Catholicism – and one that was never under medieval Serbian rule when 
the particular architectural style emerged.44 He also argued that the “ritual 
killing” of cities such as Vukovar during the 1990s is an example of a “freakish 
‘civilization of glossolalia’ in whose labyrinths the mass media would easily 
stray and betray”45 from the perspective that the Communist (that is, 
alternative Socialist) ideology tried to silence alternative memories, or at the 
very least attempt to distort them. What he forgot to mention is the 
manipulation of history present in Croatian narratives.46 Vukovar’s border 
status has meant that its history contains architectural traces of not only the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, but also the Independent State of Croatia, 
Yugoslavia (during the Kingdom and the Socialist period), the RSK and now 
the Republic of Croatia.47 Oddly, reconstruction post-1995 has not only 
strengthened balkanized ethnic enclaves but is also consistent with removing 
any trace of history that does not complement the current ideology of the 
Croatian Republic. 
Using Bogdanović’s own logic of “ritual killing” of cities as motivated by 
a distorted image of events, memory and history, an alternative narration of 
recent destruction and reconstruction of Croatia is also possible. This 
alternative understands that the violence within the SFRY context is complex 
and that a clear perpetrator-victim identification is not possible, just as the 
destruction of architecture and cities cannot be separated from various 
political changes taking place at that time. More broadly, the naming of a 
Croatian “Homeland War” is peculiar since it only ever existed as a nationalist 
project rather than as a territorial entity.48 National identity is managed by 
bringing together nationalism, sovereignty and ideology for purposes of 
eliminating other ethnic narratives. That the battle of Vukovar is coeval with 
the birth of a Croatian nation in rightful and dignified ways is presented in a 
wide variety of media; from music to education, ceremonies, currency, street 
names, stamps and religious heritage.49 
Vukovar is the example par excellence of memorializing a singular 
perspective of the past. This is done through monuments, with Vukovar and 
the region of Slavonia seen to count the most: the Ovcara Memorial Centre, 
Monument to Victims of Homeland War, War Museum-Vukovar Hospital, 
Memorial Cemetery for the victims of Homeland War and the Water Tower 
being the most prominent and promoted.50 The Ovcara Memorial Centre is 
used by Croatians to commemorate the start of the siege when at least 200 
Croats were massacred near Ovcara by the JNA and the Serb paramilitaries. 
  
The relatively closely located Memorial Cemetery for Croat defenders 
commemorates the Homeland War whilst ignoring the ethnic cleansing of 
Serbs in 1995 and massacres perpetrated since 1991. There is a meta-rhetoric 
that history can be understood only in black-and-white terms, the position that 
is used for purposes of establishing truth, that is, historical amnesia. 
 
Figure 3.3 Prominent memorials and reminder of the war in Vukovar: 1 – War 
Museum; 2 – Water Tower; 3 – Monument to Victims of Homeland War; 4 – 




Figure 3.4 War Museum inside the Vukovar Hospital. 
The discourse of truth is the capacity to strategically maneuver a battlefield 
of narratives when there is only just enough fact to validate all the erasures. 
Simultaneously, truth is contingent on the dominant Western and Anglo-
American privileging of violence perpetrated during the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. What makes this partisanship even more peculiar is that the 
recommendations made to member governments of the Council of Europe on 
the teaching of history in the 21st Century include recognizing it as a vital 
element “in the promotion of fundamental values, such as tolerance, mutual 
understanding, human rights and democracy.”51 It is thus incongruent that 
Croatia as an EU member does not abide by these values, or at least does only 
enough to send up a smoke screen. Ethnic plurality is seemingly accepted in 
the city of Vukovar, given that this is one of the few areas in Croatia with a 
small Serb ethnic minority. In meeting the conditions of the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages, bilingual plaques are displayed there in 
both Latin (Croatian) and Cyrillic (Serbian) scripts. However, divisions are 
present in most other areas of life. Co-existence is contingent on primary 
schools having two entrances, one for the Croatians and the other for Serbs. 
Classrooms are also separate, as are the ways in which history is taught. If 
anything, such an approach teaches segregation and an inability to see other 
people beyond ethnicity. There is a fine line between addressing violence and 
history in order to understand the history of violence as well as using this 
history to spearhead acceptance of the other and using it to bear hatred. Walter 
Benjamin’s thinking resonates in this context: suffering and violence from the 
past is often used to enable hatred rather than reconciliation.52 
  
 
Figure 3.5 The unreconstructed Water Tower as a signifier of the war. 
Memorializing history is dependent upon falsifying historical moments. 
This is seen in the memorial erected by Croatians in the majority Serb village 
of Borovo Selo to commemorate the death of 12 policemen who died in a 
violent encounter with Serbs in 1990, an incident that has been presented as 
the precursor of the violence in Croatia. The memorial was vandalized by the 
Serbs, probably because they were in disagreement with its one-sided 
interpretation of history. The Croatian response was the erection of a new 
memorial as a way to have the final say on Croatian power and territorial 
  
occupation.53 While the significance of war memorials and war heritage is not 
a new concept, with memorials and monuments deployed to construct 
historical framework and identity from Poland and France to Cambodia,54 the 
specificity of Vukovar is that war has been subsumed into tourism in a way 
that undermines the possibility of facilitating other forms of tourism, from 
archeological settlements of Troy to nautical culture.55 
 
Figure 3.6 Memorial Cemetery for the victims of Homeland War. 
  
 
Figure 3.7 Ovcara Memorial Centre. 
 
Figure 3.8 Monument to the Victims of Homeland War. 
War and trauma occupy the political and built landscape, implemented not 
only through segregation and the supposed inability to co-exist with ethnic 
minorities, but also on behalf of the military defenders of Vukovar. 
  
Nationalism is kept alive by memorials coded with simplistic narratives and 
symbols from the war. That war symbols and names extend beyond the 
boundaries of Vukovar is seen with the 2017 construction of its airport 
terminal and the renaming of the airport in Zagreb to Franjo Tudjman Airport, 
a name suggesting that Croatia meets the world in a celebration of war 
criminals and nationalist tendencies. The design of the terminal building, 
which arose out of the competition organized by the City of Zagreb in 2008 
and won by Branko Kincl, Velimir Neidhardt and Jure Radic, celebrates the 
symbolic national insignia even in landscaping, with a chessboard landscaped 
garden plot fronting the main entry. 
The destruction that Dubrovnik incurred has been remediated and is largely 
not visible. However, upon entering the Old City, one encounters large boards 
affixed to the perimeter walls that note the complete or partial destruction 
incurred during the 1991 bombardment of Dubrovnik by the JNA; for the most 
part, these indicate damage to areas of pavement and rooftop strikes rather 
than actual destruction. One of the notable buildings destroyed was the 
Baroque-style house that was home to the painter Ivo Grbic. The reconstructed 
building has now been turned into an exhibition space for the destruction 
incurred. The Memorial Room of the Defenders of Dubrovnik is another 
notable reference to the war, a space found on the ground floor of the Gothic 
and Renaissance style Sponza Palace built in the 16th Century, to 
commemorate all the lives lost in the defense of this city between 1 October 
1991 and 31 May 1992. Its interior is populated with photos, live video 
footage and memorabilia in the form of war objects and a burned flag. 
  
 
Figure 3.9 Prominent memorials and reminders of the war in Dubrovnik: 1 – Museum 




Figure 3.10 Façade of the Sponza Palace in which the Memorial Room of the 
Defenders of Dubrovnik is located, and inside the Memorial Room. 
A more charged evocation of the war is found in Dubrovnik’s Museum of 
the Croatian War of Independence. The museum is located within the walls of 
the fort on Mount Srdj. The space is broken into four areas, each of which 
commemorates a different aspect of history. The first maps the 19th Century 
history of the Imperial fort and the fall of the Republic of Dubrovnik, while 
the other three thematic spaces are oriented towards commemorating the 
targeting of the city in 1991, the liberation and the destruction of buildings 
and civilian suffering. Its weighting of history certainly is directed towards 
the 1990s period and its aftermath, rather than to the Republic of Dubrovnik 
(then known as Ragusa), which for a period of 500 years and up until the 19th 
Century was known not only for its trade but also as a showcase of Baroque 
urban planning, features which contributed towards its 1979 UNESCO 
inscription. In other words, the intent behind the museum is largely to place 
Dubrovnik as the prime site of the war in Croatia and, alongside the memorials 
in Vukovar, as an example of the true face of war. History was not only 
compressed but also short-circuited in that the museum, which exhibits 
everything from historic documents and video footage to war maps and 
remnants of war memorabilia, largely ignores the 20th Century history of 
Dubrovnik, when it was part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and then the 
SFRY. 
A compulsion to eliminate the 20th Century history has been seen in the full 
or partial destruction of over 3,000 post-WWII monuments erected to 
commemorate the Yugoslav victory against fascism during and in the 
aftermath of war. Others, such as the Bogdanović-designed and Bogdanović-
enacted memorial in 1966, Stone Flower, to commemorate the WWII deaths 
of Jews, Roma and Serbs in concentration camp in Croatia’s region of 
  
Slavonia – also known as “Auschwitz of the Balkans”56 – has largely remained 
unscathed due to its global recognition. Where the memorialization of history 
becomes twisted is that in mass media the Jasenovac concentration camp is 
now also referred to as a ‘labour and collection camp,’ designed for purposes 
of upskilling and cultivating possibilities for arts and culture.57 
Even the Memorial Museum Jasenovac, designed by Helena Paver Njiric 
and added in 2006–07 for purposes of supposedly addressing the fascist past, 
denies the attempt to collectively remove particular national identities.58 It 
seems that the dominant act of destroying anti-fascism monuments in Croatia 
is simultaneously synonymous with a tacit agreement with fascism, as well its 
denial. Presumably, the EU recognized the significance of this (continuing) 
intent and operation at the time it welcomed Croatia into the European fold. 
Memory not only has been militarized, but also delegitimized and short-
circuited. When it comes to the SFRY period, memory and history can be 
recalled and addressed only from the perspective of anti-communism and anti-
Balkanism. That the need to remove any association with the Balkans and 
communism was paramount was seen in the 1990s name change of the movie 
theater in Zagreb from Cinema Balkan (Kino Balkan) to Europe (Europa).59 
Locating Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The transition to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been related directly to 
urban post-socialist reconstruction, largely made possible through foreign 
funding. As for Mostar, reconstruction remains tainted with divisions and 
disagreements between the Bosnian Croats, who reside in the western part, 
and Bosnian Muslims, who inhabit the eastern part. This is despite the 
reconstruction of the Old Bridge in the old Muslim quarter, held up as an icon 
of reconciliation between the two warring sides. The impetus for the 
reconstruction of the bridge came from UNESCO in 1994; the funding flowed 
from numerous organizations such as the World Bank, EU, the Aga Khan Trust 
for Culture and the World Monuments Fund as well as in the form of donations 
from European countries such as France, Italy, Turkey, Croatia and the 
Netherlands. The funds were predominantly directed towards visible and 
symbolic projects such as monuments. Symbolically, reconciliation was 
directly representative of the opportunity to present glossy images to the 
world, rather than investing in projects that would alleviate the real war trauma 
within the region. The ongoing presence of trauma and divisions is evident in 
the stone plaque set below the bridge, reading “[e]xtremists HVO [Croatian 
Military Defence] and HV [Croatian Army] destroyed this 427-year-old 
bridge.”60 And so that the international community need not be aware of it, or 
may avert its eyes from it, the plaque cannot be seen from the tourist trail.61 
The borders in Mostar are not as obvious as those in the West Bank or 
Nicosia, but they are certainly present. Within this context, balkanization is 
found within the Old Bridge itself. Despite serving as a spectacular emblem 
  
of peace and co-existence, the actual bridge now reinforces the separateness 
of the two sides of the city. As it affects Mostar, the bridge restoration is no 
longer just about the symbolism of reconnecting the Bosniaks (Bosnian 
Muslims) with the Bosnian Croats. It is the way its restoration to ‘original 
heritage’ state is nothing more than a fabrication of history. Not only can the 
bridge not serve the same function as it did prior to its fileting, but also the 
craft does not match the originary tectonics, despite attempts at heritage 
accuracy by referring to numerous documents and sourcing stone from the 
same quarry the builders of the original used. The process of reconstruction 
even involved archeological and scientific research that uncovered bridge 
structures predating the 1557 construction of the Old Bridge. 
 
Figure 3.11 Prominent past and present memorials in Mostar: 1 – Bogdan 
Bogdanović’s 1965 Partisan Memorial Cemetery; 2 – Park Zrinjevac: the location of 
the Bruce Lee sculpture since 2013; 3 – Spanish Square: location of the 2005 Bruce 
Lee sculpture; 4 – Stari Most (Old Bridge). 
The actual construction, which began in 2001, was accompanied by a 
rhetoric of ‘honesty and integrity’ in ensuring the application of ancient 
techniques and methods. The honesty perhaps being the more prominent of 
the two, in light of the fact that every bridge that has existed in this location 
up until the 2004 unveiling of the New Old Bridge was constructed in a 
different style, without replicating the previous design. Tradition may need to 
be derived from a basis other than mere replication of the structure that was 
there prior to destruction. Addressing the typology of the bridge, its uses and 
weathering are more suited to framing the context of history than a 
reconstruction that treats history as a frozen object. The only difference that 
  
has been permitted in the rebuilt bridge is the name: once the Old Bridge, but 
now a New Old Bridge. 
 
Figure 3.12 The UNESCO-protected Stari Most (Old Bridge), that is, Novi Stari Most 
(New Old Bridge) in Mostar. 
While Todorova has described Balkanism in terms of stages of development 
between developed and less developed areas, and a bridging together of 
cultures and spaces, a more precise description of the current state of FB-H 
demands greater complexity. Perhaps that state is best encapsulated by Georg 
Simmel’s observation that “practically as well as logically, it would be 
meaningless to connect that which was not separated and indeed that which 
also remains separated in some sense.”62 Although the bridge is physically 
connecting the two parts, the politics of balkanization has it reinforce the 
inability of the two parts to co-exist. But the fact that this is not just a question 
of the present operating as two separate islands in the face of the immediate 
past can be seen in the attempts made to remove any history when co-existence 
was possible. The identity of post-Dayton Mostar is dependent upon the 
dismantling of socialist and anti-fascist history, as seen through the damaging 
of Bogdanović’s 1965 Partisan Memorial Cemetery in 1992, which was built 
with the intent to commemorate the deaths of those who fought against 
fascism, in Mostar and across Europe and the world. The memorial has been 
only partially restored. 
The attempts to breach divisions were also seen in the initiative by Mostar 
Urban Movement to construct a life-sized bronze statue of Bruce Lee. The 
choice of the martial artist was so far removed from the context of the war that 
  
it seemed an appropriate symbol of reconciliation and solidarity; Lee was a 
figure loved by all who grew up in SFRY. The sculpture, made by the Croatian 
sculptor Ivan Fijolic, was unveiled in November 2005 in the Spanish Square, 
only to be vandalized soon after. The memorial was removed and relocated to 
the nearby Zrinjevac park in 2013. Its placement is significant, as the statue 
faces neither the western nor eastern side; in other words, he is not siding with 
either the Bosnian Croats or the Bosniaks. 
When it comes to Sarajevo, the lack of commonality between the different 
ethnicities is exacerbated through reconstructed architecture. The 
reconstruction of Vijecnica (the National and University Library of Bosnia-
Herzegovina), and its symbolic association with the different ethnicities that 
have passed through, occupied and lived in the city of Sarajevo, have been 
eclipsed by the fact that attempts were not made to deal with the history of 
trauma; instead, the focus has been symbolic and power-oriented. The 
reconstruction was seen as a tribute to Europeanization and civilization, as 
values opposed to barbarism. This is significant considering that the building 
has been associated with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 
1914 (some of the last visual records of his life were captured on the steps of 
Vijecnica) and indirectly with the start of the Balkans War, the outbreak of 
WWI and the association of the Balkans with violence and despotism. 
 
Figure 3.13 Prominent past and present memorials and rebranded and reconstructed 
buildings in Sarajevo: 1 – Sarajka: BBI Centar; 2 – Eternal Flame memorial (Vjecna 
Vatra); 3 – Memorial to mark the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of 
Austria and Museum Building in 1914; 4 – Gazi Husrev mosque; 5 – ; 6 – Vijecnica; 
7 – Martyrs Memorial Cemetery Kovaci; 8 – Museum of Alija Izetbegovic. 
  
The reconstruction and reopening of the building in 2014 seem to have 
erased much of its public use, considering that from 1947, Vijecnica was 
turned into a library, public space and a cultural seat of multi-ethnic Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The reopened building has reverted to its ‘original’ use under a 
change of name to Sarajevo City Hall. However, this city hall is used largely 
for private events, with some spaces activated for token exhibitions to do with 
the 1990s war – largely for purposes of attracting tourists. In the attempts to 
recreate the ‘original’ structure and style, including interior patterns and colors 
– despite its 19th Century style being molded to suit the Austro-Hungarian 
aesthetic palette – the chosen exterior and interior color hues have been made 
so vivid that they seem plastic. The intent behind the chosen colors has been 
for each hue to retain its intensity, despite the inevitable loss of opacity that 
original colors undergo over time. The reconstructed building denies the wear 
of time. 
The reconstruction also rests upon the widely held principle of 
ethnonationalism; at the very entrance of Vijecnica, a plaque in Bosnian and 
English has been placed reading,  
On this place, Serbian criminals in the night of 25th-26th August 1992 set 
on fire the National and University’s Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Over 2 millions of books, periodicals and documents vanished in the 
flame. Do not forget. Remember and warn!63  
The plaque is not only overturning the heterogeneity and plurality of views 
and values associated with Vijecnica prior to its destruction, but also 
signposting that the building of the post-socialist identity of the capital is 
premised on cementing the polarization of public and private space as well as 
‘us as victims’ and ‘them as perpetrators.’ The role of architecture in Bosnia-
Herzegovina building of peace and stability seems to be oriented not only 
towards erasure and selective narration of history, but also colonization 
considering the association of the building with the Hapsburg era in an attempt 
to throw out the Balkanist baggage. 
  
 
Figure 3.14 The reconstructed 19th Century Vijecnica. 
 
Figure 3.15 The entry to Vijecnica – the plaque is a reminder of war and those seen 




Figure 3.16 Inside Vijecnica – the exhibition as a reminder of war and destruction. 
However, the reconstruction of Sarajevo is more complex than this, and any 
attempt to ascribe to it a particular identity may not be possible. The 
reconstruction of the city’s Gazi Husrev Mosque was made possible by the 
Saudi government. The process of remaking was made provisional on 
eliminating any versions of Islamic design considered by the Saudi 
government to lack merit. Thus, the 1996 reconstruction of Gazi Husrev 
involved stripping the interior of all Balkan Islamic design and color. 
Seemingly, to locate the historically multi-ethnic and multi-religious Sarajevo 
is contingent on removing any sense of cultural context and difference in 
practicing and representing Islam. This is not a question of reinterpretation of 
Islamic design, a tactic implemented during the Austro-Hungarian reign when 
the Austrians reinterpreted Orientalism to create Vijecnica. That may well 
deserve to be classified as a sign of colonialism; but what is different in 
Sarajevo’s Gazi Husrev Mosque is that reinterpretation is permissible only if 
it replicates a singular vision of Islam – the vision of the Saudi government. 
The funding corporations, and their ability to determine what needs to be 
preserved, drive the decisions behind not only reconstructions but also 
historical narrative. The guided tours within and around the historic Bascarsija 
bazaar now narrate the centuries-old buildings such as the Gazi Husrev 
Mosque in relation to the 1990s war rather than to its more distant history. 
The national politics of FB-H are just as single-minded. Despite the 
Museum of Alija Izetbegovic being portrayed as a museum of plurality and 
inclusivity, the reality is significantly different. The agenda is geared towards 
setting up a clear victim – perpetrator mentality, where the perpetrator is the 
genocidal Serb whose violence is nothing short of Nazism.64 Izetbegovic 
comes across as some kind of visionary and a preacher of tolerance, though a 
totalitarian one. Within the corridor that connects two parts of the museum, 
photos of Izetbegovic are interspersed with his sayings. Alongside his prisoner 
mug shot taken in March 1946, during his imprisonment post-WWII, he is 
noted as saying “to openly look the truth in the eye is to realize that the 
meaning of life lies in the fight against evil.”65 The quote is not only directed 
against the ideology of the communist/socialist rule in Yugoslavia post-WWII, 
but also is an attempt to establish his beliefs as the only voice of truth. Other 
photos and quotes permanently exhibited in the corridor largely depict Bosnia 
and its people as innocent in the face of the other side, represented by 
Milosevic and Tudjman. Izetbegovic is not only the face and voice of truth, 
but also to engage with and support him has the character of revelation and 
miracle, since, after all, “[s]weet lies are of no use, while bitter truths can have 
a healing power.”66 That the Museum is in the immediate vicinity to the 
Martyrs’ Memorial Cemetery Kovaci where a notable number of Bosnian 
soldiers who were killed whilst defending Sarajevo were buried, and where 
  
the body of Izetbegovic was also buried, makes it questionable as to how these 
reminders of death and war can have a healing power. 
 
Figure 3.17 View from the Museum of Alija Izetbegovic towards the Martyrs’ 
Memorial Cemetery Kovaci; it houses the bodies of the Bosniak soldiers killed during 
the 1990s war and the body of Alija Izetbegovic. 
  
 
Figure 3.18 Inside the Museum of Alija Izetbegovic; the corridor features plaques with 
Izetbegovic’s photos and words of wisdom. 
Narrating 1990s history through exhibitions within the city of Sarajevo has 
become a regular event, no longer something exceptional. Such events are 
largely sponsored by foreign money. One of these is the exhibition that 
addresses the genocide in Srebrenica as well as the siege of Sarajevo; it was 
supported by the Turkish government. No other examples of genocide 
experienced by other ethnicities are displayed there. Against the state- and 
foreign-funded memorials, civilian memorials such as The Sarajevo Roses are 
less ethically divisive in that loss and trauma are treated as more complex and 
less binary. That particular memorial was conceived by filling in with red resin 
all the bullet and grenade holes in the surface of the ground, areas where 
civilians were often killed. This filling in created abstract patterns of flowers, 
which led to the naming of the memorial. As the city is being reconstructed, 
and roads repaired, traces of these memorials are also being removed. 
Sarajevo largely seems to be constructing its identity through the 1990s 
violence, and in response to a need to remove the historical socialist tag. The 
post-socialist transition is intent on the removal of any communist names from 
the public domain. The socialist store Sarajka has also been reconstructed with 
Saudi funding. The glitzy new shopping center not only has a new name – 
BBI Centar – but also articulates the instatement of religious cultural practices 
previously not followed by the Bosnian Muslims: there is a ban on serving 
alcohol inside. Another key target in the political maneuver to erase any trace 
of socialism has been street names, with 40 per cent of streets being assigned 
a new name.67 One name change that did not go ahead, as a result of public 
  
protests, is to Marshal Tito Street. This is significant since that name was to 
be replaced with the name of former President Alija Izetbegovic. While such 
resistance may be seen as an example of nostalgia, the more radical agenda is 
found in the thinking that alternatives found in Titoist socialism have not been 
completely eradicated from the people’s psyche. 
 
Figure 3.19 The rebranded Sarajka, now BBI Centar, on Marshal Tito Street. 
Traces of more distant histories are still present, though few and far 
between. One of these is the Eternal Flame (Vjecna Vatra) memorial built in 
1946 to commemorate the anniversary of Sarajevo’s liberation from Nazi 
Germany and the fascist Independent State of Croatia. The flames have stood 
the test of time and are still burning despite the change of government and 
political orientations. The inscription at the 1946 Eternal Flame notes: 
With Courage and the Jointly Spilled 
Blood of the Fighters of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian, 
Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian Brigades 
of the Glorious Yugoslav National Army; 
with the Joint Efforts and Sacrifices of Sarajevo’s Patriots 
Serbs, Muslims and Croats on the 6th of April 1945 
Sarajevo, the Capital City of the People’s Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was liberated. 
Eternal Glory and Gratitude to the Fallen Heroes 
of the liberation of Sarajevo and our Homeland, 
On the First Anniversary of its Liberation - 
  
a Grateful Sarajevo 
 
Figure 3.20 The 1946 Eternal Flame memorial. 
With the memorial located in the city center, and designed by the well-
known architect, urban planner and educator Juraj Neidhardt, its meaning sits 
uncomfortably against the plaques in the immediate city center vicinity that 
identify the Serb destruction as criminal. One of these recent plaques is located 
a couple of hundred meters from the Eternal Flame memorial, located at the 
entry of a clothing store, Parfois. It was allegedly placed there by the citizens 
of Sarajevo and reads, “At this place on 27 May 1992, the Serbian aggressors 
killed 26 Sarajevo civilians.” While there may be examples that imply there 
is still a possibility in FB-H to think balkanization in terms of co-existence, 
even if it is hanging on by only a thread, the divisions within the city are ever-
present. On an economic level, to go by taxi from Eastern Sarajevo (governed 
by the Serbs) into Sarajevo (governed by the Federation of Bosniaks and 
Croats), taxi drivers need to remove the taxi sign. It is against the law for a 
taxi registered in Eastern Sarajevo to pick up a passenger in Sarajevo that 
belongs to the Federation, and vice versa. Segregation is monetized. 
The question that is pertinent for all unreconstructed buildings and cities is 
not whether they should remain in their ruinous state, but the role they may 
play in constructing the future post-socialist identity. In other words, how to 
deal with ruins and post-socialism via Balkanism in a way that does not 
reinforce the already violent association of the discourse. For Vukovar and 
Sarajevo, the identity is largely tied to memories of recent war and erasure, 
while for Mostar it is one of (falsely) constructed and spectacle-oriented co-
  
existence and connection. Dubrovnik is straddling its identification with war 
and its mercantile history. Thinking trauma and reconstruction simultaneously 
needs to be counterposed against the thinking on how to apply balkanization 
in contemporary times without imposing borders and homogeneity. In other 
words, the question of balkanization is how to co-exist with other beliefs and 
practices, and beyond the normative instatements of historical meta-narratives 
to do with land rights and ethnic homogeneity. One key agenda in any 
aftermath reconstruction is that the suffering and violence of the past are not 
to be brought into the present for purposes of fueling animosity and 
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Allied operations 
Present-future partnerships of 
humanitarianism, peace and victory 
Rhetoric, destruction and Operation Allied Force 
Humanitarianism and its paradoxes 
To think of Balkanism as the peripheral and liminal Other has an opportunist 
element: to use Balkanism as a means to deal with questions to do with 
violence constructed, distanced and air-brushed nationally, regionally and by 
Anglo-American and other Western countries. It is, in other words, a process 
by which certain acts of violence are normalized and/or ennobled as 
humanitarian, while others are constructed as acts of deep-seated barbarism. 
The premise of using Balkanism will be to consider violence in its forms and 
limitations, particularly when the identification of Balkanism is made to rely 
on parameters of perennial war and transient peace. Thus, the liminal space of 
Balkanism and its overlapping with a fragmentary dynamic of balkanization 
will be deployed to start deconstructing this binary setup. 
The concept of violence has varying interpretations, depending upon the 
audience and the political agenda. One that stands out in its peculiarity is when 
it is exercised for legitimate and humanitarian reasons, deployed for purposes 
of eliminating violence, but through the barrels of guns. The argument will be 
that taking aim with a humanitarian agenda not only purifies violence, but also 
exonerates the infliction of violence when serving justice is the cause. In fact, 
it perpetrates a play on words, considering that humanitarianism is not readily 
associated with acts of war and violence; indeed, “waging war to prevent war 
appears to be as farcical as fucking for virginity.”1 
The argument in international relations may be that in cases of severe 
breaches of human rights, the inviolability of sovereign rights is suspended 
and concerned states have a moral responsibility to intervene.2 The track 
  
record of applying this logic seems to have been selective, as seen in violence 
supported by the US in Congo in late 1990s; clearly, these zones were not seen 
as deserving of humanitarian ‘justice.’ The question similarly pertains as to 
why the US and/or NATO and/or the UN did not intervene in Rwanda in 1994 
to prevent some 800,000 people from being slaughtered. Selective evaluation 
of violence anticipates selective reasoning to distinguish the lives that need to 
be preserved from those that may be dispensed with. Humanitarian and moral 
zeal is seemingly mobilized relative only to a minority of ethnicities and areas 
of the world. NATO’s intervention in Serbia to protect ethnic Albanians living 
in Kosovo calls into question its failure to intervene in Turkey (a NATO 
member) where ethnic Kurds have been being massacred for years. There 
have been no attempts by NATO to restrain Turkey’s armed forces. The 
massacres in Congo and Sierra Leone have also not been seen as examples of 
humanitarian crises. While pairs of historical examples are never fully 
parallel, the lack of consistency and proportionality in exercising 
humanitarianism indicates an absence of impartiality when committing to 
such operations. 
NATO’s foremost reason for launching Operation Allied Force was to end 
the violence and ethnic cleansing by the Milosevic regime in Kosovo.3 On 31 
March 1999, US President Bill Clinton stated that the objective of the 
Operation was to “raise the price of aggression to an unacceptably high level 
so that we can get back to talking peace and security, to substantially 
undermine the capacity of the Serbian government to wage war.”4 For the 
Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, the military Operation Allied 
Force was a necessary “humanitarian intervention” 
intended to support the political aims of the international community. It 
will be directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed 
by the Serb Army and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability 
to cause further humanitarian catastrophe [ . . . ] Let me be clear: NATO 
is not waging war against Yugoslavia. We have no quarrel with the people 
of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in Europe because of 
the policies of their government. Our objective is to prevent more human 
suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population 
of Kosovo. [ . . . ] We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing 
its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century. We have a moral duty 
to do so. The responsibility is on our shoulders and we will fulfill it.5 
One day after the targeting began, NATO’s Defence Secretary George 
Robertson reaffirmed Solana’s position by stating that the intervention was 
impelled by a need “to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe by 
disrupting the violent attacks currently being carried out by the Yugoslav 
security forces against the Kosovar Albanians, and to limit their ability to 
conduct such repression in future.”6 The enactment of violence was possible, 
as it was described as a proportional and moral objective, reinforced in 
  
statements by Solana and Robertson that NATO would target significant 
Serbian military areas only. The intervention was required, as Serbia, seen as 
a barbaric and Balkanist regime in relation to both the treatment of Albanians 
in Kosovo and the 1990s acts of atrocity in Bosnia, was breaching the moral 
democratic values found within Europe and the Anglo-American parts of the 
world. These values could be defended only by military intervention. 
The claim that the intervention was in the name of humanitarianism invoked 
the traditional associations of this notion: immediacy and emergency, 
mobilization to save lives and higher morals and values of humankind,7 all of 
which legitimize the motivation and action behind humanitarianism. 
However, allowing a military organization such as NATO a free hand in 
defining and deciding when a violent situation warrants a humanitarian 
response, including articulating moral values, is of concern. Trust has been 
undermined in the past, such as when the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention 
was used during Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in the name of freeing slaves 
and introducing Western civilization, or when Hitler ordered the occupation 
of parts of former Czechoslovakia ostensibly to quell ethnic strife between 
Germans and Czechs.8 Or, indeed, when the US army expelled Native 
Americans from their homes in the name of law and humanity.9 
For the NATO operation and its mandate to retain ongoing support, both 
tight control of information through Orwellian doublespeak and a careful 
engineering of dehumanization were necessary; the latter made possible by 
observing the violence in Kosovo through the lens of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This elastic rhetoric drew much of its credibility from the 
Balkans’ liminal identification, which for Misha Glenny is evident from the 
British press’ framing of the Balkans first as a region of primordial hatreds, 
and the very next moment as a zone of multicultural values and the very pulse 
of Europe, as epitomized by Sarajevo.10 Needless to say, the elastic reasoning 
for the intervention, including associations with Sarajevo, starts to place a 
clear measure and ordering on the violence occurring in Kosovo. 
With Kosovo viewed through Bosnia’s lens, there was an undercutting of 
partiality and objectivity. By largely pointing a finger at Milosevic as the 
reason for the intervention, and (in)directly for the outcome of the intervention 
in terms of overall damage, the complexity of the violence was also reduced. 
While Milosevic’s regime was certainly a cause for concern given its 
nationalist and violent tendencies, the visibility of violence enacted by NATO 
was significantly obscured as its enactment placed neither personnel nor 
equipment on the ground. Instead, it was fought remotely from the air and 
through the infrastructure of satellites and physical wires. The distancing was 
paralleled by a slippery narration and perception of Milosevic. While the 
Western mass media largely condemned his positions, and despite the West 
supporting the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Milosevic for a large part of the late 
1980s and 1990s was seen as “a man we can do business with,” particularly 
when it came to the Dayton agreement.11 
  
Spectacle, distance and perception management 
Managing the audience’s perceptions about the people in Serbia and Kosovo 
and the events taking place there was possible because the Kosovo conflict 
was the first war fought from the air alone. Even when civilian deaths did 
occur, NATO simply acknowledged that infrastructure was hit.12 The focused 
framing of violence is demonstrated in NATO’s ‘accidental’ targeting by two 
projectiles at 11:40 of a civilian-occupied Express Belgrade-Nis-Skopje train 
393 crossing the Grdelica railway single track bridge. The bridge is located 
250 kilometers southeast of Belgrade, on a transport route that, according to 
NATO, was an important line of supply for the Serbian paramilitary forces in 
Kosovo.13 This targeting occurred at 11:40 on 12 April 1999, Orthodox Easter 
Monday. 
According to NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, “A very extensive analysis 
[. . . was done] which shows the pilot was totally unable to realize, to know 
before releasing his weapon that a train would appear on the bridge.”14 The 
narrative of the supreme commander of NATO General Wesley Clark is even 
more detailed in maintaining that the pilot was focused on the bridge, 
when all of a sudden, at the very last instant, with less than a second to 
go, he caught a flash of movement that came into a screen and it was the 
train coming in. Unfortunately, he couldn’t dump the bomb at that point. 
It was locked, it was going into the target and it was an unfortunate 
incident which he and the crew and all of us very much regret.15 
The narrative was that the train was traveling too fast for the trajectory of the 
missiles to have been changed in time to avoid the killing of 14 civilian 
passengers and wounding 60 more (some of whom were children).16 The video 
was replayed on Western television screens incessantly in order to 
demonstrate that the speed of missiles means that ‘accidents’ such as these are 
often unavoidable.17 The targeting was seen as violent only when a train 
emerged and became visible on the bridge. If this information had remained 
undisclosed and unseen, it would have evaded the classification of being 
violent. This was a case not only of audience emotions being managed through 
control of media representation, but also fear of those watching the spectacle 
from a distance that if support is not generated for the elimination of the Other, 
what is happening in Other zones may very well come knocking on Western 
doors. 
The disciplining is not overt. It is a result of the instilled fear that, if war is 
not waged, security in the ‘civilized’ world is likely to be breached. The 
paradox of upholding civilized and humane values is that they are 
implemented by creating borders to protect from the Other whilst 
simultaneously targeting the Other. To think in a civilized way would mean 
the elimination of obstacles to think and act differently from the norm. Yet the 
question is whether this type of civilization is feared, since exercising it in 
  
such a way would mean that one is no longer driven to inscribe power and 
control on the Other. 
In January 2000, the unavoidability of that incident was called into 
question. The footage shown at the initial NATO press conference was 
revealed to have been altered by showing it at three times the actual speed 
recorded by a camera installed in the warhead of one of the missiles targeting 
the bridge.18 The discrepancy in speed was attributed to technology; Shea was 
noted as saying that the speeded-up video was caused by a “technical 
phenomenon” rather than human manipulation.19 Using technology to deny 
responsibility for atrocities was also seen after WWII. According to Virilio, 
Albert Speer used the efficiency of technology in his defense during the 
Nuremburg Trial in order “to prove that he was only an instrument, certainly 
guilty, but that technological advances, in particular in the field of 
communications, had issued in the catastrophe.”20 The argument here is not 
that NATO’s ‘accidental’ killing of 14 civilians is comparable to the large-
scale genocide of Jews during WWII. Instead, the comparison suggests that 
technology is now an instrument that can erase evidence of (possibly 
deliberate) crime through a process of speed-in-variation, and it reminds us 
that instrumentation can be framed as a perpetrator of crime. Technowar is not 
replacing human involvement and impact. It is simply that the speed and 
multipurpose use of missiles can be deployed for erasing evidence of (a 
possible) crime. The development of technology, changes in military 
strategies, and public culture have all had an impact on media and war 
reporting. 
NATO’s 1999 Operation reveals that claiming to act on behalf of 
humanitarianism is nothing more than a disguise for a new wave of 
colonialism. The conditions under which supposedly humanitarian motives 
were implemented were those of the discourse of Balkanism. The rogue 
Balkanist agenda was persistently used during the Operation, as evident in the 
speech by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair on 17 May of that year when 
he stated that the world could not “stand by when a rogue state brutally abuses 
the basic rights of those it governs.”21 For the Balkanist rhetoric to stick, 
violence needed to be monitored and framed via an infrastructure of circuitry 
and satellites, allowing NATO missiles equipped with a camera to at once 
destroy, survey and record the targeted infrastructure on the ground. 
Technology was not only deployed to represent the absence and presence of 
violence through speed-in-variation. Technology was also an attempt to first 
miniaturize the weapon and then de-familiarize the military frame through a 
camera lens that could eliminate the human (subjective) gaze and replace it 
with a technological (objective) gaze. Thus, Cruise Missiles became 
humanitarian machines and weapons of democracy, frames of spectacle and 
tools of legal evidence, where any ‘gaps’ in erasing and constructing a 
narrative could be seamlessly sutured. Here, the perception of a particular 
zone is through a limited window and vision of a media spectacle. 
  
The Operation exceeded the “humanitarian” dictum, since the 
disproportional aspect of the Operation – NATO air power versus unarmed 
civilians – was, for Andrew Herscher, “destruction without humanity.”22 
Herscher’s “destruction without humanity” is evident in the transition of 
NATO’s “humanitarian intervention” from a pretext of saving Albanian lives 
to an outcome of adding to the overall Albanian death tally. The 14 April 
bombing of a convoy of Albanian refugees on a Prizren-Djakovica road killed 
75 civilians and wounded over 60; a month later, another 50 Albanians were 
killed in Korisa. If proportional strikes are synonymous with the weighing of 
the military target in terms of the harm the strike may cause, or the prevention 
and minimization of civilian casualties, the point at which the permissible 
limit of violence is exceeded becomes open to interpretation. 
The disproportionality of Operation Allied Force is made obvious in its 
claim of “no casualties on our [NATO’s] side” (the first war able to boast this) 
even as it killed 500 civilians on the ground.23 Only numbers of civilian deaths 
are highlighted because, according to Eyal Weizman, the killing of civilians 
has now turned into a “risk transfer war” where what is considered a 
proportional killing of civilians in relation to combat fatalities is dependent on 
what territory one is speaking about and who is doing the calculations.24 The 
paradox of proportional violence is thus that it has been presented on one hand 
as “a mathematical-minimum problem,” while on the other the formula one 
relies on is always subsumed in “the economy of variations.”25 The 
mathematical calculation not only optimizes violence but also sets up the 
possibility for operative and efficient violence, all of which are permissible in 
control societies.26 
Considering that the Balkanist corpse seemingly has less value than that of 
an Anglo American or other Western, the ability to discern the measure and 
distribution of excessive violence, including the grievability of certain 
populations, is eliminated from the start. If lives are ungrievable and zones are 
marked as barbaric, as Judith Butler tells us, there is nothing to mourn; 
alternatively, any destruction incurred is insignificant since both the zones and 
their people never existed as they did not fit within the Western and Anglo-
American value systems, particularly when an intervention is undertaken for 
purposes of defending security and peace.27 With the bombing of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),28 US President Bill Clinton’s rhetoric was that 
“we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the 
cause of peace,”29 which might well prompt speculation that the lack of 
democratic practices in the US is proportional to its drive to delivery 
democracy to the rest of the world.30 The way in which the audience is 
recruited for such spectacles is through images and rhetoric generated from a 
distance, justified on moral humanitarian grounds built on the logic of 
violence inflicted on the Other as a way to regain and fulfill a sense of self.31 
Or, as Elaine Scarry would put it, “The human capacity to injure other people 
has always been greater than its ability to imagine other people.”32 
  
Digital technology not only permits war to be waged over greater distances 
but also shrinks our ability to imagine what the Other may be experiencing, 
particularly when the objective or person is rendered a legitimate target under 
the proportionality dictum. However, virtual wars accommodated by digital 
technology and satellites are virtual only on one side; those experiencing them 
on the ground certainly feel the effects of violence. Yet we live in a time when 
humanity is framed through the lens of progress and in terms of instatement 
of security on grounds of fear of the Other. The belief in such rhetoric is not 
just a matter of propaganda or censorship; it reflects the perversity of the age 
we live in when the Other is framed through the lens of a second-rate citizen, 
certainly possible when the derogatory Balkanist rhetoric is used. When the 
life or death of the Other has no value, the value and potential growth of the 
self is also limited. The virtual wars rob us of emotion and empathy largely 
because distance facilitates a limited framing of the events taking place on the 
ground. 
Reporting from a distance, for Jean Baudrillard, turns its audience into 
hostages of information.33 It is not that he is likening the audience to actual 
hostages, but that he is putting focus on the information media and the way in 
which they serve to rob the audience of the diversity of information narratives 
taking place around the world. Through carefully constructed images, the 
viewers of news stories are habituated to perceive the violence taking place in 
the world through the gaze of a military-industrial-media-entertainment 
complex (MIME).34 In contrast to the wars of the ancients, which were 
sporadic and where possession of forts and citadels was contested in the fairly 
transparent language of war-fighting techniques, or with modern, more 
systematic and centralized wars, current methods of warfare are less overt, 
and possibly more dangerous, as their visibility is becoming more opaque; 
they are now fought from labs and media hubs.35 One can represent it as a 
highly computerized and digitized war assault, the last intervention of the pre-
drone era. 
Technowar and erasure of violence 
Technowar is an opportunity to not only exploit the capacities of smart 
machines but also to eliminate acts of violence. While a measure of 
technological and media exploitation did occur in the military campaign of the 
1991 Gulf intervention that made it hard to tell what did and did not happen 
as the narrative and the understanding about the war took place more on 
television,36 Kosovo was the first internet war instrumentalized from air power 
alone. It was a war of the airwaves, where not only was information gathered 
but the military operation itself was executed from a distance. Distance 
facilitating control of the act. Here, there is a management of how the targeting 
is framed and how history is constructed and managed. MIME is instrumental 
in this management, which is cast in the present-continuous in that there is a 
  
disengagement from the issue of humanitarian motives and their credibility. 
After all, humanitarianism is motivated by bringing peace rather than 
inflicting violence and war. 
These days, the battle has no start or end in that it infiltrates into every 
aspect of the ether. It is an all-encompassing battle made possible with the 
simulation of media and the military in order to discipline. It exists in the 
militarization of information presented on media and television screens. This 
is an age of information and data, where the focus is not necessarily on the 
control of physical power but on the control of information.37 The data 
generated by technological devices such as predators, which are equipped 
with tiny cameras, and were originally designed for purposes of surveillance; 
now they are also used as weapons in that they screen the context. These 
devices were used for the first time in the 1990s wars in the Balkans.38 
Balkanization in this instance is deployed not only for purposes of grouping 
data, as well as securitizing it, but also managing which data has to be 
processed and transmitted to the public to perpetuate the uniform belief in an 
intervention perpetrated on behalf of humanitarian and democratic values. 
That information control was an important NATO objective was seen in the 
targeting of the government-owned and pro-Milosevic Radio Television of 
Serbia (RTS) building on the night of 22–23 April 1999. The importance of 
establishing a uniform rhetoric was also present during Milosevic’s rule. Up 
until 1998, privately owned media such as radio B92 and newspapers such as 
Dnevni telegraf (Daily Telegraph) operated alongside the pro-Milosevic RTS, 
meaning that pro-Western views – including an open critique of the situation 
in Kosovo – were permitted and consumed.39 However, in October 1998 – five 
months prior to NATO’s intervention – media legislation was passed at the 
federal level imposing heavy fines on any media outlet that was openly against 
Milosevic.40 The law was used to crack down several times on Dnevni 
telegraf, which resulted in other newspapers toning down their anti-Milosevic 
stance or suspending their publication altogether.41 
The stance of privately owned media was in complete contrast to that of the 
RTS, which neglected to mention that Serbian military operations did involve 
attacks on Albanian civilians, sometimes targeting whole villages whether 
civilian residents were real or imagined supporters of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA).42 In that context, the RTS building was seen as a legitimate 
NATO target. This is despite General Wesley Clark stating that NATO  
knew when we struck that there would be alternate means of getting the 
Serb Television. There’s no single switch to turn off everything but we 
thought it was a good move to strike it and the political leadership agreed 
with us.43  
The attack on a building, while 120 technical and production staff were 
working there, disrupted Serbian TV broadcasts for three hours at the cost of 
16 lives and 18 wounded. NATO’s Operation seems also to have been an 
  
attempt to establish the hegemony of a single market of information, which 
paradoxically is an objective that NATO saw as undemocratic when legislated 
by Milosevic and pursued through his RTS media. The liability for lives lost 
during the targeting of RTS was disputed; the only compensation offered for 
such violations perpetrated by NATO was to the Chinese government for the 
‘accidental’ destruction of its embassy building in Belgrade some two weeks 
later. This is despite schools, hospitals, museums and even the territory of 
Bulgaria (inadvertently) being bombed. Moreover, the payment entailed no 
acknowledgment of legal liability.44 
In terms of NATO’s targeting and framing of events, the question to do with 
proportionality and territoriality is no longer only reminiscent of Foucault’s 
thinking about power, in terms of analyzing and breaking down spaces, places, 
individuals and operations into components ready to be modified.45 In terms 
of NATO’s 1999 Operation, both Western and Serbian media made a clear 
identification of who were the victims and who were the perpetrators during 
the violence in Kosovo. Questions to do with power are also no longer just 
about the alteration of NATO’s list of proportional military targets, which 
within a very short period following the start of its targeting campaign 
included cultural and social centers – the whole city was turned into a target. 
Today, years after the 1999 Operation, proportionality is seen in entrenched 
progressive training and perpetuated control via Serbia’s cooperation with 
NATO. Serbia has agreed to NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(IPAP), which ensures “that Serbian military personnel are able to work 
effectively and safely within the UN and EU missions in which they serve” 
and “[that Serbia] develop the capacity of its forces to participate in UN-
mandated multinational operations and EU crisis management operations. 
These are areas in which NATO and individual Allies have much expertise to 
offer.”46 One of these ‘expert’ operations was undoubtedly NATO’s Operation 
Allied Force in 1999. Despite these developments, the Serbian Prime Minister 
(since May 2017) Aleksandar Vucic has repeatedly been reported in Serbian 
media as insisting that Serbia will remain militarily neutral and will not join 
NATO. The business end of political deceit seems to be paramount in this 
media construct. 
In terms of NATO’s broad-scale use of military forces and territorial 
management, it is no longer only a reflection of Foucault’s thinking on 
governability filtered through various institutions, procedures and tactics, as 
seen in Serbia’s adoption of NATO’s military training techniques. Instead, this 
is a question of, first, eliminating all spaces that operate with an alternative 
structure such as Titoist or Balkanist and, second, making provisions for this 
city and region to become absorbed by the ‘security’ provisions and in the 
name of ‘protection’ by extensively becoming subsumed into the NATO 
protectorate. Violence is a multifaceted process whereby the territory of a 
country is first fragmented, blurred and paralyzed, then folded in space and 
time to affect every facet of the society. 
  
Managing the system of beliefs and values by conjuring the arts and culture 
was seen in US President Bill Clinton’s speech. He used the speech, whose 
intent was to gain support for the 1999 intervention, to invoke Bob Dylan’s 
1960s “Blowin’ in the Wind” lyrics by asking, “[h]ow many roads must a man 
walk down before you call him a man?” to imply that the air strikes were 
simply another attempt by America to intervene on behalf of freedom and 
human rights – albeit selectively by setting up the Kosovo Albanians as the 
victims and the Serbs as perpetrators. This is not just a question of 
performative rhetoric used to steer people’s moral compasses in the direction 
deemed correct, but also a sign of a culture where it has become perfectly 
acceptable to misuse the lyrics of Bob Dylan, who is known for his critique of 
dominant power structures and the need to think counter practices. Such a 
misappropriation suggests that today we live not only in a culture of 
simulation but one of glazed stimulation. Baudrillard’s thinking could not ring 
more true here: the real has been effaced by the signs of its existence, there is 
only the copy.47 Nevertheless, the very premise of being able to critique 
suggests that the end-point of Baudrillard’s theory has not yet been reached – 
which is not to say that it will not be in the near future. 
That the media was a significant aspect of the intervention is also evident 
in the incorporation into the campaign of close monitoring of the media 24–7, 
with the dialogue between military, media and broader political aims geared 
towards achieving a singular narrative of Milosevic perceived as another 
Hitler, even if that narrative contradicted the rhetoric of the recent past in 
which Milosevic was a political figure with whom political agreement was 
possible. The start of NATO’s targeting coincided with the mass flight of 
Albanians from Kosovo. According to the UNHCR, 4,000 Albanian refugees 
fled from Kosovo on 27 March, three days after the operation began. By 4 
June, the numbers surpassed the 800,000 mark. In terms of Serb casualties, 
there were more in the first three days of the operation than in the three months 
prior to the humanitarian intervention. Seemingly, far from halting expulsion 
and violence experienced by Kosovo Albanians, a key driver for NATO’s 
intervention, the 1999 targeting increased it. 
History as referential violence 
The media and military rhetoric during the intervention thus had to change 
from an objective of preventing the expulsion of Albanians by the Serbian 
paramilitary forces to one of acting to bring the Kosovo Albanian refugees 
home. In order to facilitate the shaping of a uniform – albeit elastic – rhetoric, 
the military and media dialogue extended to constant on-air briefings, 
interviews, press conferences, research, analysis and global media monitoring 
as well as to providing a platform for rebuttals.48 Within this structure, 
language was used in media to occult NATO’s role as the targeting agent. The 
language of reporting was one of passive voice, thus shifting the focus to 
  
events in Belgrade and to Serb violence, rather than on NATO inflicting 
damage.49 When the agent of such damage was mentioned, it was framed with 
reference to inanimate objects such as bombs and aircraft, as opposed to 
animate agents such as NATO and pilots, thus further distancing any 
association between animate agents and crimes committed. The storyline 
continued the Hollywood blockbuster triptych scenario: clear perpetrator 
(Milosevic/Serbs), victim (Kosovo Albanians) and hero (NATO). This is a 
somewhat adjusted version of the triadic structure of ‘ruler/victim/audience’ 
seen in Foucault’s writing on public torture, where “[a] successful public 
execution justified justice, in that it published the truth of the crime in the very 
body of the man to be executed.”50 To substantiate the justice in casting the 
Serbs and Milosevic on the barbarian side, reference was made to past crimes 
committed in Bosnia; it was a war of referential violence, via Srebrenica and 
Sarajevo. 
The Serbian media did not play an innocent game either, though in its case, 
the ordering was different. The Serbs were collectively presented as heroes 
and innocent victims of NATO’s targeting, while the role of the villain was 
attributed to NATO; NATO as a military organization rather than NATO as 
America or Great Britain as a nation, which is the key difference in the hero-
victim-villain triptych.51 In this instance, NATO was (in)directly associated 
with the Nazis since news of various targets hit by NATO would often be 
followed by reminders that Belgrade was also bombed by the Nazi Germans 
and by the Anglo-Americans during WWII. The narratives that populated the 
Serb media heavily relied on instances when NATO hit non-military targets; 
from schools and factories to hospitals and bridges. The focus was also on 
occasional demonstrations around the world protesting against NATO’s 
targeting and in solidarity with the Serbian people,52 coupled with elimination 
of any footage showing Serb violence directed towards the Albanians; the only 
voice given to Albanians was that of suffering as a result of NATO’s 
targeting.53 
Considering that the rhetoric of the operation was built upon shifting alibis, 
the images of destruction in Kosovo often required interpretation. During the 
14 May 1999 briefing, NATO’s spokesman Jamie Shea had to interpret 
evidence that buildings in Kosovo and Metohija had been destroyed by Serb 
forces.54 According to Herscher, 
[t]he subjects of these images, pictured in a bitmapped haze of pixels, had 
to be enmeshed in a complex apparatus of written, graphic and verbal 
signs in order to become legible. The image of a building in flames, or 
damaged or even destroyed, was incomprehensible without an identifying 
text signifying flames, damage, or destruction. The rhetorical distance of 
irony in Shea’s presentation thus mapped onto the spectatorial distance of 
his satellite imagery. Was it possible to get up close and personal to a 
  
satellite image in 1999? Was it possible to lead spectators from a network 
of pixels to a vale of tears?55 
Shea’s commentary may well be an example of what Weizman terms “only a 
criminal being able to interpret a crime,” as images are endowed with 
meanings and made to speak a rhetoric to suit the desired outcome.56 The 
nature of these illegible images is peculiar considering that throughout the 
Operation, NATO used cameras mounted onto missiles to film the destruction 
of a particular target from the moment the weapon was discharged to the 
moment of the strike.57 This is a different form of Weizman’s sanitary rhetoric, 
where media in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deployed to set up a clear 
representation of a perpetrator and a victim. It is possibly more coercive still, 
as the law, military and media (seen in Shea’s interpretation of pixels as 
evidence of destruction by Serb forces) form a trinity where the value of 
language and images is to show less through de-familiarization of a military 
frame. 
The Western tradition derives knowledge from the faculty of sight. 
Restricting what is seen to a distanced view not only limits clarity in 
deciphering what is actually taking place on the ground, but also eliminates 
all other ways of looking at the event. The interpretation of objects of 
destruction and pixels of images no longer need be confined to legal 
proceedings but can be undertaken during press conferences and in the media 
generally. The politics of globalization is that history is inscribed in the ‘live,’ 
with media-military partnership playing a pivotal role in this inscription. That 
global news is still largely dominated by Anglo-American media, the output 
of which has been controlled by a small number of deregulated and privatized 
organizations, means that, despite there being more news networks, the raw 
material of reportage tends to come from a single source.58 Similarly, the fact 
that media is driven by a commercial and profit-making motive means that it 
is not economically sustainable to source news independently from distant 
parts.59 
The frame of image and story presented on the news constrains rather than 
exhibits reality, in particular that which needs to be seen as being real.60 
Containment well serves the desire to eliminate any alternative narrative. 
However, for the audience to participate in ‘live’ history, the theater of 
spectacle needs to be staged in a way that makes images seem comprehensive, 
objective and intelligible yet also constructed to eliminate any questioning of 
the prevailing rhetoric. Considering that not only is ‘live’ history generally 
driven by the desire to organize the perception of the war,61 but also that 
Anglo-American media is built upon the homogenization of rhetoric,62 the 
ability to recall immediate and distant news is all the more possible since the 
objective is geared towards eliminating any questioning. The persistent 
underlying motive is to deliver a perpetrator in all his barbarity. Despite the 
immediacy of images, we have lost the means and the skills to see.63 The 
  
violence is present in that which has been removed and that which cannot 
longer be seen. 
What history in live does, using Der Derian’s thinking, is that it maps all 
that no longer exists.64 After all, the Balkanist imaginary of Yugoslavia 
associates this border region with monstrosity, and as such, it is a place that 
cannot be comprehended by the civilized part of the world.65 This is a history 
with no distance or access to percepts beyond what is shown on the screen; 
after all, the screen allows past, present and future to come together and collide 
in a dazzling array of action, color and narrative. That information becomes 
nothing short of a Hollywood movie in the making; the assemblage seen in 
the way in which the US managed to re-identify the KLA as well as Milosevic 
in the space of not much more than a year. Only a year prior to NATO’s 
targeting, the US announced that it considered the KLA a terrorist group, 
“condemn[ing] very strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo.”66 In 1996–97, at 
the height of student protests against Milosevic’s rigging of votes, the US 
described Milosevic as a democratic president. This is not to deny the 
atrocities by Serb forces in Kosovo, but it does bear out the broader truth that 
villains and victims are created to suit the politics of the time. While the 
violence in Kosovo committed by the Serb paramilitaries, as well as by the 
KLA, was significant, the NATO ‘humanitarian’ intervention did not 
extinguish it, but rather increased it. Violence was not a side effect of the 
humanitarian intervention directed towards the unruly Balkanist country, but 
its very method and policy. 
Peace, prisons and justice: history in vacuum 
Territory, peacekeeping and tower of Babel 
With the Kosovo intervention made possible via virtual networks (from 
television and the internet to smart bombs and precision targeting), the 
finishing touches were implemented on the ground – once again with a 
visibility to be showcased on viewers’ screen. Peace was brought to Kosovo 
on 3 June, after a 10-week targeting campaign. It took another six days for the 
strikes to terminate. The victory was marked by bringing in 55,000 NATO 
troops; and the territory was balkanized under a number of measures claimed 
necessary in order to ‘manage’ peace. The first measure was driven by returns 
and expulsion of civilians. Within a month, according to the UNHCR, over 
730,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees returned, whilst more than 170,000 people 
– predominantly Serbs and Roma – were expelled from Kosovo.67 The second 
mode of balkanization was made possible by creating enclaves; those Serbs 
and Roma who stayed or returned after the 1999 Operation now live in what 
has been termed “a new apartheid.”68 The third method has facilitated the 
exercise of peace by utilizing a piece of territory in Kosovo for purposes of 
creating a US military base, Camp Bondsteel, described as “a smaller version 
  
of Guantanamo.”69 Mixing torture, surveillance and legal impunity, Camp 
Bondsteel is a peculiar way of implementing humanity and peace. That the 
Balkans is already on the edge of nowhere, and a zone of monstrosity, only 
serves to facilitate the provision of what have historically been ‘invisible 
zones’ of torture camps such as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The outsourcing of 
torture to zones that are missing from the ‘map of civility’ not only 
accommodates the act of torture, but also extends the possibility for 
continuation of the 1999 Operation and its administrative method of detention, 
that is, making violence invisible. In such zones, all sense of responsibility is 
absolved. 
That law is a malleable safeguard of rights in a military intervention is also 
evident in the way this Operation has been implemented through the legal 
instrument of so-called silence procedure. The silence procedure is used when 
a military decision requires a consensus. It binds NATO alliance members to 
follow implicit consensus in actions predominantly driven by the US and the 
UK, thus making it easier to overcome any veto in the UN Security Council. 
Reaching consensus is further made easier from the perspective that members 
do not need to vote if in favor of the decision, but only if there is an explicit 
objection to it.70 Even though sovereignty has largely lost its political 
importance – in that, first, the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” 
and, second, the exception is dependent on the articulation of the enemy – law 
can be suspended and reinstated if invoked for purposes of security, such as 
during military interventions and legal procedures.71 The silence procedure 
accommodates such political landscape by preventing debate and removing 
resistance as well as contested interpretations since NATO’s intervention was 
justified in the cause of security, humanitarianism and democratic values. 
Seemingly, the silence procedure is no longer reminiscent of Weizman’s 
likening of a detective with the criminal with the dictum that “only a criminal 
[is] able to solve a crime” at tribunals and courts.72 What is embedded within 
the silence procedure is non-registration of any crime that may be perpetrated, 
since the script from the start has only one mode of speaking/interpreting – 
that of implicit consensus through silence. An example of this was also seen 
in NATO’s Rambouillet Agreement, where one of the conditions stipulated 
that “NATO soldiers and representatives would enjoy immunity and not be 
subjected to investigation even if a soldier or representative had committed a 
serious crime, [while] NATO would have the right to arrest individuals also 
outside of the organisation.”73 The legal agenda of the rejected Agreement, 
like that of the implemented silence procedure, is that the possibility that a 
military operation might be called a ‘crime’ is eliminated from the start. Both 
the act of violence and knowledge about it can be constructed, edited or erased 
to suit political exigencies. 
Law was an important element even during NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ 
Operation. Procedures eliminated all international legal rights because NATO 
considered this territory to be a potential threat. The loose definition of 
  
‘potential threat’ permits the law to be stretched to suit NATO’s purposes. The 
elasticity of international law is evident even in the wake of NATO’s 1999 
targeting. The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) had set up an office in Belgrade with 
the objective of modifying the legal statutes of Yugoslavia as well as 
positioning the ICTY above Serbia’s national judiciary. Unlike Derrida’s 
evocation of the Tower of Babel,74 which allows a continual unfolding of 
space and place with a diversity of narratives, as well as suggesting that 
neither the origin nor the core of the Tower of Babel can be reached since the 
structure exhibits the inability to complete, translate and totalize, NATO’s role 
seems to that of playing God, decreeing who will be the translator of truth – 
when it comes to both meaning and structure. The intervention facilitated 
through the implementation of the silence procedure, and subsequently the 
ICTY, is a Tower of Babel that does not allow interpretations that fail to match 
the NATO’s motives. 
What remains constant in this procedure is that its legitimization and 
erasure do have an implied structure of transformation, made possible by 
military and law. The transformation of values through the law was seen in 
NATO being able to differentiate at what point the intervention was enacted 
on behalf of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘security’ (always endorsed), and at what 
point the right to intervene would stray into military acts of violence (never 
endorsed). The silence procedure and the legal interpretations of violence it 
facilitates are possible precisely because law is perceived as a contained and 
set structure. The US Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke’s speech during the 
issuing of the activation orders for the Kosovo air campaign made evident that 
the law is interpreted and created, by noting that “[w]e realize we are pushing 
the envelope and making up history as we go along.”75 In other words, practice 
and interpretation of law can also go beyond the written law. 
Utilizing Derrida’s thinking, the very belief in law, including that one may 
lay claim to absolute knowledge of its content, is impossible; the “original” is 
always a translation.76 To claim that NATO’s intervention was humanitarian, 
just and legal is a matter only of perception, prejudice and translation since, 
following Derrida, “man is a priori condemned to translate: meaning is 
inaccessible without form, but every forming is in itself a mutation (or even a 
mutilation) of meaning.”77 The very engagement with the question, critique 
and meaning of violence automatically generates its mutation. Also, the very 
belief that there is a universal comprehension and understanding of violence, 
but that it can be exercised by only a select few, makes violence not only 
immanent but also permissible. 
The humanitarian intervention deployed through the legal mechanism of 
the silence procedure was endorsed so widely despite or because of the fact 
that it was so inconsistently consistent. It was able to secure this endorsement 
thanks to the projected rhetoric that violence can be eliminated altogether as 
well as by pursuing an agenda that was “military without being military, 
political without being political, partisan without being partisan. It was all 
  
these things precisely insofar as it was humanitarian.”78 The legitimacy of the 
intervention, while supposedly straightforward and transparent, is 
inconsistently obscure. While the act of violence is made possible through its 
“humanitarian” agenda, the ability of that agenda to erase effects such as the 
Djakovica road example starts to problematize the positing of violence in the 
first place. The urgency behind humanitarianism thus eliminates the 
possibility to contest and think outside inconsistently set parameters. In other 
words, it is not about justice but about the immanence of law as a dialectic 
structure that operates precisely due to its interpretive agenda. 
What makes the humanitarianism rhetoric in the case even more terrifying 
is that aid agencies with a track record of impartiality deferred to NATO’s 
agenda; often, they dismissed Serbian and Romani civilian casualties as not 
requiring their assistance.79 The most chilling example being that in April 
1999, in the midst of NATO’s Operation,  the historically impartial UNHCR 
asked assistance from NATO in order for NATO to revoke Macedonia’s 
position that permitting the entry of around 65,000 refugees will be 
accommodated only if it received relief-aid from other states.80 The relief 
came through NATO by building camps for the refugees. The collaboration 
between humanitarian agencies and military organizations is relatively recent, 
first appearing following the end of the Cold War. NATO was certainly turning 
into a single organization show, from enacting humanitarian operations to 
instating peace, enforcing security and assisting relief agencies while also 
building both refugees camps and military prisons. 
The coming together of peace, prisons and justice is an example par 
excellence of Foucault’s disciplinary societies enfolded in Deleuze’s control 
societies. Unlike Foucault’s disciplinary spaces where power is primarily 
applied in the present tense as a measure to predict patterns of individual 
behavior, Deleuze’s notion of control is more complex and subversive, 
constantly redrawing control in ever more encompassing webs that are both 
present- and future-oriented.81 Values such as justice and freedom have been 
taken for granted, and their framework and social implementation left 
unquestioned precisely because control societies are fluid modulations 
accommodating of continuous and extreme reversals; the conditioning of 
which is comparable to a “self-deforming cast that will continuously change 
from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one 
point to another.”82 
The former US General Charles Krulak’s concept of Three Block War, 
which arose from the deployments in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia – meaning 
that US forces would end up fighting, peacekeeping and managing 
humanitarian tasks –not only has turned into a reality, but also has been 
surpassed.83 The current disciplining is a permanent coercion, where the 
military is the new state prison, police, human rights agency and pseudo-
forensic team. NATO’s forensic capabilities were seen in its attitude towards 
verifying the extent of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The atrocities 
  
in the lead-up to NATO’s 1999 Operation, including the widely reported 
Racak massacre executed by Serbian paramilitary forces (which set the 
Operation in motion) were narrated as another holocaust.84 Deaths and 
expulsion did occur, but not in the way narrated by NATO. A year after the 
intervention, and during the ICTY, it was confirmed by Carla Del Ponte – the 
chief prosecutor for the tribunal – that the final death count in Kosovo was 
2,788. The number was inclusive and largely composed of military fighters on 
both sides – the KLA and Serbian paramilitaries. 
Memorials, victory and victimization 
NATO’s termination of the operation was marked in an odd way in Belgrade, 
by spectacularizing history through the erection of a memorial in the Park of 
Friendship on 12 June 2000. The memorial Eternal Flame (Vjecna Vatra) was 
designed by architects Marko Stevanovic and Miodrag Cvijic and sculpted by 
brothers Svetozar and Svetomir Radovic. The name, ironically, was borrowed 
from the memorial dedicated in Sarajevo in 1946. The initiative for the 
construction, intended to honor the defense of Serbia and ultimate ‘victory’ 
over NATO in 1999, came from the Milosevic government. The memorial was 
planned to stand 78 meters tall, a symbolic number recalling the 78 days 
NATO bombed Serbia. The project was designed in two days and the structure 
built in another ten days by 160 workers. At its completion, its height was 
significantly reduced to 27 meters. 
 
Figure 4.1 Belgrade and New Belgrade: 1 – Park of Friendship; 2 – The Generalstab 
complex (the Military Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence). 
  
However, the placement of the memorial in the Park of Friendship is even 
more ironic. The park was the first of four large purpose–designed parks85 in 
New Belgrade, located along Belgrade’s foreshore, commemorating the First 
Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Its location at the confluence 
of the rivers Danube and Sava occupies a 12.5-hectare area of New Belgrade’s 
total 4,100 hectares. Its large size was made possible largely through the fact 
that the land was owned by the state. The Eternal Flame occupies a significant 
place in the park, as it stands at the end of the 180-metre-long pathway called 
The Colonnade of Peace (Aleja Mira) lined with a ‘living memorial’ of 26 
trees. They were planted by the 25 heads of state who attended the First 
Summit.86 The first seedling was planted by the Park’s initiators – Young 
Foresters (Mladi Gorani). The London plane trees87 (platanus × acerifolia) 
were spaced 8 meters apart, with a plaque placed at the base of each tree 
identifying the country and head of state who planted it. A sculpture by Lidija 
Misic was placed in the middle of the Colonnade. The indefinite form of the 
sculpture could allude to a tree, a flower or a bird and was intended to signify 
the beauty brought by peace, friendship and co-existence. In 1965, a public 
competition was launched to redesign the Park. It was won by the architect 
Milan Palisaski, with his triangular landscape design, although the entirety of 
this proposal was never fully realized. 
 
Figure 4.2 Park of Friendship: Lidija Misic’s sculpture with the Colonnade of Peace 
in the foreground and the 2000 Eternal Flame memorial in the background. The right-
hand side visual shows the Eternal Flame memorial in 2010 with one of the graffiti 
reading ‘Kosovo is in the heart of Serbia’; the NATO-targeted and now reconstructed 
Usce Tower is in the background. 
The Eternal Flame memorial, which is composed of three key elements: 
white painted concrete base and column and the bronze flame atop, found at 
  
the end of the Colonnade of Peace, certainly dominates the surrounds due not 
only to its height but also the odd proportions of each element. Two marble 
plaques with excerpts from Branko Miljkovic’s poems “To the Homeland” 
(“Domovini”) and “Yugoslavia” (“Jugoslavija”), published in a 1959 poetry 
collection By Death Against Death (Smrcu protiv smrti), were placed on the 
base, separated from the ground by one step. The excerpts were chosen by 
Mira Markovic, the wife of Slobodan Milosevic, notionally on behalf of the 
people of Serbia. However, the people had no say in the selection of poems or 
the erection of the memorial. The irony of Mira Markovic using excerpts from 
these poems by Miljkovic is that Miljkovic was not a supporter of any political 
party during Titoism. More so, the poems were written and derived out of 
“that” Homeland (the SFRY/Serbia) and then manipulated to suit this Serbia 
(after 1999).88 The use of the fragment “And if they killed me, I love you,” 
from “To the Homeland” to allude to NATO’s bombings is problematic, since 
the verse indicates a love of life that is opposed to any ideology and system. 
The appropriation of ideas from a specific time and political context to suit 
a completely different political context is not simply a manipulation to suit a 
particular political project – Milosevic’s nationalism, in this instance – but a 
revealing of the danger of taking a single verse of a poem out of the context 
of a poet’s body of work. There is also a risk when an individual in power is 
the sole interpreter of a particular situation, and indirectly of history, as heroic. 
When that individual adopts such a role, and society participates in the 
historical spectacle in silence, it is an example of Nietzsche’s “shrunken, 
almost ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of good will, sickly 
and mediocre.”89 Ironically, in the first two lines of the poem “Yugoslavia” 
chosen by Markovic, Miljkovic wrote “[a]ll that does not have fire within 
itself burns/ what burns becomes night/ what does not burn gives birth to day.” 
The birth of a new day is not the sort of spectacularization of history evident 
in Mira Markovic’s inaugural speech, where she proclaimed: 
Let this flame burn eternally as a reminder of the war that was waged by 
NATO’s 19 countries – USA, Canada, UK, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, 
Iceland, Norway, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
– against Serbia between 24 March and 10 June 1999. Let it burn eternally 
as a memory of the heroism of Serbia’s defence in which all the citizens 
participated. Let it burn eternally and for the whole world [. . .].90 
The Eternal Flame memorial was erected to attempt to obscure the historical 
fact that Serbia did not win the war against NATO. While the intent of the 
memorial was to feature a constantly lit flame, perhaps invoking the one in 
the Eternal Flame memorial in Sarajevo, nearby gas storage could supply 
enough power only for the opening ceremony. 
The artificial gas flame and the symbolic bronze flame further showcase 
confusion of concept; the memorial is certainly far removed from being a 
  
marker of victory and the new age. Instead, it may be said that the memorial 
in Belgrade is a poor copy of Socialist Realism,91 or that it is a second-rate 
architectural appropriation of the memorial in Sarajevo as well as an inflated 
simulacrum of history that never happened; unlike the 1946 example, when 
Nazi Germany was truly defeated. To draw any parallels between this 
memorial and the 1946 Eternal Flame memorial in Sarajevo not only short-
circuits history for purposes of inflating heroism (actually victimization), but 
also coercively blurs the line between fact and fiction, and, in turn, helps to 
manage a particular understanding of events, memory and history. The history 
of post-WWII Yugoslavia as an example of fascism overthrown is thus 
conflated with the aftermath of 1999, an example of a softer and more purified 
fascism in operation. 
The memorial being erected so soon after the NATO targeting, little 
attention was given to placing that targeting of Belgrade in the larger context 
of events that occurred during the 1990s dissolution of the SFRY, or to the 
impact that the 1999 targeting might have on the course of history. When 
events occur and are not placed within the larger historical perspective or 
directed to critically analyzing the past by projecting alternatives into the 
future, history remains closed. Short-circuiting history in the wake of the 1999 
incursion is associated with identity, memory and history being managed 
through spectacularization. Mira Markovic’s attempt to turn the trauma and 
terror associated with the NATO targeting as well as the violence generated 
between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo prior to the intervention into a 
spectacle of nationalism not only helps flatten the understanding of history, 
but also exposes the danger when spectacle infiltrates politics. If history is 
political, then it is not a matter of safeguarding a particular rhetoric but of 
challenging the hegemonic notions of that rhetoric. 
Architecture as partnership of peace: balkanization in vacuum 
Where the irony of memorializing resilience, victory and autonomy steals the 
limelight is with the reconstruction of Belgrade’s Military Headquarters 
(Building A) and the Ministry of Defence (Building B), the Generalstab 
complex. Despite the complex becoming an informal memorial to and cultural 
artifact associated with Operation Allied Force, more recently the role of the 
complex in its past, present and future has been oriented towards eliminating 
any connotations that deviate from the politics of somewhat corrupt control 
found within the Serbian Government of the Property Directorate and the 
Serbian Army. Previous identifications92 of the Generalstab complex have 
been concealed through a process of erosion and demolition, both of which 
are seemingly contingent on negation and forgetting. 
The exterior of the complex was placed under a historical preservation order 
in 2005, as it was considered a canonical example of modernist Yugoslav 
architecture.93 It was also commemorative, as it signified the strength endured 
  
and victory that resulted from the Sutjeska Offensive. More recently, there 
have been attempts to remove the preservation order with the emergence of an 
opportunity to sell the land to an international buyer for conversion into a 
hospitality venue. It seems that “the economic benefits surpass all others, and 
in the light of the constant struggle for financial stability in the national budget 
they [governmental institutions] see demolition and new construction as a 
valid reason.”94 To do this, the complex has been carved up incrementally 
since 2010, in the name of “structural stability and safety,” as the prevalent 
rhetoric has it. 
  
 
Figure 4.3 The Military Headquarters (Building A) in 2014 and in 2017. 
  
In this clean-up process, traces of 1999 violence are also being removed. 
The removal has significantly sped up in the past couple of years; the entry 
pavilion of the Ministry of Defence (Building B) was entirely removed in 
2015 and the central core of the Military Headquarters (Building A) hollowed 
out in 2016. In order to mark this process, the front façade of the Ministry of 
Defence (Building B) is currently veiled in the Serbian Armed Forces’ 
billboard, on which a quote by the late 19th–early 20th Century Serbian Field 
Marshal Zivojin Misic – who is seen as the most effective Serbian commander, 
a participant in all of Serbia’s wars from 1876 to 1916 – reads, “Who can, 
may. Who knows no fear, advances forward.” Misic’s times, whilst no doubt 
violent, were ones of struggle to forge an autonomous way forward. The quote 
itself is from a time associated with distancing from Turkish rule and the 
overthrow of various foreign strongholds. Today, it has been deployed in a 
very different political context; the period of then to suit Serbia of now is a 
manipulation of ideas used to drive a political project in gridlock. This 
cunning play is further apparent with the company, Yugoimport that sponsored 
the billboard. It is not because this company imports and exports defence-
related equipment, but because the company carries the name of a country that 
no longer exists; Yugoimport was formed in 1949 when Yugoslavia was a 
socialist country, and one that was by the 1960s associated with NAM. Now, 
Yugoimport is supplying the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia 
with imported complex weapon systems, whilst Serbia is in the process of 
joining forces with NATO. 
 
Figure 4.4 The billboard on the façade of the Ministry of Defence (Building B) reads, 
“Who can, may. Who knows no fear, advances forward.” 
  
The once nationally condemned NATO attack is metamorphosing into a 
drawcard to join the operational forces of this pact. The deception orchestrated 
by politicians and the media is apparent on the façade of the Ministry of 
Defence (Building B). In the context of the contracts entered into between 
NATO and the Serbian Army Forces, the message on the banner which covers 
the façade of Building B is not about autonomy or implementing a distinct 
vision, but about manipulation and a deceit upon the Serbian population, since 
up to 75 per cent of them are against Serbia joining NATO.95 The “vote 
against” is largely driven by the persistent memory of the effects of NATO’s 
targeting. The bottom line is that the initiative is undemocratic in light of the 
majority opinion poll. While one may argue that Serbia has not actually joined 
NATO yet, it is an undeniable fact that the provisions made in the past 10–15 
years have opened the doors for an orchestration of policies and structures 
deemed necessary by NATO. This is seen with Serbia’s cooperation with 
NATO, which is most likely an indicator of Serbia losing the political right to 
pursue various national decision-making processes to do with the country and 
international relations. 
While the encroachment of NATO’s prerogatives has been apparent since 
1999, their physical spatialization was clearly marked in 2006. That year 
NATO’s Military Liaison Office was opened in Belgrade, and Serbia joined 
the NATO’s “Partnership for Peace.” The pretext behind this move was for 
NATO “to provide advice and assistance to the Serbian authorities on reform 
and modernization of Serbia’s armed forces, and to build a modern, 
affordable, and democratically controlled defense structure.”96 There is a 
strange placement of words here: democracy, control and defense. Stringent 
procedures have been implemented to do with security and defense reform, 
security cooperation and public information. It will soon require a magnifying 
glass to detect the differences between the nationalistic regime bolstered by 
control and manipulation of information during the Slobodan Milosevic era 
and the current democratically controlled government spearheaded by 
Aleksandar Vucic as prime minister that ushers in the ‘Partnership for Peace.’ 
It seems that what Virilio foresaw is coming sooner than envisaged; when 
addressing questions to do with the instantaneous delivery of destructive 
power, he responded that “if we don’t watch out” it will arrive “without a real 
war ever having started.”97 The Generalstab complex is indicative that more 
recent political dispositions facilitate a time of perpetual present, and 
balkanization of policies and defense structures are used as means to 
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Circulating violence 
Decomposition, dispossession and control 
The less visible violence 
Balkanism as excess in Kosovo 
Balkanism is a discourse of perceived excess where the identity of the region 
allows for a complete breakdown and disruption of any norms, including those 
which articulate a clear definition and belonging to either the West or the East. 
In this signifying process, Balkanism is implicated in the idea that its identity 
needs to be continually abjected in order to re-establish its borders, one that 
resonates with Julia Kristeva’s framing of abjectness: “[I] expel myself, I spit 
myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to 
establish myself.”1 As an abjected zone, Balkanism proffers the opportunity 
to engage with questions of sanitation implicit in Anglo-American and 
Western sanitary dispossession and decomposition of infrastructure and 
resources deployed for purposes of ‘normalizing’ Serbia post-1999. Thus, 
Balkanism will not necessarily be used to address questions to do with 
normalization, which in this case is reflective of processes of regulation; more 
readily, the discourse will be thought as an opportunity to address “for what?” 
purposes are these regulations being implemented, and “what is not being 
said?” In terms of Kosovo, the question is what was it that instigated the 
intervention when other notable examples of violence around the world such 
as the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo that started in 1996, or the 2 
million Sudanese refugees since 2003, apparently did not merit the same 
urgency of intervention or media exposure? To intervene in Kosovo was, in 
contrast, a matter of overwhelming importance. 
Historically, for both the Albanians and the Serbs, the territory of Kosovo 
(or the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, as it was known up 
until the late 20th Century) is identified with notions of loss and suffering. For 
  
the Serbs, the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 has taken on mythical proportions, 
bearing the significance not only of a battle lost against Turks and the 500-
year Ottoman rule that would follow, but also the loss of territory associated 
with the emergence and flourishing of Serbo-Byzantine architecture during 
the Nemanjic Dynasty (1160s–1371). The architectural style was 
implemented in churches and monasteries and located predominantly 
throughout Kosovo. The architectural heritage is synonymous with the 
national identity of Serbs and the seat of their ancestors. For the Albanians, 
the belief is that they are the original Illyrian settlers of the region, that 
Albanian is linguistically closest to Illyrian, and thus that the territory is 
originally and rightfully theirs. 
Despite these respective positions, up until the turn of the 20th Century, 
Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo mostly collaborated in their fight against the 
Turks, the common enemy since the 14th Century. With the defeat and 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century and early 20th Century, 
Serbia saw Kosovo as justly theirs considering the cultural and artistic 
heritage established in this region in the Middle Ages. For the Albanians living 
in Kosovo, the Serbian reoccupation was simply an instatement of a different 
version of colonial occupation, which would be shored up by Serbian and 
Yugoslav government attempts to accord prominence to the Serbian version 
of history.2 The perception led to tensions even before WWII; the desire 
among Kosovo Albanians (now known as Kosovars) was to assert 
independence and become a part of Albania. 
Up until 1968, Serbs in Kosovo were given preference in all areas of 
decision-making, which provoked dissent and nationalist sentiment among 
Kosovo’s Albanians. However, once the province was redefined as a socio-
political entity under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, the majority Albanian 
population in Kosovo were given substantial rights. They held a veto power 
over decisions made by the Serbian parliament to do with Kosovo, unless that 
decision-making related to matters of significance to Serbia.3 Having said this, 
Kosovo held power of veto over decisions made by the Serbian parliament on 
matters to do with the province. With the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional 
changes, Kosovo was granted near-republic status, including representation at 
the federal level and the power to issue its own constitution.4 Rights to 
autonomy extended so far as to permit the University of Pristina to teach 
course content in Albanian, the only institution of higher education in the 
former Yugoslavia to do so.5 The catch-22 was that despite the Albanians’ 
notable autonomy and ability to exercise self-rule, they did not have the same 
technical right to secede that other federation member states enjoyed.6 It did 
not assist that the economic development within republics and autonomous 
provinces was very uneven, with Kosovo being one of the more undeveloped 
areas. 
Despite economic assistance received from other more developed republics 
such as Croatia and Slovenia, and developmental gains within Kosovo, the 
  
significant demographic growth within the province was eroding the 
possibility for economic prosperity. In 1981, the population was ethnically 
relatively homogeneous (91 per cent Albanian) and had grown by 23 per cent 
since 1948, one of the highest rates of increase in Europe. In the wake of an 
economic recession and high unemployment rates, the 1981 student 
demonstrations motivated by socio-economic disparity also spurred a wave of 
Albanian nationalism. The ethnic and nationalist dimension was evident in 
student slogans: “We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs,” and “Unity with 
Albania.”7 There was a reversal of discrimination; from Albanian oppression 
to Serb. According to New York Times correspondent Chris Hedges, the period 
from 1966 to 1989 saw about 130,000 Serbs leave the province due to 
harassment.8 Discrimination was reported in workplaces and social life; 
people were threatened with rape and forced to sell their agricultural land 
below its value in order to escape.9 
With Milosevic coming into power in mid- to late 1990s, including his 
adoption of the Kosovo Serb cause in 1987, a notable shift in Serbia’s control 
of Kosovo occurred, primarily through alteration of the constitution. The 
alterations stipulated the transfer of all state companies into Serbian 
ownership as well as the withdrawal of the Albanian curriculum in schools. 
The early 1990s attempts by Albanians in Kosovo to gain independence were 
not internationally supported. The failure of the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement to accommodate the rights of Albanians in Kosovo provided a 
pretext for the escalation of violence and further nationalization of the cause, 
including the formation of the KLA. The period from 1989 to 1998 saw 
violence in Kosovo perpetrated to varying degrees by both sides; these events 
in their totality were portrayed as critical to NATO’s 1999 targeting decision. 
However, according to Eric Hobsbawm, the 1999 NATO Operation was the 
“first war fought under conditions of [. . .] consumer sovereignty.”10 Its 
humanitarian agenda was brought to bear on behalf of an ethnic group, the 
Kosovo Albanians. On a humanitarian pretext, a calculated value judgment 
was made on behalf of an ethnic group rather than asserting humanitarianism 
on behalf of all (irrelevant of nationality) who are in need of humanitarian 
assistance. The air attack further created a situation for a ground intervention, 
made all the more possible by projecting the context using transitional and 
post-socialist tags in the name of Western values. 
Immobilizing movements in Serbia 
While the destruction of infrastructure in Belgrade was considerably smaller 
than in Vukovar or Sarajevo, the agenda may have been more complex in that 
targeting was oriented towards severely degrading transport routes and media 
as well as other lines of communication and industries. In effect, the focus 
may have been on strategically hamstringing the economy and its circulation 
to a point where rebuilding the system and securing the country’s safety was 
  
possible only through recourse to foreign loans and security measures. 
Belgrade, and Serbia, were introduced to Western programs of security and 
surveillance in the form of both long- and short-term operations. The long-
term included the imposition of UN Security Council resolution 757, adopted 
in May 1992, as well as – amongst other bans – economic and air travel 
embargoes (unless this was for humanitarian needs) on Serbia and 
Montenegro during the 1990s SFRY disintegration. The restriction on 
mobility, and the economic hyperinflation that followed, accommodated a 
series of short-term operations that reached their apex during the 1999 NATO 
targeting. 
One of the coercive aspects of NATO’s intervention11 was oriented towards 
disciplining and controlling a country that was not consumer capitalist. On 23 
March 1999, one day before NATO’s strikes began, US President Bill Clinton 
stated the importance of economics to the intervention: 
[if the US is] going to have a strong economic relationship that includes 
our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key. And if we 
want people to share our burdens of leadership with all the problems that 
will inevitably crop up, Europe needs to be our partner. Now, that’s what 
this Kosovo thing is all about.12 
Clinton’s position was reaffirmed in NATO’s Rambouillet Agreement. The 
stipulation of free market principles hints at the later incursion being driven 
by the desire to transform economic values in the direction of the market 
economy. This is significant, as the FRY (composed of Serbia and 
Montenegro) was one of the last remaining countries in Europe resisting the 
shift towards consumer capitalism, a shift that gained momentum with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall followed by the disintegration of the USSR and the SFRY 
in the 1990s. NATO’s strategy was to deploy an array of tools in the lead-up 
to the intervention,13 the 1993 sanctions imposed on the FRY by the West 
being in part a preparation for NATO’s 1999 Operation. That targeting 
exacerbated the 1990s economic slump from which the country was still 
attempting to recover as well as the instability left over from the economic 
stress of the 1980s. In 1993, the unemployment rate was 50 per cent.14 In 1994, 
Serbia’s inflation reached 313 billion per cent.15 By 1995, 500,000 refugees 
from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina settled in Serbia, an added contribution 
to the overall economic and political collapse of the country.16 
The 1999 bombing’s physical and psychological impact was extensive 
because the targeting was directed at not only military-oriented targets but also 
the everyday lives of the civilian population. This was done by targeting key 
infrastructure points in order to sever connections between places and 
immobilize the citizenry. The effect was balkanization of the country in terms 
of access to resources such as water and electricity. According to Julian H. 
Tolbert, a pilot and combatant in the operation, NATO disrupted “power to 70 
percent of the population on 2 May and continued to turn out the lights through 
  
soft bombing of electrical transformer yards [in an attempt] to drive a wedge 
between Milosevic and the population.”17 The NATO campaign was a 
coordinated military matrix of “[c]overt operations, psychological warfare, 
information operations” in an attempt “to threaten what air war planners 
labelled Yugoslavia’s ‘centers of gravity’.”18 These “centers of gravity” 
attracted not only media-military-finance attacks, but also attacks directed at 
civilian life and all that facilitated their everyday life. 
Numerous industrial facilities were destroyed, such as the Zastava car plant 
in Kragujevac and the Lola Utva aeronautical factory in Pancevo (Serbia), and 
overall, 600,000 workers lost their jobs. The degradation of infrastructure 
included 41 bridges and four overpasses destroyed or heavily damaged. The 
destruction of bridges also destroyed water mains, leaving many areas without 
water. NATO’s use of carbon soft bombs meant that power blackouts were an 
everyday occurrence, further disrupting water reticulation. Overall, the 
intervention destroyed 100 per cent of Serbia’s petroleum refining capacity, 
which, in turn, affected 24 fuel, oil, chemical/petrochemical industry and/or 
storage sites; water supply lines; rail facilities; ten agricultural complexes; and 
a fertilizer plant.19 The specific damage to power-generating infrastructure 
affected four power stations and a coal mine, 16 substations and seven long-
distance transmission lines.20 The devastation of electrical transmitters had a 
domino effect on food supplies and the provision of medical care as well. 
Despite US General Wesley Clark’s statement that the Kosovo intervention 
had nothing to do with resources,21 the reality is somewhat different. NATO’s 
bombing of electrical systems in Kosovo in 1999 used laser-guided weapons 
and graphite soft bombs designed to generate massive short circuits and fires, 
which led to de-electrification of the cities.22 Apart from de-modernizing23 
Serbia above ground, below-ground resources were also depleted because the 
high-tech projectiles that were used during NATO’s Operation contained 
depleted uranium (DU).24 The ammunition that contained DU was PGU-14 
API 30 millimeter rounds fired from Gatling guns mounted on A-10 Warthog 
‘Tankbuster’ aircraft.25 While DU munitions are not prohibited by 
international law, Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions prohibits “employ[ing] methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.”26 This legal doublespeak is demonstrated 
by DU munitions not being prohibited by international law, but warfare that 
has a long-term impact on nature being prohibited. 
Sanitary decomposition and limitless destruction 
Even though NATO’s projectiles contained DU, the strikes were globally 
described as “surgically precise,” words that carry implications of not only 
health but also extreme accuracy. Considering that in this sanitized war only 
29 per cent of the 28,000 bombs and missiles used were precision-guided,27 
  
there is a deceptive legitimization of NATO’s violence. With large numbers of 
these cluster bombs still lying in the ground where they fell, and despite the 
bombing ending in June 1999, people are still being killed as undetected 
bombs explode.28 In the intervention’s ‘sanitary’ strikes, technology became 
an act of violence directed to destroy territorial and urban infrastructure, as 
well as human bodies, even after its conclusion. The effects from use of DU 
munitions are debilitating once the DU enters the body through inhalation and 
ingestion. The air as the primary substance of life has been utilized as a zone 
of combat.29 The particles released into the body cause breakdown of cells, 
tissues and organs, destroying proteins and enzymes and damaging DNA. This 
kind of damage in the reproductive organs can lead to genetic hazards that can 
be passed on from generation to generation. 
Wars are no longer fought only for causes of religion or territory. Part of the 
process of NATO’s balkanization seems to have included creating new sites 
of death from radiation that will remain a silent killer years after the 1999 
targeting. This is no longer an example of NATO’s attempt to control 
information as part of MIME or to dominate the air (considering that 
Operation Allied Force was fought from the air alone). Rather, with the current 
nuclear weapons, genocide becomes less detectable; the Balkanist body is 
eliminated permanently and silently. Its invisibility not only poses challenges 
to representing that violence, but also depoliticizes its pervasive effects 
despite their rapid spread. 
The less visible death and violence brought into play by NATO’s targeting 
is notably different from the sites of death and spatial representation via 
cemeteries. It is different from the 18th and 19th Century cemeteries where 
the focus on hygiene also conferred significance on corpses, with sites of death 
and cemeteries occupying an important place in modern urban infrastructure. 
Up until the 18th Century, cemeteries in Europe and the West occupied land 
close to the center of a city or town, but thereafter they were relocated to the 
peripheries. In Belgrade, there has been a different siting of death and 
cemeteries; perhaps this may be because the city has been destroyed over 40 
times in the Common Era. 
  
 
Figure 5.1 Belgrade: 3 – The Republic Square; 4 – RTS; 5 – Tasmajdan Park; 6 – 
Vuk’s Monument train station. 
Today’s Republic Square (Trg Republike) holds traces not only of the 1999 
mass protests of the Songs Sustained Us gatherings, including the re-
interpretation of public spaces by exposing the national and international 
political rhetoric related to NATO’s Operation, but also more immediate and 
distant histories of violence. The square is currently being reconstructed, with 
the proposal showing a very formalized space oriented towards eliminating 
the formation of crowds; it is a space to pass through rather than congregate 
and sit with all the previous raised planter beds, also used for seating, 
removed. This is significant considering that the square is a signifier of space 
not being fixed or contained, but that events – official and dissident – are 
moments of identity renewal.30 Historically, the square has been used not only 
as a promenade, but also for events ranging from various celebrations to 
displays of fashion and art. In times of conflict and contestation, the space has 
been appropriated for public demonstrations. This space held particular 
importance during gatherings against the SFRY disintegration in the early 
1990s, with the 1996–97 period experiencing escalated protests against the 
increasingly nationalistic Milosevic rule. During that period, the square was 
referred to as the Freedom Square (Trg Slobode). 
  
 
Figure 5.2 The Republic Square before the reconstruction, and now in the midst of 
reconstruction in 2018. 
Should the remodeling of the square follow the design proposal, the newly 
stone-paved and leveled space is to retain the 1882 monument to the Serbian 
ruler Knez (Prince) Mihailo on one end, and two rows of six trees will be 
planted on the other end. The monument, built in a Classical Renaissance 
style, fronted the 1869 National Theatre designed in the late Renaissance style, 
and was associated with the official break from the Ottoman Empire during 
the rule of Knez Mihailo. Both the theater and the monument gave shape to 
the Republic Square, which at the time was known as the Theatre Square. In 
the vicinity of the monument, two historical markers are designed to be added 
– to commemorate the location of the Istanbul Gate (Stambol Kapija) and to 
reinstate the monument to the death of 976 Red Army31 soldiers who died 
when the Nazis bombed National Square in 1944 battle. With Yugoslavia 
parting ways with Soviet Russia, the monument to the soldiers was removed 
in 1949 and the buried bodies moved to a different part of Belgrade in 1951. 
In 2019, there is a need to side with Russia again, and architecture is a means 
of doing this. 
The Istanbul Gate, which was surrounded by deep trenches filled with water 
and tall posts stretching from the Danube to the square and looping down to 
the river Sava, is significant not only because it was used during the Ottoman 
Empire as a defensive system against foreign attack, but also because 
immediately behind the gate’s three main openings, an area was utilized by 
the Ottoman Empire as a public execution ground where the living bodies of 
those showing open revolt against the empire were pierced on stakes. 
Seemingly, the commemoration of this space is associated not only with the 
displacement of one political orientation, the Eastern Ottoman, with another, 
the Western European and the forthcoming balkanization of the region, but 
also a reminder of the violence endured during that period. 
Where the gate’s massive stone blocks, deep trenches and tall posts once 
sat facilitated space for the construction of the current day Republic Square. 
  
However, it was only at the start of the 20th Century that the square took on a 
particularly cosmopolitan function, with the erection of the National Museum 
in a Neo-Renaissance style. The Museum, along with the National Theatre, 
enclosed the square, giving it a public status. While planning for an urban 
public space that would accommodate official parades occurred during 
Austro-Hungarian rule,32 the initiative was fully realized only in the public 
gathering on 25 November 1945. The first public address of the newly formed 
socialist Yugoslavia was made by Tito from the terrace of the National 
Theatre, and the square became known as the Republic Square. While it is 
unknown whether the name of the square will remain with the current 
reconstruction, and if so for how long, what is more certain is that the 2018–
19 remaking of the square may literally allow an unearthing of history even 
more distant considering that the area occupied by the square is archeology 
rich as is in the vicinity of the site of the Roman ruins and forum. This may 
affect the completion of the works within 420 days. The period may also be 
extended should the largely unexplored underground caves, canals, tunnels 
and underground waters affect the construction. 
The merging of sites of death and cemeteries and hygiene also occurs in the 
current day and centrally located Tasmajdan park in Belgrade’s Old City. As 
well as having been hollowed out by stone quarries, Tasmajdan also has 
several natural subterranean caves, one of which is about 7 million years old. 
One of the caves was used to shelter Belgrade’s population against German 
and Austro-Hungarian attacks during WWI.33 Another underground layer of 
Tasmajdan and its surroundings was the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian 
cemetery (depending on the period, both empires ruled Belgrade).34 The area 
of Tasmajdan also was used during the 19th Century for burial grounds, and 
thus contains the graves of Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Lutherans, 
military personnel killed during wars and those who committed suicide as well 
as non-Christians.35 When the new Orthodox cemetery was built in 1886, only 
the remains of the affluent Orthodox adherents were transferred, while the 
others remained buried beneath the park.36 The period immediately after 
WWII saw the burial of many German and Russian soldiers beneath the Tas 
stadium in Tasmajdan Park. The area allocated for burial beneath Tasmajdan 
is thus a hollowed-out space of death and violence on top of which the modern 
day foundations of Belgrade were built. This area also contains a more recent 
cemetery brought into existence by NATO’s 1999 targeting of the 
government-owned RTS building, which resulted in 16 deaths and 18 workers 
being injured. The RTS building remains in ruins, and the adjoining 
Tasmajdan Park houses a small memorial to mark the site of the deaths. 
  
 




Figure 5.4 A small memorial “Why?” in Tasmajdan Park to mark the deaths of those 
who died during the targeting of RTS. 
The presence of DU makes it less possible to name the source of death, 
commemorate it and clearly locate it since its spread has no limits. The links 
between DU and health disorders such as cancer spurred by NATO’s use of 
DU are known as the Balkan syndrome. Considering that many of the NATO 
targets were infrastructure-based, the targeting not only has affected 
production of goods, services and overall economic budget in the short and 
long term but also has created environmental damage. The bombing of oil 
  
refineries destroyed 57 per cent of petroleum reserves as well as leaving a 20-
kilometer-long oil slick in the Danube.37 Air strikes on the oil refinery in 
Pancevo, a city only 20 kilometers northeast of Belgrade, set alight an 
estimated 80,000 tons of oil and oil products. This was not just a health hazard 
for the population, but also a threat to aquatic life in the Danube.38 Reports 
show that workers at the refinery have since suffered from liver cancer due to 
exposure to high levels of the toxic chemical vinyl chloride monomer VCM.39 
In Novi Sad, a city located 90 kilometers northwest of Belgrade, the Danube 
was heavily contaminated after strikes hit a factory. About 73,000 tons of 
crude oil and oil products were reported to have leaked into the Danube 
there.40 A few months after the bombing, concentrations of mercury in the air 
were 500 times more than the 1 mg/m3 allowed. This is notable since mercury 
is the third most hazardous substance listed on the US Department of Health 
and Human Services Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.41 The 
effects of this chemical warfare were not only confined to Serbia but also 
impacted neighboring countries such as Romania and Bulgaria.42 One lesson 
since drawn from this lack of forethought given to the effects of chemical 
warfare on human life is that the US and UK militaries now require their 
people to wear protective masks when operating in all the areas affected by 
DU.43 
The dressing up of NATO’s targeting as sanitary strikes is a different mode 
of disguising death to the one seen in 18th and 19th Century cities. Not only 
do drone attacks eliminate the potential for the intervention to be called an 
environmental catastrophe, being able to target from a distance both death and 
destruction and its representation. Being able to control representation is to 
have power to negate the value normally attributed to human, animal and plant 
life. That this is permissible is due to this region of the Balkans already being 
an anomaly, and thus of no representational value. These 21st Century military 
operations extend the current understanding of war and violence. 
Apart from urban infrastructure monitored, de-modernized and 
contaminated by graphite soft bombs and missile-delivered munitions 
containing DU, a more covert impact of these strategies is that they affect all 
forms of life. The use of DU munitions affected not only life on the ground 
but also all that is below the ground, by damaging deep soil health. Apart from 
the destruction of vegetation and contamination of the topsoil, which can take 
thousands of years to regenerate, the effects of DU include negative impacts 
on the reproductive cycles of amphibians, with potential to disturb the 
migratory corridors of the birds which feed on them.44 Arguably, the 
acceleration of environmental destruction is yet another form of violence. 
While buildings might remain intact or be reconstructed, the biosphere is 
slowly being destroyed. NATO’s Operation, according to Guardian journalist 
George Monbiot, was 
  
perhaps the dirtiest war the West has ever fought. NATO’s scorched earth 
policy, which seeks to destroy Milosevic’s armed capacity by destroying 
everything else, places the Alliance firmly on the wrong side of the 
Geneva Convention. For a war which targets chemical factories and oil 
installations, which deploys radioactive weapons in towns and cities, is a 
war against everyone: civilians as well as combatants, the unborn as well 
as the living. As such, it can never be a just one.45 
The New World Order appears to be based on creating new hidden sites of 
death by destroying ecological systems and natural resources. Earth is no 
longer a surface to be cleared (as suggested in Monbiot’s quote) or associated 
with “rubbleisation” (as suggested in Martin Coward’s understanding of urban 
destructions, where the built environment is reduced to rubble), but a surface 
to be penetrated. The deployment of DU munitions has contaminated soil, 
water and biosphere in the targeted territory. 
The clean-up of contaminated soil would require removal of the first foot 
of topsoil,46 a process which neither Serbia nor the external human rights 
agencies has the funds or the will to undertake. When attempts were made to 
remove some of the munitions, such as the cluster bombs, a number of which 
remain unexploded and dispersed throughout the territories of both Serbia and 
Kosovo,47 the US military used local civilian teams to disarm them. Even the 
landmines are hard to detect due to their distribution being random; 
considering that they were remotely launched from US munitions system and 
the GPS.48 Civilian lives were not only targeted during 1999, but now come 
into play again as the deadly debris of violence needs to be removed; to 
survive is to be exposed to a permanent possibility of death. The 
contamination of the environment is an ever-present concentration camp of 
slow death experienced in this Balkanist context. 
While planned destruction through management of air and climate in the 
form of “atmo-terror” has been present since WWI (noted for its gas attacks),49 
current atmospheric destruction is harder to put on trial. This is particularly 
the case because the US, as the majority NATO member representative, cannot 
be legally held accountable, as it refused to sign the Ottawa Convention 
Agreement which, amongst other stipulations, prohibits the use of cluster 
bombs.50 Another reason for NATO having the upper hand in this sanitary 
violence is that it is often difficult to distinguish the environmental damage 
caused by NATO from – for example – the sedimented pollution present in the 
Danube and the toxicity that has been building up from the 1960s. Such 
indistinguishability is reflective of Adrian Lahoud’s comparison of the 
evidence of the aftermath to the “remains of an event that are missing.”51 
The actual extent of the toxicity is unknown, yet the ongoing nature of the 
effects is evident in the Roma refugee camps in Kosovo. These Romani 
refugees are the ones who have not managed to flee to Germany, Italy, Serbia, 
Montenegro or Macedonia; over 100,000 Roma fled in a period of three 
  
months after peace enforcement started in June 1999.52 They are not only 
discriminated against by the local Kosovo Albanians,53 but are also exposed 
to the effects of radiation as they have been housed in UN camps built on toxic 
wastelands. Those most prone to exposure are newborns, who either die from 
it or suffer irreversible brain and organ damage and have a maximum life 
expectancy of 30 years. Despite the World Health Organization issuing a 
warning in 2000 to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) to evacuate the Romani from the camps, no action was 
taken.54 
New enactments of violence are harder to see, and their effects are longer 
term. They are implemented through chemical and environmental weapons, 
air- and ground-launched missiles. Operation Allied Force is synonymous not 
only with visible violence, but also with the elimination of natural, territorial 
and bodily resources (physical and psychological). Seemingly, the less visible 
aspects of this New World Order, with the urban wasteland – ecocide – is that 
sites of death are permanently present even though their spatial borders and 
their visibility are eliminated. The river Danube, for example, Europe’s most 
important west-east waterway, is in areas dead even though drinking water is 
sourced from the same river for about 10 million people. Here, balkanization 
is pursued through the ecosystem in an attempt to silently extinguish all that 
is still resisting complete conquest. Unlike the Cold War’s nuclear strategy 
under which peace was maintained on the basis of deterrence, the 1999 
incursion used the ecosystem as a weapon endlessly extending radiation’s 
toxic effects. However, the flaw in the strategy is that this type of violence 
cannot be controlled; even if its effects are more present in the Western 
Balkans, the potential spread of radioactivity is global. The ecosystem has 
become a necessary weapon of destruction. 
Reintegration via dispossession 
Coercion, data and militarization of the economy 
NATO undertook a strategic shift between 1967 and 1991 as the US pursued 
changes in military policy that were needed to accommodate more flexibility; 
one of which was the integration of conventional forces with nuclear 
weapons.55 One could speculate that NATO’s 1999 Operation is an example 
of one of these flexibly integrated post–Cold War doctrines where the 
ecosystem is instrumental in the instatement of security and defense 
economics. However, to achieve these aims, a fertile field needed to be created 
for sowing belief in ‘humanitarian’ actions and diplomacy, and thereafter 
normalization and reintegration into the civilized West and Anglo-America. 
The economic normalization is inclusive of the intervention having a notable 
effect on general living standards in Serbia, with poverty levels increasing 
from 33 to 63 per cent immediately after the war.56 This was more or less 
  
inevitable in light of the loss of 250,000 jobs resulting from the targeting of 
infrastructure, as indicated in World Bank and IMF reports.57 Kosovo was the 
last remaining piece of Yugoslavia balkanized for purposes of eliminating 
counter economies and industries. 
The targeting by NATO not only eliminated the ability of various industries 
to compete with Western firms, as they had done prior to the Yugoslav 
disintegration, but also left the recovery and rebuilding of the systems 
dependent on loans from the World Bank and IMF. The pace of control has 
picked up momentum particularly since 2011. The list of NATO acquisitions 
is lengthy. Notable key purchases include Serbia’s Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear Training Centre in the city of Krusevac (southern 
Serbia), which in 2013 it turned into a Partnership Training and Education 
Centre. The change of ownership and use has also come with moves to make 
all activities within the center transparent to NATO allies and partners. 
Additionally, work began on decommissioning about 2,000 tons of 
ammunitions in Serbia.58 
When the less visible tactics of its operations are uncovered, it becomes all 
the harder to believe that NATO’s concern was for the upholding of human 
rights above all else. If so, it was a twisted ideology of humanity and 
peacekeeping. If anything, NATO’s humanitarian agenda may be seen as 
strategic. The ongoing reintegration is driven by economic control and 
privatization as well as ownership of industries and resources; it facilitates the 
transformation of Serbia into a balkanized enclave purely dependent upon 
foreign investors and on the Western military. The attack on Belgrade was an 
attempt both to extinguish alternative lines of communication, including the 
economic flows of the FRY, and to initiate a relationship of dependence upon 
the West. The array of infrastructural and economic interests that lay behind 
targeting Serbia and Belgrade’s alternative lines of communication suggests 
that NATO’s campaign is connected to a whole theater of violence; not simply 
destruction and paralysis, but also a particular implementation of 
balkanization where systems that sustain the life of a city are balkanized just 
enough to coerce a surrender. 
The intervention was oriented towards sufficiently damaging all the 
infrastructure systems and industries so that any reconstruction would be 
dependent on accepting foreign loans. In order to overcome the effects of the 
intervention, the process of reconstruction necessitates a form of dependence 
on conditional foreign bank loans and automatic foreign control. That foreign 
control lies in the hands of economically stronger countries, the identity of 
which is evident, with the US having 17 per cent of the IMF vote, and with 
only 15 per cent required for a veto. Such a structure ensures control and 
spread of economic debt through dependence without the resort to 
imperialism. According to Naomi Klein, neoliberalism tends to record a 
surplus during times of catastrophic events, whether those be natural disasters 
or political ones.59 
  
NATO’s intervention has resulted in the militarization of the economy. The 
rebuilding of Belgrade’s destroyed buildings and infrastructure is now 
dependent upon transforming Belgrade and Serbia according to free market 
principles, establishing consumer culture, privatization and security. Law is 
an important aspect in these processes of re-modernization and re-
balkanization, in more ways than one. Its significance was noted in 2005 when 
ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte said that while “the ICTY and other UN 
organizations are not profit-making bodies, [. . .] they, and the ICTY 
specifically, facilitate profit-making for others.”60 In other words, she was not 
associating the military intervention and the legal tribunal with morality and 
justice, but rather with creating a fertile field for investments.61 
The reconstruction of Belgrade after 1999 has been oriented towards an 
inequitable incorporation of its territory and urban infrastructure into the 
wider European and global network for the purposes of Western defense and 
security. However, before that incorporation could be completed, and in order 
to deal with a Balkan country with a history of rogue violence, the military 
intervention drew on 59 airbases in 12 countries, 941 fixed-wing aircrafts and 
279 helicopters.62 Seemingly, part of the purpose of the Kosovo intervention 
went beyond expanding the territory available to be used when required by 
NATO and extended to access to all ground, water and air infrastructure. This 
was specified in the Rambouillet accords, which granted NATO “the use of 
airports, roads, rail and ports without payment of fees, duties, tolls or charge”63 
as well as “unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, including associated airspace and territorial 
waters.”64 
Balkanization driven by the desire to map and code zones to suit military 
objectives finds a parallel in the 1973 plan outlined by NATO and its 
Committee on the Challenge of Modern Society, the agenda of which was to 
globally chart the movements of all commodities and people.65 Perhaps the 
most important claim made about this plan is that it was aiming to eliminate 
any sense of distinction between the civilian and the military.66 This plan has 
now been put into operation, with the First Security Forum taking place in 
Belgrade in 2011 as part of building a broader understanding of the present 
and future security architecture of the EU. It expects civilian and military 
relations to become part of a larger reform that would require complete 
interoperability with the EU and NATO if Serbia is to join the EU. The 
question of human security has meant that the distinctions between the 
military and the civilian spheres have been eliminated, since violence and 
threat are ever-present and never-ending. The citizen body has become 
conflated with the military body; in this instance, balkanization is not a 
method of fragmentation, but a merging of what has hitherto remained 
separate and distinct from each other. It is synonymous with the extension of 
military control into every facet of society. 
  
This is a different implementation of power from the one exercised during 
Milosevic’s era, which had the territorial agenda of extending the borders of 
Serbia, rather than erecting architectural structures. Architecture was not 
accorded particular significance; Milosevic commissioned only two structures 
during his rule: the (unfinished) underground Metro-Train Station and the 
Eternal Flame memorial. The current implementation of power is signposted 
with the vision that the rebuilding of Belgrade becomes the means by which 
to implement a Western-style legal and economic system aimed at 
constraining and controlling the movement of people and resources. With the 
introduction of various formation programs in the name of security, urban 
infrastructure becomes the means by which the Euro-Atlantic community 
seamlessly observes, circulates and extends violence and control. Here, 
surveillance and disciplining operate beyond moral evaluation; the operation 
is driven by the attempt to eliminate any tension to do with data and 
information. 
One of the more recent modes of regulation is evident in the control of data 
during travel. Recent news is that by 2020–21, all citizens from Western 
Balkans countries will have to submit an online form as part of a European 
Travel Information and Authorisation System before their arrival in any EU 
country, stating the purpose of the visit and address during their stay.67 While 
one may argue that this automated IT system is not discriminatory towards 
Western Balkans since it will apply to all non-EU passport holders, the very 
fact that its current planning policy is extended towards this region signifies 
the assumption that the Western Balkans will not complete the process of 
accession by 2020–21. In other words, the political agenda of Western Balkans 
will remain, and the process of Europeanization will remain tied to the 
transitional politics of contractual regulations. The practical motive behind 
this legal requirement is not only to map and monitor people’s movements 
ahead of time, but also to presume that Western Balkans citizens are somehow 
an immediate threat to national security. The perception of the Western 
Balkans as both an abjected zone, and an area of abjection, makes it possible 
to bring in this regulation. The Western Balkans is thus not just about a 
transition of territory from geopolitical to political entity, but also about the 
politics of data imperialism, as NATO’s Operation has facilitated this 
reconnection, reorganization and re-territorialization of Serbia. Infrastructure 
in the name of security is legitimately being deployed in order to observe and 
make known that which was unknown as well as to retain the Balkanist image 
of the Western Balkans. 
Networks of control: energy and water 
Admission to the Western alliance comes with a set of network-forming 
relationships. A 2005 Energy Community Treaty between the EU and nine 
contracting parties, including Serbia, stipulates the need for all parties to 
  
comply with the Treaty and to align with the EU acquis and EU 2020 
objectives. One of the requirements is a shift of information transparency in 
regard to each country’s emergency oil reserves: 
The level of emergency oil stock reserves is classified as a state secret 
according to the Serbian Law on commodity reserves. A new Law on 
commodity reserves is being prepared. Under the new law, mandatory oil 
stocks would be reclassified as a mandatory stock rather than a 
commodity reserve, so the level of these stocks would no longer be a State 
secret. No information has been received so far on the actual level of oil 
stocks.68 
It is not disciplining that is of supreme importance here but the need to make 
all forms of the unknown transparent in order to map, survey and 
homogenize.69 While the Energy Community was created to transcend the 
territorial borders of contracting parties, certain European countries have 
greater levels of control than others to stipulate conditions on Contracting 
Parties. That the key aspect of the Treaty is for all the Western Balkans to join 
EU’s electricity grid is telling of an uneven dialogue premised on divesting all 
capacity of power from newly admitted parties. Integration is a one-way 
dialogue and a part of political coercion that allows Western countries to retain 
their dominance in decision-making, despite a surface reading of the 
Agreement suggesting the abolition of all geopolitical and economic borders. 
The Treaty is a way to extend control over those areas in the Balkans that have 
resisted the EU and NATO hitherto. 
Natural resources are an important aspect of Serbia’s supposed 
normalization into becoming a ‘democratic’ member of the Western alliance. 
Despite the environmental damage done there, this territory continues to make 
a notable contribution to the rich biological diversity of the Western Balkans.70 
The scientific surveys indicate that this region hosts “[m]ore than a third of all 
European flowering plants, about half of the fish species, and two-thirds of 
the bird and mammal fauna.”71 Having access to these resources is significant, 
so much so that the European Central Bank is investing in the region’s energy, 
transport, water and sanitation, amongst other projects. With Kosovo having 
15 million tons of brown coal reserves, less than 1 per cent of it mined, there 
is an attempt by foreign investors to privatize these resources. The re-
balkanization is also seen in the privatization of telecommunications 
companies, construction firms, banks, power plants, refineries and shipping 
concerns. The rapid introduction of features such as the privatization, access 
to information and infrastructure just mentioned exposes the interconnection 
between the military and global politics, with NATO’s Operation facilitating 
this reconnection, re-organization and re-territorialization. 
Security and defense increasingly are becoming the means by which to 
monitor, regulate and control people and territories. However, the manner of 
their roll-out no longer reflects Foucault’s writings on governing as a 
  
disciplinary technique of power and control. Now, implementation is effected 
within the broader network of global surveillance whereby, through the 
introduction of various reformation programs in the name of security, urban 
infrastructure becomes the means of seamlessly observing, circulating and 
extending control. As a result of current wars waged by deploying surveillance 
and information operations whose infrastructural networks are globally 
interconnected, infrastructure has become a direct material and agency 
through which to execute control and counter control. This was evident during 
the 1999 targeting of Belgrade, when the prospect of “cutting Yugoslavia’s 
Internet connections was raised at a NATO planning meeting . . . [although] 
these options [were] rejected as problematic.”72 Considering that the internet 
is woven into every facet of contemporary societies, it is quite likely that 
severing the internet connections in Serbia would have had detrimental effects 
on the rest of Europe and the world. The infrastructure of wires, satellites and 
unmanned drones thus also comes with inbuilt vulnerabilities. 
Control of circulation is not only a matter of incorporating various modes 
of infrastructure such as water and energy into the global system in the 
ostensible cause of Serbia’s democratization and compliance with EU 
policies. It is that compliance is what making resources available for purchase 
is contingent upon. The European Central Bank is investing in water and 
sanitation amongst other projects. Serbia has over 400 springs of clean and 
drinkable water, only one-fifth of which is exploited for domestic and 
international consumption, and investment by foreign investors is contingent 
on privatization of these resources. The incorporation is underpinned by the 
EU’s contractual control in an attempt to remove any sense that there are 
alternatives to the one seen as valid. There have been historical examples of 
attempts at preempting insurgency in a city, such as the Haussmannization of 
Paris when, in the name of sanitation and hygiene, planning policies were 
introduced to do with building scale that resulted not only in a relatively 
homogenized city center being created but also the protests that might be 
staged by the repressed and underprivileged sector of the society also being 
rendered impossible. What is specific to Belgrade at this juncture is that access 
to Serbia’s infrastructure and resources is one of the key elements in 
incorporating it as a part of a globally connected Western network. 
Historically, there is a connection between the military, canals and water in 
Belgrade, beginning during the Roman Empire (44 BC – 1453 CE).73 During 
this period, a border line was created along the Danube known as the limes, 
with Singidunum (now Belgrade) acting as both a strategic zone of defense 
and a transport route for commerce to expand the empire’s territorial rule.74 
While the etymology of the term limes indicates a limit, it also implies a 
barrier or threshold that can be bent and stretched, thus making it appropriate 
to describe Singidunum as an elastic zone and a border between the largest 
Roman army camps in the Upper Moesia and the supposed barbaric zone 
known as the Lower Moesia. 
  
With the territorial expansion of the Roman Empire to include Lower 
Moesia, a shift occurred in the interpretation of Singidunum. The city’s role 
shifted from that of a strategic military stronghold to one of a zone of security 
and hygiene for the privileged class, prompted by the construction of its first 
water system. This system spanned several kilometers, from the area of Mali 
Mokri Lug, which in 85 AD was also a key defensive military camp along the 
Danubian limes, to the Kalemegdan Fortress in the Old City. Belgrade’s first 
water canals measured 1400–1600 millimeters in height and 700–800 
millimeters  in width, and were built using tiles and stone accessed from the 
nearby Tasmajdan mines (which at various points in history have been used 
as burial grounds and shelter).75 These same water canals were used in 1801 
by the Ottoman Janissaries76 as a transport route to enter the Kalemegdan 
Fortress and kill the Turkish Pasha Mustafa. The death of the Pasha 
foreshadowed the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1807. 
As Belgrade became part of the Occident in the 19th Century, the Austro-
Hungarian Bulbulder water supply was established and added to the existing 
Roman canals. Bulbulder spanned zones from the river Danube to the current 
day areas of Palilula and Tasmajdan.77 Later in the century, with Serbia’s 
formation into a nation state, an urban plan by Emilijan Josimovic prompted 
the construction of the modern water system. Until then, the southern and 
western areas of what is now Belgrade depended on numerous wells and water 
springs, known as the Varoski system.78 
While it is undeniable that the history of Belgrade’s water systems was tied 
to a merging of death, violence, security and hygiene, today’s investment in 
water networks is notably more cunning. Water is used as an undulating space 
for proliferating surveillance, consumerism and control. Since 1999, 
Belgrade’s waterways have become subordinated to the processes of political 
control. That this city between the Sava and the Danube is also at the 
intersection of two Pan-European Corridors might be the reason behind the 
significance of waterscapes. The location of infrastructure along the 
waterways as a precondition for Belgrade and Serbia’s admission to the EU 
exposes the intent to force Belgrade to become a thoroughfare in the world of 
global connections. The evidence is present in the construction of the Danube 
waterway Corridor VII and Pan-European Corridor X. Both corridors link ten 
European countries using the navigable section of the Danube River and are a 
part of a larger network of ten Corridors. Corridors I–X are part of the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which aims to facilitate movement of goods and 
people along routes that range from roads to waterways, railways, 
telecommunications and energy networks. 
The routing of Danube waterway Corridor VII and the almost parallel Pan-
European Corridor X is significant, as both would provide connections 
between West and East. The construction of the 69-kilometer Belgrade bypass 
connecting to the Pan-European Corridor X (a highway and railroad that runs 
Salzburg-Ljubljana-Zagreb-Nis-Skopje-Veles-Thessaloniki) has been in 
  
planning and a part of Belgrade’s general urban plan for several decades. 
However, the fact that the construction is largely funded by loans from the 
EBRD, European Investment Bank and the World Bank confirms that 
reconstruction assumes not only dependency but also the permanent presence 
of EU and NATO; any NATO intervention is followed by a proliferation of 
IMF and World Bank contracts. These various debt-establishing agencies 
spout the rhetoric of development to disguise the re-balkanization of the 
Western Balkans by establishing an oppressive system of dependency for this 
region. In terms of economics, the value of Corridor VII can be seen in the 
fact that in the period 2001–09, approximately two-thirds of the total foreign 
company investment in Serbia was directed towards areas along the Danube 
and its adjacent transport routes. 
The political agenda is oriented towards controlling the historically 
complex Balkans, a zone that over the past 200 years has been associated with 
a set of behaviors and values that do not conform to those of the West or the 
East. According to Todorova, prior to the Kosovo war in 1999, 
the dominant paradigm applied to the Balkans translated into the practical 
ghettoization of the region. The pre-Kosovo European Union visa regime 
accepted Central Europe but not the rest of Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans, where restrictions were placed on the movement of populations. 
This was ‘balkanism’ in action.79 
The global agenda under the pretext of transition is used as a means to 
implement policing and control in less detectable, yet nonetheless 
disciplinary, ways. Also, it is not simply a question of it being used to spread 
the market economy as the norm, but that this norm is also used to block any 
tendency to think of alternatives to the one professed. The paradox of global 
politics is that while it facilitates access to information, it also obstructs the 
possibility to propose a counterculture. Infrastructurally, an example of such 
an alternative during Titoism was the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity, the 
transport route linking Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis and Skopje. This 
traffic artery that stretched from Slovenia to the Greek border was imagined 
as infrastructurally unifying and bringing together all its nationalities and 
ethnic groups. 
Work on the road was done predominantly by the Youth Labour Brigades 
(Omladinska Radna Akcija – ORA) volunteers. After WWII, the ORA was 
established for several purposes: strengthening friendship and solidarity 
among peoples, spreading Tito’s ideology, helping to rebuild the SFRY and 
even increasing the literacy of Yugoslavs by providing educational facilities 
within the brigades. Perhaps the most significant point was that the Yugoslav 
balkanization integrated the youth into the development of cities. Now the 
same transport route is known by different names, depending upon which 
former Yugoslav city it is passing through; in New Belgrade, the highway has 
been renamed the Boulevard of Arsenija Carnojevica. Since 1999, this road 
  
has taken on particular importance, as it forms a part of E75, an important 
international E-road network developed by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, connecting Finland on one end and Greece on the 
other. The Boulevard of Arsenija Carnojevica also connects to the Pan-
European Corridor X. 
The intent to civilize the region is also seen in the impetus to affix the values 
and structures of the EU and Anglo-America. This has become particularly 
evident in the aftermath of the military operation, as remaking a city and a 
country becomes implicit with a forceful introduction of standardized 
economic and financial practices. Remaking is contingent on destruction 
rather than on reconstruction of alternative economic practices. In Belgrade, 
reformation was seen in the privatization of various telecommunications 
companies, construction firms, banks, power plants, refineries and shipping 
concerns. National banks such as Jugobanka, Investbanka and Beobanka were 
driven into bankruptcy, a move orchestrated by the government but supported 
by the World Bank and the IMF. Foreign loans were possible only subject to 
the government facilitating the bankruptcy. The banking void was filled with 
foreign banks opening their branches in Serbia, bringing with them ideas and 
practices at odds with what was prior to the 1990s a socialist system. Bringing 
democracy to Serbia is nothing other than the opportunity to put post-socialist 
spaces and institutions on the market and proliferate an ever-expanding 
market economy through privatization, consumerism and security rights. 
Reversibility of resistance and violence: transport networks, international 
loans and DU 
With the reformation of Belgrade’s transport routes, where priority is given to 
the Pan-European Corridor X and the Danube waterway Corridor VII, Vuk’s 
Monument80 underground train station – located in the immediate vicinity of 
Tasmajdan – offers an ‘escape’ and a mode of resistance, as it has only ever 
been partially completed. While the train station was completed in 1995, the 
metro is still no more than a design on paper. The architect Mirjana Lukic 
designed the station in 1990. The design and planning occurred during the 
early phase of Milosevic’s presidency and signified the first step towards a 
mass underground rail and metro system comprising over 30 tunnels beneath 
the city of Belgrade. However, the realization of the train and metro network 
in its entirety did not eventuate. 
  
 
Figure 5.5 The underground Vuk’s Monument train station. 
While Vuk’s Monument train station was designed to handle 15,000 people 
per hour as part of a dynamic underground rail network, in 2005, only 10,000 
people daily passed through the area.81 This fragment of the incomplete 
underground train and metro network includes several levels: an entrance 
level, passageways catering to multiple uses from a police station to retail 
shopping, a concourse level, services floor and the station platforms 
themselves.82 When the train station was opened on 7 July 1995 (a date that 
marks the anniversary of the Serbian uprisings against the Ottoman Empire in 
the 19th Century), it was the deepest underground train station in Europe at 
39 meters below ground.83 The station’s depth and its internal bunker-type 
structure provided city dwellers with shelter during the 1999 NATO strikes. 
The underground transport system is at an impasse, and in its unfinished 
state has an unrealized potential in that, if constructed, it might expose the 
location of underground tunnels and caves to a wider population. The 
underground spaces of the city center of Belgrade constitute a network of 
interwoven caves, canals, tunnels and circulation routes. Some of these 
underground spaces, which have remained largely unexplored (their networks 
are still not known to most people), were used as shelters during various wars 
  
and for transport/storage of goods such as food and gunpowder. Almost all 
buildings in Belgrade’s Old City center sit on underground water bodies, often 
posing problems for the construction of stable building foundations. It is 
estimated that 160 water passages flow beneath the greater metropolitan 
area.84 Their instability is resonant of Balkanism and Belgrade. 
The underground metro has, in a way, remained incidentally a space of 
resistance due to its very unbuildability. Set against the network of 
underground water streams and largely unexplored tunnels, Belgrade has a 
history of unrealized plans for an underground transport system. This planning 
was subject to many interruptions. The first metro was approved in 1883. The 
approval covered an area from the dock on the river Sava to Knez Mihailova 
Street. Other notable metro proposals include the 1958 design for the areas of 
Kalemegdan, Terazije, Slavija and Cubura.85 The 1976 iteration was based on 
five metro lines, while the 1981–82 proposal was meant to establish a network 
connecting Belgrade from north to south and from west to east. The US$700 
million cost of the last proposed system was to be funded from part of the 
Soviet Unionʼs WWII reparations to Yugoslavia.86 In the face of objections to 
this plan from the former Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, construction did 
not proceed.87 
In 2010, a plan was put forward to continue the interrupted construction of 
the proposed Vuk’s Monument metro section, this time funded by the French 
government as part of unpaid WWII reparations to Yugoslavia. However, 
since these reparations were directed to Belgrade when it was capital of the 
SFRY before its disintegration, a complex web of financial, legal and military 
interests now block the way forward. To this day, and despite many proposals 
and new governments coming on board, the plan to build it keeps getting 
deferred. The deferral may also be a result of Belgrade having a history of 
reconstructions, having been destroyed or heavily damaged over 40 times in 
the Common Era. In the 20th Century alone, it suffered extensive periods of 
bombing (1914, 1915, 1941, 1944, 1999). 
From its first Neolithic settlement in 7000 BC, Belgrade has been under the 
domination of numerous groups: the Illyrians and Thracians, the Celts, the 
Romans, the Ghepids, the Huns, the Sarmatians, the Slavs, the Avars, the 
Goths, the Franks, the Macedonians, the Bulgarians, the Byzantines, the 
Serbians, the Turks and the Austro-Hungarians. Its strategic importance began 
to take shape after the west-east division of the Roman Empire in 395 CE, 
when what is now Belgrade became a northwestern border zone in the Eastern 
Empire of Rome. As each new system and power takes hold and begins 
regulating and coding, there is a discontinuity and the possibility that some 
spaces avoid being coded. The notion of discontinuity is a mode of resistance. 
In reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomes,88 Virilio writes that the 
globally interconnected system is the “blue-print for military survival. But 
everything is always reversible, as in Kafka’s ‘The Burrow’: each escape route 
becomes another threatening entry. Terror too is built into the rhizome.”89 
  
Escape routes are those Other spaces that have been exposed to different 
systems. Belgrade’s history has been punctuated regularly by wars, 
destruction and new beginnings. The discontinuities and changes of rulers 
have meant that some structural layers of the city have not been coded into the 
new systems. This is not to romanticize any destruction or violence, but to 
think discontinuity as a possibility to either escape the imposition of control 
or stiffen it. The history of post-WWII Yugoslavia was an example of 
overthrowing the controls of fascism, while the aftermath of 1999 is an 
example of fascism purified and the contraction of control. 
While the unfinished underground transport system may be seen as a mode 
of resistance, there is a complex narrative to do with the significance of the 
relationship between underground transport networks, economics and 
violence. It is reflective of Virilio’s smooth space which is related to speed, 
the military and the hegemony of control found in the militarization of space 
through miniaturization of equipment. In terms of Serbia, this has been 
implemented through infrastructure and various trade agreements. One way 
in which the ground was prepared was the economic sanctions imposed on 
Serbia and Montenegro during the 1990s. However, the sanctions did not have 
the effect the West desired; instead, they set up the opportunity for Milosevic 
to strengthen his political rule through the rhetoric that the world is against 
Serbia and Montenegro and that survival is a heroic trait and historical legacy 
of the Serbs. 
The sanctions opened up opportunities for the black market economy 
through illegal and unofficial transborder trade. To survive during the 
economic and travel sanctions meant opening up trade and travel with the 
East. After 1999, normalization has become contingent on a collective 
historical amnesia; Belgrade and Serbia are highly receptive to a lifestyle 
dependent on international bank loans, and they accept risks similar to those 
of the early 1980s when the SFRY experienced significant degradation of 
living standards as a result of the inflation driven by post-WWII international 
bank loans. Such risks have already materialized, with Serbia slowly losing 
its middle class, and two distinct classes emerging – the privileged and the 
underprivileged. 
The current militarization of space is not as direct as the targeting of 
Belgrade in 1999 or the violence that occurred prior to and during 1998–99 
between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Violence after 1999 has been 
more obscured, facilitated not only by international agencies, but also by local 
moguls and the corrupt Serbian government. Here, Bauman’s words find 
resonance:  
[the] state washes its hands of the vulnerability and uncertainty arising 
from the logic (or illogicality) of the free market, now redefined as a 
private affair, a matter for the individuals to deal and cope with by the 
resources in their private possession.90  
  
While fashion has driven a greater level of heterogeneity in New Belgrade’s 
current built landscape, it may still be understood as expressing an economic 
polarization fiercer than in the preceding socialist context. The military 
intervention accommodated the introduction of consumerism; needless to say, 
militarization is ongoing since the culture of debt is largely made possible by 
IMF and the World Bank, and which in tandem with NATO play a significant 
role in the ‘redevelopment’ of cities and orchestration of supposed global 
security. 
Violence may be understood as having transformed values, using 
consumerism as the conditioner of a democratic society, despite this type of 
democracy being appropriated to suit narrow interests and depending on long-
term memory loss and a consumer culture of spectacle. Even the 
understanding of time and its use are reconfigured, as time is rationalized and 
economized for labor in the spirit of ‘progress,’ Europe and prosperity. In other 
words, with the onset of consumerism, the dimension of time in everyday life 
has been directed largely towards values re-oriented to consumerism and the 
market economy. Working hours have been extended, banks are readily 
lending money for the purchase of apartments and thereby tying people into 
the market economy system of debt and shopping is being advertised as a 
mode of leisure and the new norm. 
Obligations to meet norms are rampant within EU policies. In 2000, 
Western Balkans countries were given the opportunity for EU candidature, 
subject to their allowing the market economy to proliferate and acceding to 
every legal, democratic and social condition. However, even if all these 
conditions are met, there is no assurance that any of the Western Balkans 
countries will be given membership. Another way of looking at the list of 
conditions for Serbia to join the EU is that membership will depend on 
conforming to established modes of discipline and resource exploitation for 
purposes of debt, and control. Even though Yugoslavia’s post-WWII history 
showcased a cyclical pattern of loans, debt and economic depression, post-
1999 dependency has been orchestrated differently, from the perspective that 
in order to create an appealing domestic market for global investors, the fate 
of Western Balkans was determined with the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement in 2006; a means to leave behind Balkanist abjectness – 
“[a]bjection does not provide a reconciliation of meaning. Instead, the abject 
is that which seems to confound the possibility of meaning” – 91and enter the 
normalcy of the EU. The violence underlying this normalcy is the perpetual 
crisis of life. 
The imposition of regulatory normalization conditions is a carrot-and-stick 
policy. To superficially inflate the economy within Serbia, it needed to open 
up to more debt. This is a contemporary exercise of feudalism, where the 
division between nobility (the EU) and serfs (the Western Balkans) is not only 
territorial, including an uneven power distribution that arises from foreign 
acquisition of resources, but also intent on extinguishing any account of life 
  
lived as well as death suffered in this territory. Taking into account the 
imminent effects of DU, deployed amongst other reasons for purposes of 
bringing market capitalism to this Balkanist zone, Marshall Berman’s thinking 
finds resonance in the way that the fascism of capitalism feeds “on its own 
self-destruction.”92 In other words, that in its drive to accumulate capital, it 
would rather destroy even its servants who contribute towards generating 
profit than stop that which destroys.93 
Considering that any life in this territory, after all, verges on madness and 
the collapse of all that can be considered – from a Western and Anglo-
American perspective – as lawful, moral and honest and as such suggestive of 
abjection. The necessity to eliminate the abject is to eradicate the possibility 
of confusing meaning and standards set, since Balkanism challenges the 
perceived normalcy in the EU and Western democracies. The political 
violence being that in the attempt to remove the abject signifier of Balkanism, 
an even greater abjection is created with the circulatory forces of DU. 
Balkanization as creation of homogeneous zones is eclipsed, since DU does 
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Territorializations 
Transitions, thresholds and transgressions 
Shaping space softly 
Transitions and historical whitewash: Romani 
Balkanization appears to be an ongoing political process in that the 
Europeanization of all Western Balkans countries requires their full political 
separation (balkanization) from each other and subsequent recognition of each 
other.1 As regards Serbia, an additional condition is that it needs to recognize 
Kosovo. Deeming this process as necessary rests on the belief that ideals such 
as peace and stability can be attained only once all the Western Balkans 
countries join the EU. However, setting these ideal conditions as a qualifying 
norm assumes that the zone in question has no history of civilization and likely 
no history of political culture.2 The overall political process is manifest with 
the remaking of this territory. After all, the 1990s balkanization of Yugoslavia, 
and the subsequent rebuilding of cities as tagged by the EU and NATO’s 
agendas, are for purposes not only of Serbia finally attaining ‘civilization’ but 
also for an acquisition of Anglo-American and EU’s power made possible 
through privatization, elimination of social welfare and public good and 
negation of difference. The grab for power is particularly visible along 
Belgrade’s waterways and in its new housing developments. 
The negation of difference is seen in the drive to expunge the 
‘abnormalities’ associated with the Roma. This has been reinforced in spatial 
terms through dehistoricization associated with negation of history of 
settlement and occupation; the presence of Romani zones in Belgrade’s 
history has been largely undermined. At their highest population and footprint 
in 2005, the Romani settlements in Block 18 (located along the left bank of 
the river Sava) were a bustling and rich patchwork of inhabitation, with each 
  
Romani dwelling constructed of different materials; rubbish took on a new 
meaning and purpose there as a valued and primary element of construction. 
The Romani move from southern Serbia to New Belgrade was prompted by 
the 1980s economic crisis, spurred, in turn, by Tito’s death in 1980 and 
increasing interest repayments on World Bank loans. Since their initial 
settlement there, the Romani population grew to become 173 dwellings and 
820 people in 2005.3 The increase in settlement size and population was also 
due to the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the 1990s, which 
signaled the disintegration of the SFRY, and the 1998–99 Kosovo War, during 
and immediately after which 140 new refugee families arrived.4 The mid-
1990s hyperinflation in Serbia further affected the livelihood of some 
Belgrade locals, meaning that Blocks 17 and 18 grew in size, occupied by 
lower socio-economic classes and the disadvantaged. The developments that 
have sprung up in the past 20–30 years have remained largely unregistered. 
Settlement size has increased despite the lack of adequate infrastructure: 
sanitation, sewerage, electricity lines and pedestrian corridors. To address this 
lack would be the first step towards legalization of these informal and illegal 
settlements;5 however, that is not in the interest of the Serbian government 
considering the prime waterfront position of Block 18. 
 
Figure 6.1 The waterfront along Belgrade’s foreshore, and New Belgrade: Block 17 – 
Belgrade Fairground, residences, car markets and small industries; Block 18 – 
predominantly residences of the Romani and those from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds; Block 43 – current day flea market and future bus station; Block 67 – 
Belville and Delta Shopping Centre; Blocks 21–30 – 1950s urban proposal. 
Besides the fact that Block 18 exemplifies the type of Romani living not 
approved of by the Serbian government (nor, more recently, by international 
  
agencies), the central importance of these settlements is that they are located 
beneath the Gazela Bridge, a major transport route that connects to both the 
west and the east via E75. This 332-meter-long and 27.5-meter-wide beam-
and-arch steel bridge with concrete abutments is, at the moment, the most 
significant bridge across the Sava. This is due to a number of reasons. Its three 
lanes in both directions connect Belgrade’s city center with New Belgrade, 
now coping with more than 40 per cent more traffic than the intended 40,000 
vehicles per day when it was finished in 1970. At its opening, Tito was present, 
perhaps because at the time this was imagined as an artery that forms part of 
the Brotherhood and Unity Highway (Auto-put Bratstva i Jedinstva), 
imagined to connect SFRY’s Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. 
Although visible to a passer-by only from a distance through the bridge, the 
settlements established and occupied by the Romani are provocative in that 
they contradict normative expectations of how ‘civilized’ and ‘respectable’ 
people should live. They do not observe the aesthetic approved by the West or 
the Serbian government. As they are located in the central zones of New 
Belgrade, rather than on the fringes, the settlements are difficult to overlook. 
They expose a normative limit, a signifier of a social and political position of 
who can live in a city and how that city can be occupied. 
In 2007, the European Investment Bank and the EBRD provided funding 
for the reconstruction of this structurally unstable bridge, but on the condition 
that the people living underneath it (the Romani) be moved and provided 
adequate housing.6 Approximately 50 families (most of them Romani) lived 
beneath the bridge, all having fled Kosovo in 1999. The requirement to 
relocate was underpinned by invoking the need for security. The Belgrade city 
authorities met this obligation by forcibly removing the Roma to various 
peripheral areas.7 The options they were given included relocation to housing 
in tin shanties – a proposal supported by the German government, which 
donated used tin shanties for purposes of housing through the humanitarian 
agency Caritas – with no water or electricity laid on, a situation that is 
admittedly not uncommon in Belgrade.8 
  
 
Figure 6.2 Block 18: the Romani settlements beneath the Gazela Bridge with the 
transport artery joining E75. 
Needless to say, the sweltering summer months turned these dwellings into 
furnaces, and in the sub-zero winter months, they became ice blocks. Whilst 
the presence of the Roma inhabiting the spaces below the Gazela Bridge in 
Block 18 was perhaps welcomed by Belgrade authorities during the 78-day 
NATO campaign in 1999, as it saved the bridge from being targeted – just as 
it appears likely that the rock concert demonstrations staged on Branko’s 
Bridge during Operation Allied Force spared that bridge from destruction9 – 
their being there seems not to suit either national or international bodies today. 
The EBRD’s pretext of need for security during the reconstruction of the 
bridge (which went ahead in 2010–11) was a cunning bid to ‘democratically’ 
define how public space can be used and by whom. 
Since 2007, the density of the Romani settlements has been reduced 
significantly, now occupying only the edge of Block 18, as in 1983 when two 
Romani families settled there despite the immediately adjoining area being 
used for waste disposal. The 2007 resettlement of the Romani is only one 
example of violent evictions, serving perhaps as a precursor to the instatement 
of the City of Belgrade’s 2009 “Action Plan for the Resettlement of Shanty 
[Unhygienic] Settlements.”10 It seems that because of the absence of a Roma 
historiography, the violence of these evictions is increasing in tempo. In 2011, 
another 27 Romani families were forcibly evicted from Block 61, a zone in 
proximity to the river Sava, in order to make space for a new commercial 
development.11 According to Amnesty International, this is momentous, as it 
  
is the first time that the state has become involved in questions to do with the 
evictions of the Romani in Belgrade; prior evictions were carried out by the 
city authorities.12 
Considering that the Romani have not had a fixed association with land, 
territory or a nation state, their very presence goes against the line of thinking 
that treats land as a commodity with potential for economic surplus and 
political power, serving as a reminder that alternatives perhaps exist on how 
to think nation, national rights and legitimization of land and territory. From 
this perspective, the presence of the Romani constitutes a radical difference. 
That very little academic writing has been dedicated to the status of the 
Romani living in this New Belgrade zone since 1983 reinforces the hegemonic 
position. The relocation of the Romani – the ultimate ‘outsiders’ – to the 
fringes from this central location cancels visibility and thinking to do with 
land, nation and national rights in that the Romani way of life demonstrates 
that land and territory can be considered beyond the practice of balkanizing 
enclaves for purposes of exercising control or generating profit through 
ownership. 
Threshold erasures: Belgrade fairground 
On an adjoining block, Block 17, a different kind of territorial appropriation 
is taking place; that of historical erasure of a territory’s identification with its 
first built structure. The 11-hectare Belgrade Fairground (Sajmiste), located 
within Block 17, was turned into a concentration camp not long after it was 
built in 1937.13 It was used by the Nazis during WWII to exterminate Romani, 
Jews and all those Serbs who were openly opposed to the Fascist regime. 
During the period 1947–50, the Fairground served as the headquarters for a 
construction firm that was in charge of building New Belgrade.14 Some of the 
pavilions also housed the volunteer members of the ORA who helped lay 8 
million cubic meters of sand and gravel as foundation for New Belgrade’s 
post-WWII construction. In 1987, the Fairground was placed under a 
historical preservation order. In 1995, a memorial sculpted by Miodrag 
Popovic was erected in its vicinity to mark the violent extermination of 
peoples during WWII; while commemorating the manifestation of genocide 
in Belgrade on the Fairground site, the memorial plaque also mentions the 
Serb and Roma victims of the concentration camp in Jasenovac (Croatia) and 
marks the heroism and resistance of all Yugoslav peoples and victims of the 
Nazi terror. There is a proposal for the construction of a memorial complex 
dedicated to all those exterminated within the Fairground. 
The Fairground used so violently by the Nazis during WWII has been 
layered with more recent violence. Recent proposals include the conversion 
of the Fairground complex into a Holocaust memorial and museum.15 This 
adaptation of the complex would entail the displacement of the zone’s very 
heterogeneous community (artists’ studios, the residences of the Romani and 
  
those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, car markets and small 
industries). The first evictees were forced out in 2013. The association of the 
Fairground with one particular event reduces the salience of other events as 
well as other examples of violence that have occurred on this site and within 
these pavilions. 
 
Figure 6.3 Block 17: new and old residential dwellings and the Belgrade Fairground. 
This is not to disregard the immensity of scale and extreme nature of 
violence during the Holocaust; however, associating the Fairground with only 
one violent event fixes history to a frozen image, one that places measure and 
ordering on violence. It is a portrayal of violence as a fixed and obvious matter 
that can be quantified and compared. This categorization, whereby so-called 
quantity or historical singularity becomes the indicator of the extremity of 
violence, further facilitates negation of other histories of violence. This is the 
politics of the right to historical voice, an ordering against which all other 
kinds of violence are measured. Classification of violence prefigures an 
ordering on who may speak and who needs to remain silent. In more extensive 
and even spatial terms, it eliminates the opportunity to question the strategy 
(how) and the intent (why) behind violence, beyond the voice that has been 
given the historical and hegemonic right to speak. Here, the meaning of 
violence becomes predetermined, further restricting the possibility to 
understand history in any way other than through the lens in which it has been 
framed. 
Blocks 17 and 18, located on the left bank of the river Sava, are geared 
towards development, as evident in the proposed 2021 Urban Plan of New 
  
Belgrade prepared by the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade; this is an 
extreme transition, from the post-1945 socialist conception of space for all to 
a right-wing, neoliberal and private property–oriented market for the few. For 
Block 18, a new street network has been superimposed upon the Sava 
Amphitheatre, which has been conceived to connect Old and New Belgrade 
through the Gazela Bridge (Most Gazela) and Old Railway Bridge (Stari 
Zeleznicki Most). The proposed privatized mixed-use and high-rise complex 
is fragmented by a network of manicured pathways and landscaped grounds. 
The proposal treats Block 18 as a tabula rasa. Elimination of this heterogeneity 
would negate not only the contemporary nature of living and building there 
but also the historical status of this zone as a unique example of rural 
dwellings built in the 1930s in an urban context. 
The zone along the left bank of the river Sava (present day Block 18) was 
the first area to be developed, even though no urban plan was approved. It was 
probably chosen for construction of residential houses due to its slight 
elevation above the level of the wetland. Prior to the purchase of 200 hectares 
by the Yugoslav King Aleksandar in the mid-1930s, the land was owned by 
farmers and used to graze sheep. The zone was divided into seven linear streets 
(only six streets exist now) and subdivided into 200 long, narrow parcels, sold 
to individuals and used for the construction of houses. The parcelization 
would be a residual rural influence on what was in the process of becoming 
an urban context. Initial construction on each parcel was primarily of a small, 
single-storey house on the edge of a strip and closer to the street, with a long 
yard behind utilized for orchards and vegetable gardens. 
The site may be seen as a living archive that shows the transformation of a 
single-storey residential type over time, with changes influenced by 
fluctuating social and economic factors. History is whitewashed for purposes 
of financial gain in that the less history a zone is presented as having, the 
greater scope there is for profit. Both Blocks 17 and 18 have a uniquely 
historical position in New Belgrade, the balkanization of which violently 
negates both historical and current conditions. The violence is largely 
predicated upon the whitewashing of history in that it ignores the fact that the 
erection of New Belgrade began in the area that is today known as Block 17 
and Block 18 in the mid-1930s; the development of these areas occurred 
despite no urban plan being approved, even though a number were proposed 
since the 1920s.16 
Privatization and Belgrade’s greenbelt 
With Serbia’s shift to a ‘democratic’ government in 2000, land privatization 
also started to occur. In 2003, a new law was adopted under which the City of 
Belgrade was established as the owner and user of land in New Belgrade, 
while the Old City remained predominantly in individual private ownership.17 
However, in 2014, with the development of Belgrade’s waterfront along the 
  
right bank of the Sava, not only were 180 hectares of land there gifted and the 
ownership transferred to a foreign investor, but the investor was exempted 
from local taxes and fees. The land along the right bank of the Sava has been 
converted to private leasehold, to the detriment of public amenities that have 
been extinguished. Development is largely intent on eliminating any 
distinctness specific to Belgrade in that there is a flattening of the possibility 
to activate space for public interests; use of space is instead geared towards 
private interest in the construction of mixed-use developments and 
commercial architecture. The waterfront urban redevelopment has become a 
possibility only as most of the buildings in this zone have been snapped up 
inexpensively by the Serbian upper middle class from their lower socio-
economic owners.18 They have been acquired largely for ownership short 
term; the medium-term agenda is driven by the vision to sell at a substantial 
profit, since these buildings fall within the Belgrade Waterfront plan.19 
With the imminent redevelopment of the zone along the river Sava, the 
historic green belt along the rivers is also in question. The green belt along the 
Sava and the Danube was drawn into Belgrade’s urban plan with the arrival 
of the architect and mathematician Emilijan Josimovic in Belgrade. 
Josimovic’s 1867 urban plan proposal brought about the reformation of the 
city. At the time, the Old City of Belgrade was separated into three zones: the 
Turkish population occupied the Kalemegdan Fortress and the north areas of 
Belgrade’s Old City sloping towards the Danube, the Jewish quarter was 
located south of this and the Serb district took up the area sloping towards the 
river Sava. Josimovic’s urban plan for Belgrade was guided by the objectives 
of regularizing the congested and labyrinthine city streets and creating a more 
uniform plan to the city.20 It was perhaps predictable that the 19th Century 
reconstruction of Belgrade would involve erasure; Josimovic was a 
contemporary of the famous urbanist Georges-Eugène Haussmann. Unlike 
Haussmann’s violent intervention in Paris, however, which attempted to clean 
out that city and suppress the tendency of the lower economic class to revolt, 
Josimovic’s objective was predominantly to eliminate memory of the 
centuries-long rule of the Ottoman Empire.21 
  
 
Figure 6.4 View towards the Kalemegdan Fortress and the port along the top right end 
of the river Sava. 
The reshaping of Belgrade as part of a modern nation-state was a form of 
balkanization in the sense that it was an attempt to erase the memory of 
Oriental traces. Perhaps because Josimovic’s plan remained relatively vague 
about the future status of mosques, the erasure does not seem to have been 
overly premeditated.22 Nevertheless, with the general expansion of the 
Habsburg Empire and the Occident in the mid-19th Century, and the 
associated change of values, the cultural and religious markers of the Orient 
were left to decay. Now, a century and a half later, the focus has moved to 
erasing Josimovic’s instatement of the green urban plan along the water 
bodies, intended for purposes of recreation and, more important, access to 
green space for all socio-economic strata. There is an impetus towards 
eliminating all reminders of Yugoslav socialism in terms of public ownership. 
It is driven by the agenda of controlled socio-economic settlement, a far cry 
from the 19th Century when the Serbian Prince Milos allowed the land along 
the Sava to be freely settled. In response, the zone was quickly settled by 
predominantly poor people and the Romani from not only Belgrade but also 
Serbia more broadly. 
While the rest of Belgrade’s central zone was developed, this zone has 
evaded implementation of any rigorous planning visions, and in spite of or 
because of this, the area is a rich and diverse source of ideas, scales and 
approaches to building and aesthetics. The argument is that its run-down state 
is precisely the reason why the area along the waterfront is in such dire need 
  
of development, and further that high end development there is appropriate 
since Belgrade is largely devoid of luxury apartments within the city center. 
The rejoinder to that argument is that the increase in population is 
predominantly along Belgrade’s peripheries and comprises people who would 
not be able to afford such apartments considering that the average monthly 
wage in Belgrade is approximately £250–300. Also, the value of once public 
and state-owned greenscapes used for cycling and rollerblading amongst other 
leisure activities is now being traded to privilege only a particular public (the 
upper middle class) for whom greenscapes foreground consumption 
associated with shopping centers. 
It is not that consumerism is negative, but that it, in this example, preempts 
diversity of voices by privileging a particular way of thinking and living. In 
the attempt to flatten diversity of aesthetics and functions (from physical 
buildings to use), what also comes into play is the desire to eliminate the 
alterity and associated tensions that make a city a dynamic place. The 
repercussions include not only ghettoization of economically disparate areas, 
but also elimination of social solidarity. In this process, what become obvious 
is the way in which individual choices are eclipsed if they attempt to deviate 
from consumerist ones. According to Zygmunt Bauman,  
the art of . . . democratic politics, is about dismantling the limits to 
citizens’ freedom; but it is also about self-limitation: about making 
citizens free in order to enable them to set, individually and collectively, 
their own, individual and collective, limits.23  
He further suggests that the latter category of citizenship is almost extinct as 
a result of limiting all choices other than those dictated by the needs of the 
market economy.24 This is particularly significant for Belgrade considering its 
history of social awareness and the cohesion that came with the socialist 
brotherhood and unity tag. 
Desocialization and Belgrade’s waterfront 
While the initial redevelopment of the waterfront Savamala (Little Sava) 
district in the early to mid-2000s, encouraged by city authorities, was oriented 
towards this zone becoming a design quarter through development of art and 
culture,25 more recent redevelopment as seen in the Belgrade Waterfront 2012 
master plan is tied to a gutting of all sense of socio-economic diversity and 
alternative design and cultural practices. In other words, more recent 
developments are nothing short of savage gentrification of a zone now to be 
associated with a transitional post-socialist identity intent on membership in 
the EU. What makes the initiation of the Master Plan even more chilling is 
that, despite the initial talk that all investment proposals would be assessed 
through a tender process, the only name chosen and announced as investor-
builder was the Government of the United Arab Emirates and private 
  
international company Eagle Hills. At the time, Prime Minister Aleksandar 
Vucic, now President of Serbia and president of the Serbian Progressive Party, 
said that the development would change the image and identity of Serbia. This 
was the first time that the Serbian government became directly involved in 
any development; it both initiated and facilitated the project. As such, it is 
playing a key role in the re-balkanization of Belgrade for purposes of 
consumerism. The process of shedding one identity and adopting a new one 
is necessitated by economic reforms and overall privatization of industries and 
resources. To secure this new identity, Serbia must be transformed into a 
balkanized enclave purely dependent upon a corrupt state government, foreign 
investors and the Western military. 
 
Figure 6.5 Savamala (Little Sava) from Branko’s Bridge in 2010. 
This is not just a question of the profit margin, however, or a need to change 
the image away from identification with the political rule of Milosevic and the 
1990s dissent as well as the underlying degrading associations of the Balkans. 
The new identity is a global one, contingent on depoliticizing the historically 
complex and liminal identity of Balkanism, and in this process, blocking out 
the possibility for social rights and citizen participation, which automatically 
removes the possibility for reshaping historical processes. The ‘regeneration,’ 
now associated with the construction of predominantly upper middle class 
commercial and residential complexes, has been cloaked in opacity, 
particularly between the government and the citizen.26 Attempts at silencing 
the public go so far as simply declaring “[t]he public interest [to be] 
established for the expropriation of real estate for the purpose of [allocating] 
  
the land . . . for the construction of commercial and residential complex 
‘Belgrade Waterfront’.”27 What has made lack of transparency possible is the 
elastic maneuvering of the law for purposes of determining public interest; 
any proposed legislation is halted if it appears to put the development into 
question. 
 
Figure 6.6 Belgrade Waterfront development in Savamala in 2017. 
Until one aspect of this project, the proposed shopping center – the largest 
one in the Balkans and a signifier of a new face of Belgrade and Serbia – is 
constructed, some of the green spaces are used to house funkily decorated 
mobile food carts, a smorgasbord of Middle Eastern, Indian and European 
cuisine; staging the belief that not only is Belgrade joining the world but also 
the world is coming to Belgrade. The Belgrade Waterfront is a reinstatement 
of brotherhood and unity, in a superficial way. Also, the emerging typology of 
mobility is a far cry from Foucault’s counter heterotopias as spaces that open 
up and destabilize the governing powers within any city. These mobile carts 
are emblematic of a new type of power where a sense of openness and 
diversity is conditional on diversity and culture being subsumed into a 
spectacle of reductive imagery to represent that culture. To engage with a 
culture through a single cursory layer, the complexity of flavors altered to suit 
the habits of taste buds found within this region, food ready to be eaten on the 
go. 
The city is slowly being emptied of its heterogeneity – of identities, 
relations, encounters and beliefs – by being turned into a series of enclaves 
that cater to the largely wealthy minority and (in)directly drive the parameters 
  
of how the city may be molded to suit bigger commercial agendas.28 The 
redevelopment of the Waterfront is nothing more than a tested recipe of market 
investment urbanism and privatization-driven planning. The proposed 
commercial developments showcase lack of creativity by projecting a new 
vision for Belgrade through the well-worn commercial image of waterfronts 
blended with a dense assemblage of skyscrapers and glitzy façades, and all 
finished off with multiple shopping centers, manicured green spaces and high 
surveillance. The grand attempt is to remove all association with Titoism and 
the time of socialism; any remnant of nostalgia for that period delays the 
transition to market economics. 
  
 
Figure 6.7 Part of the Waterfront master plan development advertising campaign at 
Belgrade’s ‘Nikola Tesla’ airport in 2018. 
The reductionism of styles and opportunities afforded is also seen in the 
proposed architecture and public spaces. Recently, the barges on the Sava – 
located directly opposite the waterfront development and within New 
Belgrade’s Blocks 17 and 18 – used for purposes of entertainment 
(predominantly as nightclubs) have been given orders by the local government 
to either close or relocate. Apparently, the excessive noise was causing 
  
residents to complain. That the residents of both Blocks – the Romani, 
refugees from the 1990s wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and those 
from low socio-economic backgrounds –actually have put forward these 
complaints is hard to believe. Even harder to believe is that their appeals were 
listened to. After all, these are the residents who have been forcefully relocated 
to the fringes of the city in 2007 and 2011 or have been forewarned that they 
will need to relocate. 
If architecture and urban spaces are the index value of the society,29 
Belgrade is suggestive of a distance-shrinking and time-compressing 
consumer culture of noise associated with billboard signs and their symbols, 
and where more significantly once-exterior spaces are becoming interiorized. 
The city is turning into a variation of Las Vegas; however, unlike the 
possibility to engage with and comprehend the buildings offered by travel in 
a car driving at high speed,30 the encounter of speed in Belgrade is very 
different. When traveling along a highway, there is a push to eliminate any 
sights that transgress against the norm of acceptable living standards, such as 
the Romani settlements along the left bank of the Sava. When infrastructure 
is deemed no longer necessary and of use to the government, buildings are 
pulled down at unprecedented rates, people moved out without hesitation or 
delay and dialogue between citizen and institution interdicted; a method of 
balkanization that is both corrupt and specific to this region. An example of 
specificity is the de-Romanization of the waterfront. Moreover, in May 2016, 
a number of buildings located in Savamala on the right bank of the Sava – a 
zone now utilized by the Belgrade Waterfront – were bulldozed. The residents 
who were there were tied up, and any attempt to contact the police over the 
matter was blocked. Overall, the changes in Savamala were rapid in an attempt 
to remove the possibility for citizens’ protest and largely oriented towards 
closing the city off from any type of engagement that may question the need 
for privatization of once-public spaces. 
Unlike the duck buildings found along the Las Vegas highway strip, whose 
function can be comprehended only through its symbolic form, ducks found 
in Belgrade have a different application. The duck is the key symbol of the 
Don’t Drown Belgrade/We are not Handing Over Belgrade (Ne da(vi)mo 
Beograd) initiative. This activist group brings together people of different 
profiles and professions with the aim of raising awareness around the 
degradation of Belgrade, as seen in the construction of hyper-colossal projects 
such as Belgrade Waterfront. The first, bigger public display of dissent was 
the February–March 2017 street protests. Some of the stunts deployed 
included Operation Lifebelt (Operacija slauf), where through beach toys, 
songs and noise the message was conveyed loud and clear that citizens need 
to be included in any decision-making regarding development – for 
themselves and in the name of Belgrade as well as to allow the greenscapes 
along the riverfronts to remain public and used for leisure activities. Another 
of the messages was that public resources need to be injected for the benefit 
  
of citizens, rather than purely for investors. While the large protests in public 
spaces have been either scaled down or completely halted, the online presence 
of Don’t Drown Belgrade/We are not Handing Over Belgrade, with its critique 
of initiatives driving the redevelopment of Belgrade, is still being felt. 
The 2018 campaign has taken on greater speed and urgency, spurred by the 
local elections, from a renovated vehicle in the shape of a duck called duck-
mobile (patkomobil) that is driven around the city to stage stunts such as 
pulling up to the main entry of the Parliament House in Belgrade, to 
generating video material in the form of jingles and songs to draw attention to 
the problems of privatization spurred by investor urbanism. All has been 
documented as part of a marketing campaign and shared online to foster 
broader reach and solidarity, while also incurring lower marginal costs than 
are normally involved in professionally orchestrated election campaigns. 
Undeniably, it is very possible that the state mass media networks would have 
attempted to censor the campaign. Despite the local elections swinging in 
favor of the Serbian Progressive Party,31 led by Zoran Radojicic, no surprise 
considering the number of ‘ghost’ voters (deceased and non-Belgrade 
residents), the Don’t Drown Belgrade/We are not Handing Over Belgrade 
campaign has received international support from Ska Keller, co-president of 
the German Greens/European Free Alliance, and Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek 
economist, academic and politician. 
Balkanism and balkanization: distinctness, diversity and alterity 
Historical shifts and mixed-use development 
Despite the proposed Waterfront development not being designed with the 
public interest in mind, and despite the protests that have been mounted by 
Don’t Drown Belgrade/We are not Handing Over Belgrade, the project is 
going ahead. The development of the Sava-facing waterfront32 is also driven 
by the intent to relocate the bus station to New Belgrade’s Antifascism Battle 
Street (Block 43), which currently houses a flea market (buvljak).33 The irony 
of this relocation is that despite the street name suggesting resistance to right-
wing politics, the current remaking of Belgrade is precisely geared towards 
the attempt to eliminate the battle found in alternative thinking. Even though 
the reconstruction presented as diversifying the palette of opportunities as well 
as opening up the city and the country to the world, the vision for this new 
Belgrade – one of the last European capital cities to join the market economy 
in the aftermath of 1999 – is not only driven through policy, but also made 
operational obliquely through desocialization. It has been seen in the 
abandonment of the socialist right to a residence and even the corollary 
understanding of a residence as a possession. Those are now being replaced 
with a new understanding: residence as a commodity. What is being removed 
is the history of alternatives that were implemented in constructing New 
  
Belgrade, which was designed strategically for purposes of serving as the 
capital of (what with the 1963 Constitution became known as) the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
The urban plan that facilitated these construction priorities was devised in 
the 1950s. This is significant considering the 30-year period many urban plans 
being proposed, and none being implemented. The 1950s plan – constituted 
of tall block-type architectural forms separated by wide roads – dealt primarily 
with the central zone of New Belgrade, constituting nine symmetrical blocks 
(Blocks 21–29) whose central axis was formed by three blocks (Blocks 24, 
25, 26) intended for public use and serving as the grand assembly area. The 
symmetrical blocks fronted the building of the Federal Executive Council 
(1947–61) and were backed by a proposed railway station, which was not 
built. 
Despite the projected 1950s image of New Belgrade as a center for 
government and cultural buildings, it instead developed a residential character 
as the SFRY experienced great housing demand following the end of the war. 
Construction of residential accommodation was accelerated as a result of 
SFRY’s socially owned property system, in which state institutions provided 
housing for their employees. The specificity of the housing function followed 
the ideological premise that a place of residence in socialism is not a 
commodity but rather something defined by its use value. This reflected 
another legal and social standpoint, that of the right to a residence as a 
fundamental right to the common public good and the well-being of society, 
and related to the ideal of just distribution, that is, the ideal of a free apartment, 
and free social services for all. 
With residential buildings taking precedence, construction of the central 
axis was halted. New Belgrade was filled with block-type buildings, which 
were seen as a highly efficient solution to the great housing demand in the 
aftermath of WWII.34 The orthogonal blocks were planned with hierarchical 
vehicular/pedestrian circulation. The hierarchy was achieved in three ways: 
first, by having major streets connecting the area; second, by having an 
internal street system between the blocks consisting of primary streets; and 
third, by having bridges connecting the blocks to a pedestrian zone within 
each block. The plan closely followed the principles of Le Corbusier’s Radiant 
City, Brasilia, and reflected the program of CIAM, by which strict 
functionality of urban planning became the social means of improving the 
living standards of the urban population. Modernization was a signifier of 
urbanization, industrialization and socialization. The urban construction was 
part of a larger political project whose motives were ideologically unique and 
experimental: the interlacing of socialist social welfare with a planned market 
economy. 
With Tito’s death in 1980, and the ensuing economic crisis resulting from 
increasing state indebtedness to the World Bank, the planning, use and 
decision-making process concerning land developments of many unbuilt 
  
zones within designated Blocks also started changing despite the incompletion 
of New Belgrade’s Modernist urban plan.35 In the 1990s, with the violent 
disintegration of the SFRY, which also led to the imposition of trade and travel 
embargoes on Serbia and Montenegro, the state started to sell apartments in 
New Belgrade to their occupants.36 It was an attempt to deal with growing 
hyperinflation flowing from conflict and the newly imposed measures. With 
this shift, an apartment was no longer a social right, but a possession. Since a 
residence was no longer a right but a possession, time was significantly shifted 
and oriented towards earning in order to rent or own a property. The notion of 
common good was now headed towards individual survival. 
The privatization process was accelerated after 1999. The rapid 
reconfiguration of New Belgrade’s central axis and other blocks has been 
driven mainly by international investment, foreign loans, contractual 
stipulations of the EU, corrupt local Serbian politicians and their just-as-
corrupt international clients. This is evident in another zone of Block 67, 
where, in preparation for the 2007 Universiade Belgrade (25th World 
University Summer Games), one area of New Belgrade’s ‘vacant’ blocks was 
turned into an Olympic Village called Belville, with the intention that the 
2,100 apartments in the Village would be sold after the event.37 Whilst this 
practice has become common in contemporary Olympic real-estate 
development (evident in both Beijing and London), what is specific to the 
context of Belville in Belgrade is that the construction was preceded by 
evictions that targeted a specific ethnic group – the Romani. In a period of six 
years to 2012, about 250 Romani families were relocated to the peripheries 




Figure 6.8 Block 67 in 2010: Belville and the Delta City Shopping Centre and the 
Romani settlements which are now expunged. 
The planning and construction of Belville exposes a shift from the SFRY 
model of owning property collectively to treating property as a private 
commodity. The cultural desocialization has been evident in the creation of a 
new consumer culture. One of the first examples was seen with the 
construction of the Delta City Shopping Centre (Delta Holdings) located in 
Block 67; this was the first Western-style shopping center constructed in 
Serbia in 2007. Hypo Adria Bank and Delta Holdings funded Belville’s 
construction. It is worth noting that the owner of Delta Holdings was a 
supporter of Slobodan Milosevic during his rule and therefore likely to have 
been a NATO target at that time. Presently, though, the old associations appear 
to have been forgotten as the current leanings are directed towards 
accelerating the market through consumerism and privatization. 
Apart from the increased number of commercial properties, there has also 
been a change in appearance, use and renaming of particular buildings. One 
example is a building that was used as the headquarters of the Central 
Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (also known as the 
CK Tower) and was one of three significant governmental/cultural buildings 
in the post-WWII formation of New Belgrade.38 The 1962–64 100-meter-tall 
CK Tower, the tallest structure in SFRY when it was constructed, was targeted 
during the 1999 strikes. It was also one of the first renamed and reconstructed 
buildings, a process that lasted three years (2002–05). Now occupied by 
private and commercial offices and known as the Usce Tower, the building is 
a signifier of the impulse to eliminate socialist practices and introduce a 
consumer and private culture. The tower has had two more storeys added to 
its initial 23, primarily used for hospitality and fitness activities, whilst the 
greenscaped public area surrounding the building was taken over for the 
construction of what is now known as the Usce Shopping Centre and a car 
park that opened in 2009. 
  
 
Figure 6.9 Usce Shopping Centre in the foreground, and the reconstructed Usce Tower 
in the background. 
The green spaces that were once public commons have been turned into 
private and inert pristine spaces to be viewed and consumed rather than used. 
Indications that the consumer culture of spectacle now plays a more prominent 
role are amplified with the reclad glass façade of the Usce complex (tower and 
shopping center) turned into a billboard of messages. At night, the volume of 
the complex hauntingly disappears, apart from the array of spectacle 
manifested by its neon light signs. The ultimate irony of the reconstruction is 
that a tower once associated with communism/socialism now boasts the sign 
of the first market economy bank – Hypo Adria – introduced to Belgrade and 
Serbia after 1999. The global and political restructuring, in which buildings 
as well as goods are becoming commodities for consumption and which re-
educate residents to believe in the necessity of consuming, underscores the 
proliferation of spatial violence. 
This is not to say that every development is an instance of gentrification; 
only those where the development is largely oriented towards increasing real 
estate and profit margins, expunging the diversity of uses and socio-economic 
profiles. The increasing real estate and profit margins come about precisely 
because the world of consumerism feeds on a continual loop of creating, 
managing and extending the existence and availability of various products, 
whilst also neutralizing and flattening alternatives since diversity is possible 
only if it is tied to the profit margin of the market economy. The balkanization 
of Serbia post-1999, and Yugoslavia during the 1990s, has been oriented 
  
towards the accommodation of consumer culture and debt. Speed is a 
significant factor in this process; the more swiftly the changes are made, the 
less scope there is for protest. 
Gentrification versus balkanization: militarization 
The question that arises then is what the difference between gentrification and 
balkanization may be, since gentrification is contingent on the city authorities 
redeveloping run-down areas to repopulate newly created zones with the 
middle and upper classes. Understanding the differences between 
gentrification and balkanization is particularly pertinent since Neil Smith 
articulates that gentrification, that is, ‘urban regeneration,’ is not just pursued 
as policy by many states in Europe, but also is a preference of the EU.39 The 
policy is promoted for the revenue it yields, but at the expense of socio-
economic segregation. Balkanization operates on a different level. It is a two-
fold process by which gentrification is achieved, the first being that through 
the rhetoric of decay, lack of order or normality, areas are prepared for a 
necessary and largely unquestioned regeneration. The second aspect of this 
process is that balkanization is a part of a broader strategy to homogenize, 
whether this be socio-economically or in terms of creating ethnically 
homogeneous enclaves, as seen in Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement. 
Balkanization, in the former Yugoslav context, is also tied to questions of 
democratization, peace and stability – or at least the perception that these 
values are realized. 
Implementing peace and democracy is contingent on the violent instilling 
of discipline and control. Using Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s thinking, 
violence is a question of procedure and an ordering enforced for purposes of 
not only managing social hierarchies but also regulating social life.40 Thus, to 
remake a country and rebuild a nation through, first, 1990s economic and 
travel sanctions and destruction and then imposing a transitional identity is 
less reminiscent of the birth of a nation and more akin to colonialism in that 
colonial powers first balkanize the world and then politically and socio-
economically absorb the newly created zones. The tag of transition, which has 
marked this region for close to 30 years since the start of the 1990s, is driven 
not only by the agenda of eliminating the alternative practice of Titoism, or 
reinforcing the derogatory tag of Balkanism, but also an opportunity to open 
the transitional systems of the former Yugoslavia in general, and Serbia in 
particular, to urban militarization through political, social and economic 
policies. 
To militarize the urban is to eliminate any form of Balkanist alternatives 
and prepare a space where any opposition beyond that advocated by Anglo-
America and Western Europe is smoothed out. This is a different smoothing 
from the one found in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari on smooth and 
striated space, concepts used to show the inter-relatedness of control and 
  
counter control. For Deleuze and Guattari, striated space is inclusive, gridded 
and finite, and smooth space is extensive, open-ended and infinite. It is the 
tension between zero and one, the relation inclusive of a push-and-pull 
network, thereby suggesting that within every measured and territorialized 
space, there are opportunities to resist and re-territorialize, since even the most 
disciplinary striated space can foster the de-territorializing opportunities of 
smooth spaces.41 Smooth space found in the aftermath of 1999 in Belgrade 
and Serbia by contrast is more reminiscent of Virilio’s understanding on 
smooth space, which is related to speed, the military and the hegemony of 
control – all of which are found in the militarization of space through 
miniaturization of equipment. 
The militarization of Belgrade is exercised through desocialization, 
dehistoricization and negation of diversity through policy. This militarization 
is not comparable to the militarization of cities during WWII. Instead, the 
militarization process is a means of organizing a society in such a way that 
violence is produced, though concealed, through the reformative agenda of 
post-socialist cities. The transition from the undemocratic Balkanist zone to 
become a valued democratic member of Europe and the world is marked with 
socio-economic polarization, privatization of land and infrastructure and 
elimination of solidarity. More so, the preference for the marginal zone of 
Belgrade and Serbia to mold itself into the centralized identity of Europe is 
the opportunity to eliminate any European or NATO act of violence from the 
start, since acceding to centralization automatically declares acceptance of, 
first, the derogatory and violent agenda associated with the Balkans and, 
second, the need to remove the liminal alterity present within this region in 
the name of attaining civility. 
Post-socialism through balkanization is ultimately driven towards the 
establishment of post-Balkanism, a dispensation under which the people who 
live in the region finally learn to behave and cooperate in ways thought fitting 
by the rest of Europe and the West. To eliminate socialism and Balkanism is a 
sign not only of violence permanently made present and spearheaded by 
military interventions, but also of the erasure of a belief that alternative 
systems are possible. Such alternatives were certainly present in the former 
Yugoslav context. They were to be found in the form of a state constitution as 
a conclave of multi-ethnic republics including the instatement of workers’ 
self-management,42 and in the alternative approach taken under Titoism to 
questions of economics, and of the military. SFRY was one of two European 
countries – the other being Cyprus – that openly opposed Europe’s Eastern 
and Western Bloc divisions. 
For Jean-François Lyotard, violence in the name of Enlightenment values 
is always enforced by the merchant and/or economist and the bureaucrat.43 
Violence is implemented through softer methods; utilizing Foucault’s 
thinking,44 through the policies and regulations that need to be obeyed in order 
to establish the truth that this Balkanist region is ever-so-barbaric and 
  
therefore in need of discovering obedience. These softer methods are nothing 
other than a sign of colonialism and colonial administration enacted for 
purposes of accommodating and maintaining supposed peace. Abiding by 
these new regulations is not a sign of becoming European, but rather that 
European political and legal standards are being adopted.45 If anything, the 
colonial system implemented is oriented towards the Western Balkans – a 
zone that belongs neither to the first nor the third world – becoming a third-
world zone that is administered through European politics. 
Balkanization and distinctness: pre and post SFRY 
For Srdjan Jovanovic Weiss, the balkanization of 1990s Yugoslavia has 
provided an opportunity for identity distinction through the creation of more 
national capitals (from just one main capital Belgrade, to now Belgrade, 
Zagreb, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, Podgorica, Skopje and Pristina). This 
fragmentation is seen to accommodate particularity and “territorial 
specificity.”46 According to Kai Vockler, it is rather that the hybridization of 
different aesthetic styles and typological mixes exemplified in instant 
urbanism, and spurred by transitional politics, demonstrates how to develop 
the ‘European city’; it is a developmental model of Balkanology.47 
Utilizing Bakic-Hayden’s thinking, “territorial specificity” was already 
present in that SFRY states identified themselves in terms of what “one is not 
in relation to the other,”48 the distinction predominantly centering on one 
republic being less or more developed than another. It is not simply that each 
capital identity was unique in its building style; they cultivated distinct arts, 
economic and cultural palettes. If anything, post-1990s distinctness is more 
suggestive of each capital city being rebuilt with various foreign loans and 
thus being amalgamated into the homogeneous spectacle of global consumer 
culture. Weiss’ distinctness, and Vockler’s belief in the radical potential in 
instant urbanism of corporate and private properties, are possible only if 
thinking distinctness and potential means complying with the global 
hegemony of the market economy agenda, which for Andrej Grubačić is 
“balkanisation from above.”49 
Where Weiss sees further positive aspects of balkanization is during the 
early 1990s Yugoslavia, when the flood of refugees created an alternative way 
of living and started diversifying the scale and typology of buildings. On one 
hand, he compared newly created extensions or temporary buildings that 
encroached over sidewalks or were perched over rooftops as both inventive 
indices of a will to live and hilarious architecture.50 Another example of 
architectural vitality was seen in the construction of “mushroom houses,” 
which were essentially residential upgrades in the form of two vertically 
stacked buildings, the top being the larger and newer one.51 This is in sharp 
contrast to “turbo architecture,” which for him was exemplified by either huge 
kitsch villas built by shady businessman or commercial buildings.52 What 
  
distinguished these massive buildings is the unorthodox and clumsy melding 
of quasi-Byzantine architecture with neoclassical elements to form lavish 
castle-like structures. Turbo architecture, much like turbo folk music,53 
enmeshed many different stylistic influences during the heights of corruption, 
criminality and Milosevic’s nationalist rule. All of them were built without 
planning permissions and marked the height of urban and architectural chaos. 
It is said that the construction of about 150,000 building shells occurred during 
the period of Milosevic (1989–2000).54 
 
Figure 6.10 CIAM-inspired housing developments in the background and the 
‘temporary’ structures constructed in the 1990s. These structures are still in use. 
Illegal construction is a result of not only systemic failure among urban 
regulation bodies but also the general economic and political isolation. 
Notably, the organized crime and illegality present during Milosevic’s reign 
has not stopped, even after the supposed democratization of Serbia from 
October 2000. The violence of soft methods, evident in the bankruptcy of 
national banks and subsequent foreign ownership privatization, and the 
expunging of the presence of Romani and people of lower socio-economic 
background under the pretext of security and regeneration, all manifest the 
presence of criminality. Now, however, it is portrayed as legitimate, since the 
changes made are under the cloak of Europeanization and the Westernization 
of this unruly region. What both periods, pre- and post-Milosevic, showcase 
is the relation of (il)legality with lack of public transparency. 
Weiss’ attempt to suggest that architecture during the SFRY was largely 
homogeneous in style is odd. Regional distinctness was pursued by architects 
  
and domestic owner-occupiers alike. The 1961 economic reforms were driven 
by the opening of Yugoslav borders and the legalization of emigration; the 
strategy was to keep the economy afloat with the remittances of Yugoslav 
emigrants who worked abroad, while also easing the rising national 
unemployment. Those who worked in Germany and Austria would, with their 
hard-earned money, often build large and lavish residential dwellings that 
appropriated traditional Germanic and Austrian styles. These influences were 
more apparent and style more dutifully followed in areas such as Croatia. 
In areas such as Serbia, the appropriations were more opulent, blending the 
styles inherited from the Turks during the Ottoman Empire with the traditional 
Germanic, Austrian or Swiss styles. Just how much hybridization and 
influence were taken from different architectural styles and cultural traditions 
depended on the personal aesthetics of the owner of the dwelling. When 
structures were designed by architects, they became no less distinctive. These 
residences also accommodated businesses ranging from hairdressing and 
beauty studios to dentist’s surgeries; hybridity was achieved through lack of 
program distinctness. The scale and mixing of architectural programs perhaps 
anticipated Rem Koolhaas’ 1995 thesis that classification of architecture needs 
to be based solely on scale, not on things like building typology, or location 
or construction techniques.55 
With the 1948 split with Stalin’s Russia, Yugoslavia also moved away from 
centralized socialist planning. Balkanization, that is, decentralization, was 
integrated purposely into the construction of mass housing after WWII. 
Architectural differentiation was clearly a marker of balkanization, despite 
this balkanization in Yugoslavia also being politically synonymous with 
socialism, anti-fascism and bringing together different ethnicities. For 
example, the interpretation of double-tract units in mass housing in Serbia was 
two units that varied in function and shape connected vertically into a unitary 
structure.56 In other republics such as Croatia, the interpretation was a corridor 
joining two functional zones.57 The difference of interpretation in mass 
housing also led to varying façade treatments; from Serbia’s interest in 
experimental patterns and pulling out volumes to Croatia’s interest in color, to 
Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s focus on appropriating the dominant 
Western aesthetic of modernism.58 The architecture of balkanization was not 
a question of uniform mass production, but a complex operational procedure 
whereby function was also dependent on experimentation in pre-fabrication, 
volumes and façades. What brought the diversification together is economical 
affordance and speed of construction; balkanization as implemented in the 
former Yugoslav context being an event of transgression. 
Balkanist transgressions and the Mikser house 
The radical potential of Balkanism (especially in the Yugoslav case of 
balkanization, in which territories where different South Slav peoples lived 
  
were internally integrated, meaning that the entity thus created was 
heterogeneous) is that it demonstrates alternative ways a society can be set up 
through events, leisure and everyday life as well as re-thinking the 
preoccupation with land and power. In other words, the potential is found in 
the frictional and deviant Balkanism, comparable to Deleuze’s description of 
nomadism, since for Deleuze “the nomads are those who don’t move on, they 
become nomads because they refuse to disappear.”59 It is the refusal to 
disappear that is the event of transgression. Thinking event in relation to 
Balkanism is to think how mapping events in terms of the political landscape 
in which they arise proffers thinking event as that which eclipses the ‘self-
evident’ understanding of that event in terms of its originary articulation. In 
other words, the focus is more on how the event articulates power, the effects 
it has and how these may be used as an operative tool to (de)stabilize and 
challenge the dominant understanding of history of this region and the 
practices that make it distinct. 
One contemporary example was seen in the Don’t Drown Belgrade/We are 
not Handing Over Belgrade political campaign discussed earlier. Another has 
been around since 2008, and it utilizes Balkanism in a very different way. The 
independent design and cultural center Mikser House and the annual Mikser 
Festival that started in that year – the largest festival of innovation and 
creativity in the region – skirt local and global politics in an attempt to create 
a multidisciplinary platform where the distinctions between architecture, 
media design, spatial activism, education and economics start to falter. This 
platform reveals an operation of Balkanism beyond the conventional rhetoric 
of barbarism. 
Mikser House was cofounded in 2009 by a husband-and-wife duo, Ivan 
Lalic (a playwright) and Maja Lalic, an architect who studied in Belgrade and 
New York. Her return from the US was prompted by the termination of 
Milosevic’s rule in 2000 and the promised surge of democratization in the 
country. Initially located in Savamala, Mikser House was part of a larger 
desire to revitalize the area along Belgrade’s Sava, the zone currently being 
redeveloped as part of Belgrade Waterfront. Other notable cultural centers that 
emerged within Savamala were KC Grad and the Spanish House as well as a 
number of alternative cafés and bars. The criticism that has dogged these 
initiatives has been that the touted cultural revitalization is no more than 
exploitation of simulacra in a drive to pile high the symbolism that goes with 
anything that is understood as arts and culture, even where it is contingent on 
capital accumulation and the removal of the less privileged layer of society.60 
If the criticism is valid, this amassing of the symbols of culture was 
nevertheless not spared by the Belgrade Waterfront plan. In May 2017, 
Belgrade’s Mikser House had to leave its premises, once a vacant mechanical 
workshop, and temporarily close its Belgrade branch. The Belgrade 
Waterfront 2012 master plan had marked the area of the Mikser House as a 
prime zone for “urban regeneration,” and this was now to be put into effect. 
  
Two things set the Mikser House apart from other design/cultural centers in 
this Balkan region. The first was its yearly thematic Mikser Festival.61 In 2017, 
the Festival operated from Dorcol (an industrial zone in proximity to the port, 
one occupied by an eclectic population from a low socio-economic 
background and whose post-1999 redevelopment is at a halt). The second was 
seen in the plan to expand its activities into other Balkan and former Yugoslav 
areas, with the intent of showcasing Balkan creativity and innovation through 
co-existence and beyond the Balkanist derogatory rhetoric. The first such 
expansion, albeit short-lived, was the opening of Mikser House in Sarajevo in 
September 2017.62 In many ways, the ethos of Mikser House re-interpreted 
the 20th Century Yugoslav ideology by applying balkanization in reverse to 
the norm. Rather than fragmenting areas and isolating different ethnicities, 
Yugoslav balkanization was associated with multi-ethnicities and constituent 
nations co-existing in the same territory. 
What the independent Mikser House and Festival showcase is a belief in 
change, and a more tolerant and heterogeneous world. In many ways, the event 
is that the very existence of belief prompts transgression of control, since for 
Gilles Deleuze  
[i]f you believe in the world you precipitate events, however 
inconspicuous, that elude control [. . .] Our ability to resist control, or our 
submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of every move. We need 
both creativity and a people.63  
It is true that Mikser House and the Mikser Festival’s instatement of 
balkanization are tied to consumerism and advertising; if Mikser House re-
opens after its closure and follows the originary idea of expansion, it is bound 
to become more mainstream and at the same time driven by the desire to 
increase profits. However, what has remained constant in the initial 
conception and during its period of expansion (exemplified by the opening of 
its center in Sarajevo) is the desire to create a space that can showcase art, 
design and cultural knowledge and practices specific to the Balkans. Both the 
annual Festival over five to nine days and the House, which is open every day, 
are driven by an ethical agenda of eliminating racial/ethnic, religious, gender 
and age boundaries through workshops, debates, youth programs, exhibitions, 
lectures, dance and cinema. 
  
 
Figure 6.11 The façade of the no longer operating Mikser House in Sarajevo. Parts of 
the façade read, “This land is for all. This is a house from a dream.” 
Mikser House does not discredit consumer culture but uses it to attempt to 
shift the thinking around Balkanism; it shows an alternative thinking when it 
comes to economics and its relation to solidarity among regions that only very 
recently, in the 1990s, fought over territory. What Mikser House also does, 
despite being profit-oriented, is to showcase, through a multi-platform and 
multi-ethnic approach found in arts and culture, the presence of a long-
standing history of centuries-old socio-political cooperation in this Balkanist 
region. That this platform is also driven by a belief and a desire to bring 
together kids from across the former Yugoslavia around music and 
performance, as seen during the recent opening of Sarajevo’s Mikser House, 
is a step towards building friendship and tolerance. This is noteworthy 
considering that current education in each of the former Yugoslav republics is 
tainted by efforts to short-circuit history with teaching materials that negate 
solidarity. From this perspective, the Mikser House/Festival reflects Bernard 
Tschumi’s thinking whereby the event is a different mode of thinking space.64 
This position somewhat parallels Rem Koolhaas’ thinking when during his 
visit to Belgrade in 200365 he advocated the importance of Belgrade 
capitalizing on its potential to lower urban standards, rather than compete with 
standards of living found in Western Europe, and thus always remaining a B 
or C version.66 The Mikser House/Festival has appropriated his conceptual 
position. Where Koolhaas, and to an extent Mikser House, undermine the 
potential of Belgrade, Balkans and Balkanism is that they associate the city, 
  
the region and the discourse with a set of measurable values. As such, the 
radicality of thinking event in relation to Balkanism is weakened since 
Balkanism is trapped by being dependent upon the Western ordering of high-
low values and imposition of Western power structures. 
However, the opening of a center for refugees – Refugee Aid Miksaliste – 
with the first wave of arrivals from the Middle East, and as an extension of 
Mikser House, showcases the attempts to extend solidarity and flatten 
boundaries. The overall ethos is oriented towards associating the Balkans and 
Balkanism with vitality and creativity, rather than with violence and conflict. 
More recently, and as a result of space infringement – as seen with the closure 
of the Mikser House in Savamala, which has also affected the (temporary) 
suspension of the Mikser Festival – the Mikser House has been turned into an 
educational caravan that travels to different cities of Serbia addressing issues 
from urban planning to civil society. The workshops bring together various 
experts in the fields as well as NGOs to think ways of becoming more 
proactive and participatory in the current political climate. 
Thus, thinking events via Balkanism and balkanization are dependent upon 
mobility and active participation which seeks to both challenge and transgress 
the transitionary impositions of control in the form of delineation of values 
and lack of transparency to do with urban development as well as 
commercialization and privatization. The potential lies in Balkanism being 
seen as a discourse of indefiniteness, the Balkans as a region where 
“inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as 
normative,”67 and that balkanization as fragmentation can be reversed, as seen 
during the formation of the 20th Century Yugoslavia. What Balkanism and the 
Yugoslav version of balkanization demonstrate is not only that an outside 
exists, but also that the discourse may be used to re-think the political meaning 
that the society can become more open and constituent. After all, Rebecca 
West, in her 1942 Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through 
Yugoslavia, described this territory as “a decentred border space, which 
deconstructs linearity.”68 Not only does the center not exist, but also neither 
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Present spaces, present times 
Other spaces, other times 
Present 
Political tensions of balkanism, balkanization and architecture 
With the geopolitical zone of the Balkans being historically complex, the 
countries that now form the political zone of Western Balkans (which includes 
Serbia) are those whose physical and psychological spaces (if not their 
geographical ones) are still perceived as an abject inconvenience and an 
anomaly in the privileged Anglo-American and Western system. Indeed, the 
necessity to eliminate this type of space is given paramount attention; the drive 
to absolve this inconvenient space is made possible with its association with 
barbarism and perennial violence. In terms of the former Yugoslavia, the 
means of achieving this has been a multifaceted and complex process that has 
seen the country’s territory first balkanized and then destroyed in space and 
time, with consequent effects on the urban and architectural spaces of 
everyday life. 
The balkanization that was implemented with the 1990s disintegration of 
Yugoslavia into separate enclaves was also a means of placing restraints on 
the exercise of a diversity of beliefs, values and relations; it was indicative of 
elimination of co-existence. Simultaneously, its enactment prompts us to re-
think our current value systems and conventions to do with defining spatial 
violence and human agency; the meaning and deployment of both grow less 
clear, particularly because the violence perpetrated in the 21st Century is 
understood through the lens of the 20th Century. 
Studying the complexity and the transitionally undecided state of former 
Yugoslavia reveals distinctive ways in which balkanization is being deployed; 
the understanding of the intents is the understanding of the contemporary 
implementation of balkanization in this territory. The focus on former 
  
Yugoslavia in general, and Belgrade in particular, is largely because any 
imposition of power for purposes of evolution and attaining civility becomes 
more obvious as the power structures implemented are coming into contact 
with a zone of counterapproach to balkanization by affirming and expanding 
heterogeneity. The study of balkanizing processes past and present reveals the 
political tensions inherent in architecture and urbanism, including the fragility 
and constraints of power and its structural logic. In other words, the 
balkanization of cities and architecture in the aftermath of the 1990s 
dissolution has been an opportunity to reduce the depth and complexity of 
history, both that of the immediate past and of more distant times. Matters to 
do with identity were also brought into being and implemented symbolically 
or pragmatically; often for purposes of classifying violence in the name of 
those who may speak, that is, those who do not have a right to voice. 
The ideological and symbolic aspects of architecture were often narrated 
through mass media, which portrayed the 1990s dissolution largely as a result 
of ethnonationalism. However, the balkanization of Yugoslavia was more tied 
to eliminating its association with communism, socialism and anti-fascism by 
reducing the complexity of history through urban and architectural spaces, 
including the breadth of violence taking place on the ground. Balkanization in 
this instance was deployed for purposes of categorizing and managing data 
and information, to be processed and transmitted to the public to perpetuate a 
uniform message that Western and Anglo-American intervention was 
undertaken to bring civility and peace. It was also done to map the flows of 
people and commodities and extend military control into every aspect of life 
by blurring the line between the military and the civilian. Two examples from 
the kind of peace brought to Kosovo in the aftermath of 1999 were the 
apartheid created for Serbs and Romani and the piece of territory that was 
sequestered for a US military base. Meanwhile, in FB-H, enclaves were 
legally implemented through the 1990s Dayton Agreement. 
Where the potential of Balkanism lies is in its liminality. This was seen in 
the public protests that occurred in Belgrade during the NATO bombings; the 
‘abnormality’ was extended and space reinterpreted despite Western warnings 
and threats. Balkanization may also be used in opportunistic ways, as 
symbolically suggested in Kusturica’s films, where new territories can be 
created again for purposes of ambiguity and in the name of joy and diversity. 
The course of history can be altered, both symbolically and pragmatically; the 
Generalstab complex symbolic of the real Sutjeska Offensive that brought into 
existence the affirmative balkanization through extension of difference and 
heterogeneity of the second Yugoslavia as well as anti-fascism. 
The politics of identity is a significant aspect of balkanization and 
architecture. The unmaking and making of cities and space tends to be a 
complex interplay of historical short-circuiting and fabrication of myth. This 
was seen in the reconstruction of Croatia, FB-H and Serbia. Thus, to 
understand the complexities of identity reconstruction, there is a need to 
  
engage with the politics of rubble. Reconstruction extends beyond physical 
remaking, as seen with the rebuilding of the Old Bridge in Mostar; the 
reconstruction often making apparent that which is not ready to come together. 
Having said this, any form of balkanization including political matters to do 
with the identity of architecture needs to be approached from the perspective 
of more than one history. Otherwise, the framing and engagement with history 
remains polarized; violence required to be visible and seen as it was 
perpetrated by Others, and that which needs to remain invisible and not seen 
as it was enacted in the name of civilization, humanitarian values and for the 
homeland thus allowing the cleansing of that violence. The narrative 
eliminates the opportunity to comprehend the complexity of violence inflicted 
on more than one side. Moreover, when balkanization is implemented for 
purposes of policy control and in the name of defense, as seen with the 
reconstruction of the Generalstab complex, there is less possibility to 
penetrate the power vacuum of perpetual present. Likewise, it is an 
opportunity to control data and information on the basis of security. 
From a pragmatic perspective, NATO’s intervention was geared towards the 
introduction of the market economy, as seen with the Rambouillet Agreement. 
Balkanization was enacted for purposes of attaining civilization and 
instrumentalized through urban infrastructure via privatization and control of 
entities from construction firms, power plants and telecommunications to 
banks and matters to do with shipping. This is the politics of greed. 
Infrastructure has also been used for purposes of eliminating any sites that 
breach the norm, such as the Romani settlements beneath Belgrade’s Gazela 
Bridge. The sites of violence whose borders are less visible are those created 
by NATO’s use of DU; that violence of balkanization is silently enacted years 
after the 1999 intervention, since DU is limited neither by time or nor by 
territorial boundaries. 
More broadly, Western values have been attained together with the removal 
of social welfare and rights to public good. From a socio-economic and ethnic 
perspective, the alterities of Balkanism and the Yugoslavian type of 
balkanization are still possible. The work by Mikser House-Festival and 
Refugee Aid Miksaliste is very much geared towards solidarity with a multi-
platform and multi-ethnic approach. From an architectural and urban 
perspective, the implementation of balkanization in Yugoslavia showcased 
that mass production, social housing and profit are possible without letting go 
of creativity and experimentation. Moreover, globalization was approached in 
a way to think solidarity, affordance and heterogeneity rather than the current 
practice of discord, polarization and homogeneity. 
Global politics, balkanization and the camp 
Balkanization extends beyond the Balkans. The UK’s decision to leave the EU 
is a sign of not only balkanization, but also the beginnings of regional 
  
fragmentation of many other European countries. North Italy’s secessionist 
tendencies are on the horizon and, as in Spain and Yugoslavia, are driven by 
reluctance to share economic wealth in a way that subsidizes neighbors who 
are socio-economically less fortunate. While autonomy may seem to promise 
independence and economic gain, the mid- to long-term effects are potentially 
troublesome since such newly balkanized regions find themselves more easily 
dominated by global powers such as NATO. While Yugoslavia’s 1990s 
balkanization may be seen as a different scenario due to the country’s Titoist 
and, therefore, not democratic dispensation, the very premise of balkanization 
as a method and a system of analysis intersecting with fields that extend 
beyond the borders of the Western Balkans – such as sociology, the law or the 
urban – suggests that fragmentation is pursued for purposes of administration 
and control as well as to place restrictions on diversity and complexity. 
The global world of today is not only remade and reorganized as a result of 
ongoing ways of destroying and militarizing the urban by destroying public 
space through privatization, militarization of security and implementation of 
a permanent sense of fear as well as using the city as a space to enact warfare.1 
It is also a fortified camp of aestheticized threat and imaginary fear. The 
understanding of the constructs embedded within the rhetoric of risk would 
undermine the need for permanent security and the construction of borders 
(real or virtual) to prevent co-existence with the Other. Understandably, this 
is not in the interest of the military since fear is used as a tactic and as that 
which both provokes and maintains the presence of risk. It is a cyclical 
process; to make defense and security a matter of priority, fear needs to be 
invoked regardless of how real or imagined the threat may be. Fear, in this 
instance, is used as a tool to isolate and to legally toughen borders; it is the 
agent and the motive behind every implementation of economic and defense 
measures. It is used to obscure the fact that we are living in a time when it is 
becoming ever harder to step back and recognize that the imagery of politics 
is both aestheticized and abstracted. 
Control is found at the intersection of imagery used for purposes of 
convenience and entertainment. An ability to decipher the aesthetics and 
simulacra of imagery would make it possible to step out of the infantile, 
mechanistic and purely visual mass media industry in which we engage in. 
However, unlike Agamben’s thinking on the camp, in which “there was no 
space for rest, reflection and comfort: work, finding something to eat and 
survival were parts of a daily battle, which meant that the prisoners were in 
permanent movement,”2 mobility in the current globally connected society is 
constrained by the need to be physically inert due to imminent threat. The 
ability to perceive and make sense of the ‘threat’ depends on its presentation 
in the mass media. Though, this reality assumes short-term memory loss on a 
scale that forgets even events in the immediate past; moreover, a future beyond 
the one projected by the dominant political structures is hard to imagine since 
the political realm is activated and stimulated around a recurrent circulation 
  
of one-liner narratives and representations. It is this short-term memory 
vacuum that produces a situation of not seeing or believing in alternatives 
other than those which currently exist, which creates a fertile ground for the 
present to become even more rigid and extreme in the name of supposed 
defense and security. 
Contrasting Agamben’s conception about the camp, the current camp is 
always altering its formation precisely because it is dependent on how the 
Other is framed. That framing is contingent on whether the Other’s system 
manifests political oppositions, and/or alternatives, to the privileged political 
structures in Anglo-America and Western Europe, or if those Other zones are 
willing to subserviently accept the imposition of Western values. Those who 
challenge the systems and conditions presented are silenced by using the 
rhetoric of violence that may be enacted by the Other. Thus, when the 
derogatory Balkanist agenda is deployed, it is to deny the possibility for 
alternative values and relations, that is, to eliminate spaces that operate outside 
Western Enlightened values. Paradoxically, these Western values enacted on 
behalf of humanitarianism, human agency and justice are compatible with 
military interventions. The values of civilization have arisen on foundations 
of violence, wars and technological developments. Likewise, current 
moralization is established by the ethos of NATO, the new superpower. With 
the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, NATO has established itself as 
an organization that drives ‘peace-building’ and the new order in southeast 
Europe.3 
Global politics is nothing other than violence deployed as a mode of 
military operations and transitional politics, despite this violence being 
purified as it is decreed in the name of human agency and civil values. The 
calamity of such replicatory violence is even greater when we recognize that 
Western Balkans countries agree to partake in binding dialogues with Western 
Europe and Anglo-America that are constructed on the foundations of the 
derogatory Balkanist imaginary. The dialogue is not even-handed; instead, it 
takes the side of and privileges one type of violence and indirectly 
misrepresents another type of violence. In terms of the Balkans, 
misrepresentation is achieved through dehumanization. Violence is condoned 
precisely because this part of the world is said not to have reached the level of 
maturity, found in the rest of Europe and Anglo-America, that would sustain 
a functioning multi-ethnic society. To comprehend the Balkans, after all, 
requires grappling with complex and interrelated histories of cultures, beliefs, 
practices and values. It is a task that confounds the conventional cognitive 
map of understanding spaces and events via fixed coordinates or the peculiarly 
European nation-state formation. It also supplies the opportunity to mark this 
Other space as an anomaly and a black hole of barbarity. Such sidestepping of 
the norm is deemed to include the inability to engage in civility by virtue of 
the fact that it challenges that very norm. 
  
Humanism of normality 
The norm is not just a social construct implemented for purposes of 
disciplining and compartmentalizing humans, but also one of articulating 
pressing concerns. This is particularly relevant when it comes to questions of 
displacement, that is, human resettlement, regardless of whether it is 
generated by conflicts, natural disasters or gentrification. According to the 
UN, in 2016, 65.6 million people were displaced globally, 22.5 million of 
them being refugees.4 What is even more concerning is that in a period of 23 
years (1990–2012) close to 3,200 people were found to have died while 
attempting to cross borders. When it comes to Europe, these borders are 
located along the territorial line of the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean 
(southern Europe).5 The need of refugees to cross the border into the EU while 
not accepting assistance from any of the Western Balkans countries is driven 
by Europe’s decision that accepting humanitarian aid is tantamount to 
expressing willingness to remain living in countries such as Serbia. 
Remaining in the Western Balkans disqualifies the refugee from seeking aid 
from more economically stable countries. 
The question of humanitarian aid is a matter not just of Foucault’s bio power 
but also is concerned with difference in that difference is to be devalued and 
borders need to be policed against it. This was seen in the 23 September 2015 
speech given by Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, who 
advocated the need to reinforce border control as a matter of “responsibility 
and common sense,” lest Europe experience a “political catastrophe” from 
allowing the refugees to settle.6 Refugees are thus synonymous with threat and 
are directly agents that will erode peace, freedom and the identity of the EU. 
This is freedom, but freedom from difference. 
To have freedom in difference would mean the elimination of obstacles to 
thinking and acting differently from the current political reality. Having this 
freedom is to simultaneously have the capability to critically analyze the 
legitimation and extension of control and to think beyond the current 
implementation of violence. Perhaps this type of freedom is discouraged since 
the established culture is civil only if border fortifications and systems of 
control are erected and maintained. Unlike the medieval forts where the walls 
were visible, current forts are softer and more ‘democratic’; they are instated 
through legal policies and the rhetoric of threat. Even though the refugees are 
fleeing persecution, their existence is conflated with the language of 
barbarism and threats to Western security. To invoke security is to allow the 
possibility to limit civil liberties – a technique made apparent after 9/11 when 
US authorities ‘rightfully’ subjected migrants to interrogation based purely on 
their appearance and a supposition that they would perpetrate violence should 
they be granted entry. The invocation of security is an attempt not only to 
manage uncertainty but also to establish uncertainty as a persistent image 
associated with threat. It is to project an image of the present as well as the 
  
future before it even occurs. Heidegger’s thinking to do with all beings living 
their life in the shadow of death7 is now being overtaken by the situation of 
all beings living their life in the shadow of fear. Fear is the seat of power over 
life, and the implicit destruction of life. 
The humanism of normality is the politics of discrediting alternative 
futures. To believe in the necessity of enforcing border security (physical, 
legal and socio-economic) measures is to find meaning in protection from 
difference; implemented through finding justification and meaning in violence 
inflicted upon the Other. With the alleged need to protect against threat, the 
necessity for external and internal, as well as general and particular, security 
also grows in partnership with the rising fear. The great danger is of fostering 
a belief in the enduring righteousness of these systems and that they should 
continue indefinitely. A greater danger, though, is the belief that there is no 
outside. Hardt notes that the corollary of Foucault’s thinking that power 
“comes from everywhere, [and] that there is no outside to power, [is that] he 
is also denying the analytical separation of political society from civil 
society.”8 In other words, there is no possibility to resist or to create an 
alternative reality since the operational mode of power is circular for Foucault. 
There is no outside to the history prescribed. 
Balkanization implemented in the name of ‘humanism’ itself is a new way 
of imposing Western values and diplomacy that allows the use of force. It is a 
tale of morality narrated in terms of obedience and submission. However, 
since the intentions are ‘just,’ the violence is automatically absolved. These 
values enacted in the name of human rights, justice and freedom have been 
made possible precisely by displacing what Bauman identifies as the “truth of 
modernity” in that this identification facilitates the ability to selectively enact 
and display these values.9 Kriss Ravetto elaborates upon Bauman’s thinking 
by saying that such selectivity has afforded the West the chance to associate 
“less modern or civilized figures and nations [. . . with . . .] Saddam Hussein, 
Stalin, Serbia, and Cambodia.”10 The upholding of these values has been 
rendered possible first by isolating particular areas and second by using that 
isolation as an opportunity to construct knowledge to do with lack of civility 
found in those territories and/or valued amongst their people. In contemporary 
times, the construct gains further credibility from being posed in terms of 
economics, security and defense of civil values and human rights. 
The belief in the existence of modernity’s justice and freedom is the belief 
in violence since the formation of modern nation states was contingent on 
balkanization where newly created states were largely ethnically 
homogeneous. It would seem that the “truth of modernity” is the veiling of 
violence and bloodshed; the invocation of liberty, fraternity and humanity 
during the French Revolution coincided with mass killing. Also, the very 
premise of humanity is anything but humane since it is moralized on the basis 
of classifying people and places in terms of practices, convictions and 
  
imaginaries; the contemporary practice of humanity not only fabricates 
history but also prevents it from existing. 
Despite, or because of, the heritage of values from the perspective of the 
“truth of modernity,” it was necessary to identify areas such as the Balkans as 
zones of historical barbarity where the possibility of humane and civilized 
ways like those found in Europe and the West did not exist. This belief in a 
lack of moral values and humanity in the Balkans is not only paradoxical, 
considering the Western history of colonialism and balkanization, but also 
unproductive, as it traps Western history in an imaginary construct of heroism 
and progress. That this progress is flawed is made evident by the fact that, 
despite significant technological advances, the hand of solidarity is still not 
extended unless it comes with the imposition of values geared towards the 
market economy. The imposition of values is also dependent on eliminating 
co-existence with difference, unless that difference is kept outside designated 
borders; legal regulations and social values are built upon delimiting 
difference. 
To participate in the imagery of modernity’s values is to accept that certain 
liberties, such as freedom to think and live outside the prescribed norms, can 
be suspended if necessary, for purposes of defense. The rhetoric of security 
not only makes violence more palatable when distanced from Western 
borders, but also requires defense from it in that the media screen has been 
able to portray the need to guard the borders to ward off violence. Blocking 
violence is simultaneously contingent upon suppressing the efforts of 
mobilizing thought if that thought challenges assumptions about the vilified 
Other. To partake in the vilification is to contribute to a world of 
spectacularized impressions, which not only control one’s attention but also 
discredit the value of an alternative future; to keep operating under the current 
values of civility and security on one side, and barbarity and threat on the 
Other side, is to remain living in a present-continuous “truth of modernity.” 
The inability to grasp the immensity of the violence being implemented 
circumscribes protests since the underlying agenda of exercising humanism, 
that is, violence, is in the name of border security and stable economies. In 
this whole process, technology is perceived as a neutral apparatus as if utilized 
without the involvement of a human agent; despite that same technology – the 
mass media, for example – being drafted to frame and evaluate violence and 
to directly influence our perception of the Other. The nature of invisible 
violence is highlighted in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, where freedom is 
contingent on muting thoughts and ideas that challenge the oppressive 
political structures.11 This muting, according to Orwell, is undertaken 
voluntarily. That such a choice can be made willingly indicates that freedom 
comes at a price; individual thoughts and desires are possible only if consistent 
with the overarching structures. Correspondingly, to aspire to national security 
and freedom requires partnering with the dominant global powers, such as 
NATO, despite its despotic impositions. 
  
The current global culture of security protectionism and borders enforced 
in the present-continuous is bound to shift and change; all systems and 
networks come to an end or are re-calibrated. Whether the end is imminent or 
distant will depend on how balkanization is implemented: as a system of 
parcelization for purposes of creating homogeneous enclaves and enforcing 
power structures or to bring together different entities for purposes of 
heterogeneity and socio-economic solidarity (as was seen in Yugoslavia). If in 
pursuit of homogeneity, this would lead to economic debt and of degradation 
of the Other in the name of ‘normality’; it is a position of freedom from 
difference. This type of freedom has been administered since the formation of 
ethnically homogeneous nation states. In the alternative scenario, it could lead 
to destructuring the current systems and the potential for a new culture of 
freedom of difference. 
Other spaces, other times 
The fortification of camp Europe and Anglo-America begs the question of 
how to transform thinking and policies in response to the current migrant and 
refugee crisis. In other words, how do we engage with the question of security, 
but not at the price of vilifying the Other through association with a threat and 
an economic burden or of making security contingent on immobilizing any 
thought beyond those deemed worthy by MIME? 
Considering that the European border against refugees and the displaced is 
drawn along the Mediterranean coastline and the edge of the Western Balkans, 
the pressing question is how Balkanism, and balkanization as it was 
implemented during the 20th Century Yugoslavia, may be used to re-think 
borders and ownership. The outside does exist, though not from the 
perspective of an absolute and all-knowing understanding. To stand outside is 
simply to ask different kinds of questions and derive different kinds of 
answers. In other words, to formulate questions in a more open way so that 
the responses generate something that previously did not exist. These 
questions and answers must go beyond the balkanization associated with the 
Enlightenment: from the formation of ethnically homogeneous nation states 
to scientific classification, to the separation of people on the basis of whether 
they share ‘civil’ values, to identifying those who are delinquents and 
therefore require vilification and punishment. To step outside is to perceive 
beyond the construct of fear of an Other which undermines social, economic 
and political liberties. Moreover, to remove fear is to remove the 
preconceptions of Other as the violator, including the preconception that 
NATO’s interventions, such as the 1999 Operation Allied Force, are 
permissible for purposes of protecting the values of the Euro-Atlantic 
community.12 The violence enacted is legitimized by the perceived attainment 
of civil values. Hence, the question is how to open up our thinking and pose 
critical questions in a society of image and information simulation; when 
  
freedom is better understood if posed in terms of how to keep control at a 
tolerable level. 
Thinking alternatives need to be reproblematized because certain aspects 
also need to be clarified in terms of what is to be seen as an alternative. Often 
what is presented as an alternative is nothing more than a type of disciplinary 
practice disguised through the invocation of topical catch-phrases and ready-
made solutions enacted and invoked in the name of terrorism. Yet terrorism 
accommodates racism and militarism; it makes racism and militarism 
permissible, as it is invoked for purposes of security, defense and protection. 
To place terrorism, racism and militarism side by side does not mean that they 
are the same but that there is an implicit relationship between them, the 
common denominator being exploitation of the Other and an opposition to 
inclusive heterogeneity. 
The alternative needs instead to have a new rationale concerning security, 
an innovative economic and social logic and a different organization of time 
in terms of work and leisure. To do so, there is a need to think alternatives in 
a way that is removed from the current rhetoric imposed by MIME. The 
alternative also needs to bracket out the rhetoric of fear and danger; emotions 
that bookend every story and all the news footage of threat and the need for 
border security. Neither is the alternative an idealized utopia, an unattainable 
space that exists only in theory and as an abstraction and will never be 
attainable in practice. Instead, it is about thinking and implementing ways that 
facilitate opportunities for even access to resources and spaces for all. This is 
not to say that we are all equal, since we are all different, but that equality 
should be measured in terms of equity and affordance of accessibility. Hence, 
if we have a sense of responsibility to the medium- and long-term future, then 
the fears that have been imposed need to be eliminated. For historiography to 
be activated, it needs to start operating in a way that allows the human to 
remain undefined, open and certainly not to follow the herd of cult figures, 
particularly in the discourse of politics and international human rights, since 
the human – according to Judith Butler – tends to be “defined in advance, in 
terms that are distinctively western, very often American, and, therefore, 
partial and parochial.”13 
One of the lessons from the Yugoslav socialist model – at least in terms of 
economics – is that any new culture hoping to establish an alternative model 
to the market economy cannot be created in dependence on that very system. 
This was clearly demonstrated during the remaking of Yugoslavia post-WWII; 
its success – its eventual failure – was founded on foreign financial aid as well 
as quick returns and high interest rates. In other words, for a more socio-
economically and politically aware culture to arise, debt in the way it is 
applied today needs to be abolished or at the very least re-valuated. 
Another lesson from Titoism, highlighted in its participatory role in the 
Non-Aligned Movement, is that the alternative still needs to work with the 
existing structure. The alternative political system still maintained dialogue 
  
with the USSR and the West (though in varying degrees during its existence), 
whilst forging an alternative third path of non-alignment. The catch-22, and 
one that certainly brought the alternative path to a halt due to various 
economic loans including later international involvement to do with the 
dissolution of the SFRY, is the possibility of working with existing systems 
without being swallowed by them. This is not to say that the period of the 
SFRY should be perceived as the golden model or the only tool kit of lessons 
since the events from the past are certainly different from those of the 
indeterminate future. It is more that thinking balkanization as deployed in 
Yugoslavia is to consider more open models and emergent policies to do with 
borders whereby territories are to be defined in terms of constituent nations 
and ethnic minorities for purposes of inclusivity and equitable access to 
systems and resources. 
From an urban perspective and by using the case study of New Belgrade – 
whose urban planning is not only physically incomplete to this day, but also 
where the variety and multiplicity of urban plans produced up until the 1950s 
for New Belgrade’s large-scale construction reveal that notions of a particular 
ideal were not set – may proffer the opportunity to suggest that being 
democratic is possible only if democracy is understood as being a project in 
process. If it is a process, then democracy implicitly evolves, treating neither 
history nor memory as eternal but as fragments from which arise both decay 
and birth. Effectively, a country or indeed any process of participation and 
decision-making cannot be called democratic if its values and history are not 
open for contestation; the ascription of democracy – rather than democracy-
in-process – signifies that elements of totalitarianism are present. Thinking 
crisis is thinking collaboration via multiplicity, and where alternatives 
certainly need to differ from current practices that invoke dehumanization in 
the name of rights, where violence is enacted in the name of security, and 
where people are denied access in the name of space and lack of historical 
belonging. 
Addressing alternatives on a global level through the type of balkanization 
implemented in Yugoslavia is to stand outside this history; where being human 
is refusing this kind of humanity. And, most important, to think crisis is not to 
think emergency or the need to make rapid and often hasty decisions. Instead, 
thinking crisis is an opportunity to alter the way in which decisions have been 
made thus far. Bauman rightly points to the etymological relation of crisis to 
the term “criterion” which is implicated in making a decision rather than the 
identification of a “catastrophe” or “disaster” in which the term is situated 
today.14 This decision needs to propose an alternative to the current political 
landscape of balkanization – exemplified by Brexit – where distinct territories 
are reformed for purposes of accommodating only singular values. Neither is 
it about forming unions or organizations – such as the EU or NATO – where 
participation and membership accedes to imposed regulations. Instead, by 
using Balkanism as a descriptive and evaluative term to do with liminality, 
  
flux and frictional multiplicity in which all Western values and conventions 
are placed into question, spatializing balkanization is more about thinking 
programs and policies where participation is rhizomatic; where values and 
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